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 CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Cognitive psychology is a beautiful, never-ending enterprise. To lose 
yourself in the details of the mind, in phenomena that last only a few 
milliseconds and then dissolve into the great melting pot of consciousness 
without leaving a trace, it’s like trying to guess the number and function of 
the cogs of a tiny machine encased in a steel box that has been welded shut, 
just by shaking it. There’s a warning sticker on the outside of the mind: 
Warranty void if opened. No user-serviceable parts inside.  
Yes, this is the life! This is the real deal; it’s like getting a chemistry 
set for Christmas, but someone forgot to include the instructions. 
- Paul Verhaeghen, ‘Omega Minor’, pp. 41. 
 
  
16     CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Psychology’s main theoretical paradigm has always built on and/or 
struggled with the dichotomy of, on the one hand, controlled and voluntary 
higher cognitive processes, and, on the other hand, automatic and stimulus-
driven processes. In his seminal work, William James (1890) already 
speculated how attention could be voluntary and active, or rather reflexive 
and passive. Not long after James, Watson’s behaviourism denied the use of 
higher cognitive constructs and aimed to explain behaviour in observable, 
purely biological terms captured by stimulus-response associations. 
However, from the second half of the twentieth century, a cognitive 
revolution in psychology shifted back the pendulum and embraced the study 
of higher cognitive functioning again. Influential theories were introduced 
about a broad range of mental processes, such as selective attention 
(Broadbent, 1958), working memory (Baddeley, 1986), and reasoning 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983), which were indirectly put to the test by ingenious 
reaction time experiments (Sternberg, 1969) and further understood through 
connectionist modelling (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). 
Finally, with the steep and remarkable upsurge of neuroscientific methods in 
psychology, cognitive neuroscience introduced a renewed interest in the 
biological basis of behaviour, relating behaviour to neural activity and brain 
functioning. Nowadays, there is a growing consensus that the traditional 
analysis of cognition can be substantially boosted by knowing how cognition 
is implemented in the brain. Moreover, neural markers of both stimulus-
driven processes and higher-order voluntary processes have been found, 
thereby weakening a strict dichotomy. This leaves a field that is 
characterized by a blend of cognitive, descriptive frameworks and neural 
network implementations that are inspiring and constraining each other at 
the theoretical level. 
Analogous to this brief historical overview, the study of cognitive 
control has witnessed similar shifts in focus on the relative role of higher 
mental processes in explaining behaviour. Cognitive control, a young 
domain of study in psychology, is an umbrella term that refers to the flexible 
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and adaptive regulation of behaviour in line with our intentions, goals or 
plans in the face of conflict. It encompasses, among other things, selective 
attention, inhibition, working memory and task switching. These higher 
mental processes were originally captured in purely descriptive theories 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Norman & Shallice, 1980), and tested in 
experiments that stressed the voluntary and strategic nature of the control 
processes involved (e.g., Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan, Zbrodoff, & 
Williamson, 1984; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). Yet, research on 
cognitive control saw an enormous boost with the formulation of the conflict 
monitoring theory (CMT; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), 
that offered an intriguing view of how the cognitive system ‘knows’ when to 
increase control and how this is implemented in the brain. Briefly, CMT 
posits that the detection of cognitive conflict, conceptualized as 
simultaneously active and incompatible response tendencies, triggers a 
stronger focus on task-relevant information. This ‘reactive’ control 
regulation is superficially similar to how behaviourists described ‘reflexive’ 
behaviours in reaction to stimulation. A wealth of studies has further 
pinpointed the exact neural underpinnings of this conflict control loop. Later 
theorizing also extended the model with associative, stimulus-response 
learning algorithms (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). As associative 
learning generally has the connotation of being automatic, fast and effortless, 
the adaptation-by-binding model exemplifies the shift in the view of control 
as being voluntary, relatively slow and effortful. The oxymoronic term 
‘automatic control’ was first coined by Jacoby, Lindsay, Hessels, 2003, and 
has since then been increasingly influential in theorizing on cognitive control 
(see Bugg and Crump, 2012, for a review).  
Only recently, research on cognitive control was again further 
expanded by the investigation of how expectancies also modulate behaviour 
in pursuing our actions or goals in a ‘proactive’ fashion (Braver, 2012; 
Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007), referring back to the strategic and voluntary 
control of attention (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Gratton et al., 1992). 
Intriguingly, whereas the idea of ‘expectancy’ as a distinct construct and 
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cause of behaviour was seen by behaviourists as a prime example of 
redundant theorizing of higher mental processes in cognitive psychology 
(Umbach et al., 2012), it has lately witnessed a growing interest in many 
fields of psychology. Predictive representations of visual information have 
been shown to guide and prepare the brain for upcoming stimulation (Bar, 
2007), and recent modelling work (Alexander & Brown, 2011; Silvetti, 
Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011) has stressed the role of learning on the basis of 
prediction-driven outcomes in optimizing behaviour, contingent on the 
discovery of the neural mechanisms behind prediction errors (Schultz, 1998; 
see den Ouden, Kok, & de Lange, 2012, for a review). Contrary to reactive 
adjustments in cognitive control, as captured by the CMT, the extent to 
which proactive, expectancy-based control adjustments regulate behaviour is 
far less understood. 
The present dissertation aimed to further contribute to the expanding 
research on cognitive control, by playing out reactive, conflict-driven and 
proactive, expectancy-driven control adjustments against each other. Before 
going deeper into the aims and specific research questions of the thesis, this 
chapter first sets the stage by introducing cognitive control and the 
paradigms that have been applied to study it. Next, the congruency sequence 
effect, a hallmark in the study of cognitive control that also plays a central 
role in many of the empirical chapters, is shortly reviewed. Finally, the 
distinction between and specific evidence in favour of reactive and proactive 
control is discussed more extensively. 
COGNITIVE CONTROL 
In today’s overly busy society, we are continuously bombarded by 
temptations that we need to resist. Social network and entertainment sites 
beg for our attention during working hours, and our preferred but unhealthy 
snacks and drinks are readily available around every corner. This requires us 
more than ever to orchestrate and direct behaviour and attention according to 
internal goals or external task demands – so-called cognitive control. In their 
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pioneering work on cognitive control, Norman and Shallice (1980) identified 
and grouped situations that typically trigger the call for such cognitive 
control processes. Among other things, they highlighted situations that 
require us to overcome habitual, prepotent responses, situations where new 
responses have to be learned that are not well-rehearsed, or situations in 
which errors are likely to occur or have to be corrected. Classic examples 
refer to resisting that tasty snack after deciding to stick to a diet, or 
overcoming rush hour traffic during a first driving class. Regulating 
behaviour as such clearly suggests an intentional and effortful control 
process, yet recent evidence has shown that control processes can equally 
well be implemented unintentionally or unconsciously (Sumner et al., 2007; 
Kunde, Reuss, & Kiesel, 2012), implying that they are an emergent property 
of the cognitive system striving for optimal performance (Ridderinkhof, 
Forstmann, Wylie, Burle, & van den Wildenberg, 2010). Regardless of the 
underlying intentionality, cognitive control thus entails inhibiting prepotent 
responses and/or focussing attention on task-relevant information in order to 
comply with task demands or intentions. 
The usefulness of such functions may be most dramatically witnessed 
in cases that they are disturbed by neurological damage. Neuroscientific 
findings have consistently linked instances of executive control to the 
workings of the prefrontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 2001). In so-called 
frontal lobe patients suffering from severe prefrontal cortex damage, loss of 
these functions led to difficulties with planning, inhibiting overlearned 
responses and executing tasks in a goal-directed manner (Damasio, 1994; 
Shallice & Burgess, 1991). As a particularly striking example, Lhermitte 
(1983) described frontal lobe patients who could no longer resist the urge to 
act upon objects or cues within their visual field, even when these actions 
were contextually inappropriate – so-called utilization behaviour. The mere 
sight of a toothbrush, for example, would make these patients immediately 
grab the toothbrush and start using it, apparently in the absence of the 
intention to do so. This shows that stimuli can evoke the tendency to perform 
the actions that were habitually associated to them. In order not to succumb 
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to these automatic response tendencies, executive control is necessary. Even 
though these patient studies have been insightful in uncovering the role of 
the prefrontal cortex in cognition, the bulk of the research has focused on 
gaining better insights into the umbrella term that is cognitive control, by 
studying selective attention, response inhibition and task switching, as well 
as their neural correlates, in controlled experiments on healthy volunteers.  
PARADIGMS OF COGNITIVE CONTROL 
In order to measure how people are able to resist temptations or to 
overcome strong or habitual responses in favour of a more controlled 
response, experimental psychologists have created laboratory tasks that aim 
to mimic such conflicting situations. So-called stimulus-response 
compatibility or congruency tasks manipulate the dimensional overlap (e.g., 
Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) between the task-relevant stimulus 
dimension, the task-irrelevant stimulus dimension and the response 
dimension as to evoke ‘conflict’ – simultaneously active, incompatible 
neural representations (see Egner, 2008, for a schematic overview). As a 
prime example, the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991, for a 
review) requires participants to simply respond to the colour in which a 
stimulus is presented. However, by presenting colour words as stimuli and 
manipulating the compatibility between the task-relevant (colour) and task-
irrelevant (word) dimension, congruent (the word ‘BLUE’ printed in blue) 
and incongruent (the word ‘BLUE’ printed in yellow) stimuli are created. 
Since word reading is an overlearned, prepotent response, incongruent trials 
evoke conflict, and cognitive control is needed to comply with task 
instructions and respond to the relevant colour dimension. In a similar vein, 
the flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) instructs participants to respond 
to the central target that is either flanked by compatible (> > >) or 
incompatible (> < >) flankers. In both congruency tasks, the difference in 
reaction times (RTs) and performance errors (PEs) is taken as a measure of 
response conflict - the congruency effect. Variations in the size of the 
congruency effect are assumed to reflect fluctuating cognitive control. This 
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approach to studying cognitive control was central to the majority of the 
chapters included in this dissertation. 
Whereas congruency tasks measure selective attention and control 
over prepotent responses, task switching paradigms have been applied to 
elucidate how people flexibly shift between cognitive tasks. In such task 
switching experiments, participants must overcome their tendency to keep 
repeating the same task and flexibly switch between two or more tasks (see 
Kiesel et al., 2010, for a review). Especially when several tasks are to be 
performed on the same class of targets, cognitive control is needed to 
activate and maintain the appropriate task-set, or inhibit a previously 
appropriate one, as to keep performance in line with instructions. Therefore, 
the difference in RTs and PEs between trials in which participants switched 
to the other task and trials in which participants repeated the same task – the 
ubiquitous switch cost – is taken as a measure of task switching 
performance. Even when task switch trials are predictable (the alternating 
runs paradigm; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), cued in advance (Meiran, 1996) or 
voluntarily chosen (Arrington & Logan, 2004), a residual switch cost 
remains. Still, variations in the size of the switch cost are also assumed to 
reflect variations in cognitive control. This approach was followed in 
Chapter 4.  
CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECTS 
As has been indicated above, fluctuations in the size of the 
congruency effect in conflict tasks are assumed to provide a direct window 
onto attentional adjustments in cognitive control. The congruency sequence 
effect (CSE; also termed conflict adaptation or Gratton effect) refers to the 
observation that the congruency effect is typically smaller after an 
incongruent than after a congruent trial (see Egner, 2007, for a review). 
These sequential adjustments have inspired much empirical and theoretical 
work – and they also lie at the core of most of the chapters in this 
dissertation. The CSE is a prime observation underlying the Conflict 
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Monitoring Theory (CMT) of Botvinick and colleagues (2001), which 
substantially boosted and dominated the research on cognitive control over 
the last decade. In this framework, CSEs are thought to reflect conflict-
triggered enhanced attention to task-relevant information in order to 
maintain goal-directed behaviour – so-called conflict adaptation (Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004). In short, CMT assumes that the processing stream is 
continuously monitored for the occurrence of conflict, conceptualized as 
simultaneously active incompatible neural representations (Botvinick et al., 
2001). Contingent upon the detection of conflict by the monitoring system, 
supposedly residing in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Jones, Cho, 
Nystrom, Cohen, & Braver, 2002), control is up-regulated. This upregulation 
is thought to be implemented by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Egner & 
Hirsch, 2005a; Kerns et al., 2004), presumably through cortical amplification 
of task-relevant information (Egner & Hirsch, 2005b).  
According to the conflict monitoring account, the CSE reflects the 
detection of conflict on the previous incongruent trial and subsequently 
triggered enhanced attentional task-relevant focus, leading to reduced 
congruency effects on the next trial. However, alternative explanations have 
been postulated in which CSEs have nothing to do with cognitive control, 
but rather derive from simple event-based learning. One such alternative 
builds from the notion of feature binding (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; 
Mayr, Awy, & Laurey, 2003), proposing that CSEs relate to the costs of 
partial feature repetitions. This debate has spawned a series of studies that 
aimed to disentangle influences from feature integration and conflict 
adaptation, leading to the conclusion that it seems unlikely that all of the 
CSE is due to such feature binding (Akçay & Hazeltine, 2001; Kerns et al., 
2004; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006; Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2007; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). 
A second major debate – to which several of the chapters in this 
dissertation are dedicated – can be identified within the perspective that 
CSEs reflect attentional modulation rather than side-effects of more basic 
episodic memory processes. When the CSEs were first reported by Gratton, 
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Coles and Donchin (1992), the authors interpreted these as reflecting 
strategic attentional adjustments based on participants’ expectancy regarding 
the nature of the upcoming trial – irrespective of conflict. Importantly, and 
somewhat counterintuitively, these authors further assumed that participants 
do not match these expectancies to the objective probabilities of the stimuli’s 
occurrences, but are biased towards expecting repeated stimulus conditions 
from the previous to the next trial. Even though evidence for this repetition 
expectancy account is rather limited (Gratton et al., 1992), it poses the 
interesting theoretical possibility that attentional adjustments can also be 
triggered proactively – based on participants’ expectancies, rather than (or 
complementing) those adjustments that are triggered in a reactive fashion – 
by conflict on the previous or recent trials. In the following section, this 
distinction is further discussed, and the evidence in favour of both is 
summarized. Next to the chapters on conflict and congruency tasks, Chapter 
4 considered the effect of expectancy-based preparation on the task switch 
cost. Therefore, the overview of reactive and proactive control is extended to 
the task switching domain. 
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BOX 1 – EXPERIMENTAL TASKS 
In this dissertation, three tasks have been employed. First and 
foremost, we adopted the classic colour-word Stroop conflict task 
(Stroop, 1935). In this task, responding to the task-relevant colour of the 
colour word is either facilitated or hindered by the meaning of the task-
irrelevant colour word meaning, creating congruent (C) and incongruent 
(I) trials, respectively. Given that overlap in stimulus features from one 
trial to the next is known to affect performance (Hommel et al., 2004), we 
designed an eight-colour Stroop task, in which features never repeated 
across three consecutive trials. The sequence below depicts a C-C-I-I-C 
transition. 
 
In Chapter 6, we applied a gender face-word Stroop conflict task 
(Egner et al., 2008). In this task, responding to the task-relevant gender of 
the face is either facilitated or hindered by the congruent or incongruent 
gender label superimposed on the face. Rather than precluding certain 
trial types, we kept associative effects and feature overlap constant across 
trial types. The sequence below depicts a C-C-I-I-C transition.  
 
In Chapter 4, we applied a magnitude/parity task switching 
paradigm. In the parity task, the target number is judged to be either even 
or odd, whereas in the magnitude task, the target number is judged to be 
either smaller or larger than five. The colour of the target indicated 
whether a magnitude (yellow) or parity (blue) judgement was required. 
All targets were equally often presented in both target colours. The 
sequence below depicts an M-M-P-P-M transition. 
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 REACTIVE VERSUS PROACTIVE COGNITIVE CONTROL 
With considerable practice, most of human behaviour flows 
effortlessly and flawlessly, seemingly without much of intentional control. 
Luckily, a football player does not have to carefully plan his movements 
each and every time he is heading full speed towards the goal. In a similar 
vein, biking home after work goes without much thinking about how to get 
there. That is, until a distracted pedestrian suddenly pops up in front of our 
bike, and we are just in time to pull the brakes. For the rest of the trip, we 
will keep a closer eye on the road than usual, so as to prevent similar 
situations. These kinds of reactive control adjustments commonly come into 
play fast when needed, implying a monitor that readjusts behaviour 
whenever necessary. Indeed, when the traffic light turns red, we usually slow 
down well in time. Yet, we are equally able to anticipate the light turning 
green again, and prepare to pull up faster than the other cars around us. In a 
similar vein, professional cyclists set out to explore the track in advance, in 
order to foresee potential pitfalls and strive for an optimal performance. This 
shows that we can also steer and control our attention and actions in 
anticipation of a future event. In other words, proactive control adjustments 
can also be called upon to optimize our behaviour to our current goals, plans 
or desires. 
SELECTIVE ATTENTION 
In the slipstream of the influential conflict monitoring theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001) described above, research on cognitive control has 
focused predominantly on adaptive adjustments in selective attention that are 
triggered reactively in a response to conflict. Indeed, this has been the major 
framework in which not only subsequent behavioural work (see Egner, 2007, 
for a review), but also most of the fMRI (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2004; Egner 
& Hirsch, 2005a; 2005b; Kerns et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof et al., 2010), and 
EEG studies (e.g., Larson, Clayson, & Baldwin, 2012; Larson, Kaufman, & 
Perlstein 2009; Donohue, Liotti, Perez III, & Woldorff, 2012; Stürmer, 
Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer., 2002) have been framed. 
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Neuroimaging studies have, for example, evidenced how increased ACC 
activity on incongruent trials correlated with subsequent activity in the 
DLPFC (Kerns et al., 2004) and the concomitant reduction of the 
experienced conflict on the next trial. The better temporal resolution of EEG 
has, for example, allowed researchers to show how increased response 
capture (premotoric activity for the incorrect response) by the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension is reduced by previous conflict (Stürmer et al., 2002).  
Part of the appeal of the CMT lies in its elegant solution for the 
elusive homunculus problem: by making performance adjustments 
contingent on a quantifiable and neurologically plausible measure of 
conflict, CMT precluded the necessity of an unspecified intelligent agent 
(i.e., a ‘little man’ or homunculus) that knows when control adjustments are 
necessary. Extending on this framework, the adaptation-by-binding account 
by Verguts & Notebaert (2009) suggested an associative learning model that 
not only knows when but also where control needs to be upregulated. More 
specifically, conflict in the model leads to a strengthening of all currently 
active representations. Given that these active representations are typically 
task-relevant, conflict detection on the previous trial will thus strengthen 
task-relevant associations, reflected in a reduced congruency effect on the 
next trial (i.e., a CSE). To further its biological basis, the model assigns a 
critical role to noradenalin (NA) as the neuromodulatory force driving the 
adaptation, even though evidence for NA being the crucial neurotransmitter 
is rather scarce (see, e.g., van Bochhove, Vanderhaegen, Notebaert, & 
Verguts, 2012; Duthoo et al., submitted, for evidence in favour of dopamine 
as a crucial neurotransmitter in bringing about the CSE). Finally, the model 
has also been proven useful in explaining instances of cognitive control in 
the task switching domain, providing a convincing account for the finding of 
an enhanced switch cost following incongruent trials (Braem, Roggeman, 
Verguts, & Notebaert, 2012), and, more general, the idea that part of the 
switch cost can be related to task-set inertia due to previous stimulus-task set 
bindings (Waszak, Hommel, & Allport, 2003). 
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However, there is also some evidence that attentional adjustments can 
be triggered in a proactive fashion, based on people’s expectancies or 
anticipation of future events. Early support for or a role of subjective 
expectancy in cognitive control was gathered by manipulating expectancies 
implicitly, for instance by varying the probability of incongruent versus 
congruent trials (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 1982; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 
1992). These adjustments to frequent conflict, reflected in a reduced 
congruency effect for mostly incongruent blocks, were interpreted in terms 
of deliberate adjustments in response strategy based on probabilistic 
expectancies exploited by participants. Importantly, such strategic 
adaptations to frequent conflicting events (or the absence thereof) are only 
observed when the irrelevant dimension that elicited the conflict is 
consciously perceived (Merikle & Joordens, 1997; Merikle, Joorden, & 
Stolz, 1995). This corroborates the voluntary aspect of such proactive 
adjustments. However, the debate on the exact mechanism underlying 
proportion congruency effects is still ongoing, but a thorough discussion of 
this issue falls beyond the scope of this introduction (see Abrahamse, 
Duthoo, Notebaert, & Risko, 2013; Bugg & Crump, 2012, and Schmidt, 
2013, for recent overviews).  
More commonly, expectancy-based anticipatory control has been 
probed more explicitly, by means of informative cues alerting the 
participants which control setting is most appropriate for the upcoming 
target (Aarts, Roelofs, & van Turennout, 2008; Aarts & Roelofs, 2011; 
Correa, Rao, & Nobre, 2009; Gratton et al., 1992; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1982; 
Strack, Kaufmann, Kehrer, Brandt, & Stürmer, 2013). Importantly, these 
studies have generally suggested that these cues elicited control adjustments 
independent of response conflict. Whereas CMT posits that control is low 
following congruent trials, leading to slow reactions on the next incongruent 
trial, proactive control accounts postulate that congruent-predicting cues can 
also evoke control adjustments, leading to faster reactions on the next 
congruent trial (e.g., by allowing the irrelevant word dimension to contribute 
more strongly to response selection). 
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Moreover, a proactive account argues that participants can also 
strategically exploit the relation between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
dimension in anticipation of an incongruent trial. When only two stimuli are 
used in a Stroop task, such strategic shortcuts can lead participants to 
respond to incongruent trials by choosing the response associated with the 
colour opposite of that indicated by the presented word (see also Wühr & 
Kunde, 2008, for evidence of strategic attention shifting in a Simon conflict 
task). In a context of a high proportion of incongruent trials, such strategic 
shortcuts may give rise to a reversed congruency effect (Logan & Zbrodoff, 
1982), with shorter reactions to incongruent compared to congruent trials. 
Such findings are hard to reconcile with a conflict-driven account, where 
performance on incongruent colours can, at best, be equal to that on 
congruent trials. The debate is still open to what extent preparatory control is 
restricted to such attention switch strategy, or can as well exert its influence 
by gradually amplifying or suppressing the relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
dimensions – so-called attentional gating. Whereas this has been confirmed 
in a visual search paradigm (Müller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003), 
Wühr and Kunde (2008) found only evidence for strategic attention 
switching, but not gating, in a variant of the Simon conflict task.  
TASK SWITCHING 
In the task switching domain, the robust finding of a switch cost (the 
difference in reaction time between task repetitions and task shifts) suggests 
that conflict or interference from previous task-sets has to be resolved for 
successful switching, emphasizing the need for cognitive control. When 
participants are provided with an advance instruction cue and ample 
preparation time, task switch costs are strongly reduced. This finding was 
taken to suggest that participants can prepare for an upcoming task, and thus 
can engage in cognitive control proactively (De Jong, 2000; Lien, Ruthruff, 
Remington, & Johnston, 2005; Meiran & Chorev, 2005; Rogers & Monsell, 
1995). Indeed, more than in congruency tasks, task switching studies have 
focused on this anticipatory control component, sometimes referred to as 
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task-set reconfiguration (De Jong, 2000; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000), 
which enables proactive switching to the other task in response of a cue 
(Monsell, 2003). This task-set reconfiguration can entail both inhibiting the 
previous task-set and activating the new task-set. There is not only evidence 
for preparatory reductions in switch costs (e.g., Koch, 2003); advance 
preparation can also lead to reaction time benefits on task repetitions 
(Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002). 
Notwithstanding the emphasis on this anticipatory control component, 
also reactive influences of the previous trial (e.g., task-set inertia; Allport, 
Styles, & Hsieh, 1994) or stimulus-driven, bottom-up associative effects 
(e.g., binding between stimuli and task-sets, Waszak et al., 2003) have been 
considered. In this light, it has been discussed whether the difference in RT 
between task repetitions and switches effectively represents the cost of 
reconfiguring the cognitive system in order to switch tasks, or rather the 
benefit of repeatedly executing the same task. Whereas the first view stresses 
an endogenous, proactive control component, the second view considers the 
slowing on task switches as a more automatic, exogenous carry-over effect 
from the previous task (Allport et al., 1994). Moreover, the issue has been 
raised that part of the cueing effects in task switching may be due to cue-
encoding benefits rather than advance preparation (Logan & Bundesen, 
2003; but see Brass & von Cramon, 2004; De Baene & Brass, 2011; Jost, De 
Baene, Koch, & Brass, 2013; Monsell & Mizon, 2006).  
Apart from these considerations, the robust finding of a residual 
switch cost with ample preparation time has led to the suggestion that even if 
advance preparation is a viable explanation for task switch costs, it appears 
to be restricted in nature. Here too, unresolved reactive interference from the 
previous task-set or interference from previous stimulus-task bindings has 
been proposed to explain the residual switch cost (Allport et al., 1994; 
Waszak et al., 2003). This was countered by the proposal that complete 
preparation is possible, yet that this effortful preparation sometimes occurs 
before stimulus onset, and sometimes also after stimulus onset. In other 
words, the residual switch cost reflects sporadic failures to engage (De Jong, 
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2000). According to De Jong, participants try to find an optimal balance of 
advance preparation that allows for sufficient task performance, since task-
set reconfiguration is an effortful process. Further support that complete 
advance preparation is possible was given by Verbruggen, Liefooghe, 
Vandierendonck, & Demanet (2007), who showed that removing the cue 
during the preparation interval encouraged participants to fully prepare in 
advance, thereby successfully eliminating the residual task switch cost. 
Dreisbach & Haider (2006) further showed that preparatory control 
processes can be dynamically adjusted to the expected task demands, by 
using either local probabilistic cues or global probability information about 
the chances of a task switch. In sum, task switching studies suggest that 
anticipatory control can effectively configure the cognitive system for future 
events.  
THE ROLE OF EXPECTANCIES 
As can be derived from the studies reviewed above, most of the 
evidence in favour of proactive control stems from explicit cueing studies, 
which suggest that people are able to prepare for an upcoming target, 
conflict or task switch. In the absence of such explicit cues, theoretical 
alternatives have been suggested that do not rely on anticipatory, 
expectancy-driven control adjustments to ensure adaptive, goal-directed 
behaviour. To what extent proactive control adjustments are called upon 
when there are no cues to predict the forthcoming events, remains to be 
explored in more depth. This question was central to all of the empirical 
chapters enclosed in this thesis.  
In the present dissertation, ‘proactive control’ was thus assessed by 
manipulating participants’ expectancies about upcoming stimulus events and 
investigating the effects of these manipulations on well-known markers of 
cognitive control, including the congruency sequence effect and the task-
switch cost. Apart from being manipulated implicitly in some of the 
chapters, expectancies were also measured explicitly in the majority of the 
chapters. This further allowed looking for patterns or biases in expectancies 
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that can otherwise only be inferred indirectly. Applied to congruency tasks, 
expectancy-induced control adjustments were contrasted with conflict-
induced adjustments. Applied to task switching, the effect of explicit 
expectancies on task performance was compared to previous studies with the 
explicit cueing paradigm.  
In sum, proactive and reactive control were contrasted by probing the 
role of expectancies. How this approach differs from other theoretical 
distinctions between reactive and proactive control will be touched upon in 
the General Discussion.  
RESEARCH GOALS AND OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
The aim of the present thesis was to further investigate the relative 
contributions of proactive and reactive control in aligning our behaviour 
with external goals or task demands. An important step in this pursuit was to 
pinpoint the role of expectancies in cognitive control. To this end, 
expectancies were both manipulated implicitly and measured explicitly, as to 
evaluate their impact on well-known markers of cognitive control. More 
specifically, the extent to which expectancy-guided attentional adjustments 
contribute to congruency sequence effects and task switch costs was put to 
the test. Expectancies themselves were also considered as an extra measure 
of cognitive control, and contextual influences on expectancies about future 
events were taken into account. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 investigated potential 
biases in participants’ predictions, and the impact of this on performance. 
Apart from knowing what future event is likely to happen, expectancies 
about when these events are likely to happen might also be crucial to evoke 
anticipatory control. Chapter 6 was dedicated to the role of temporal 
predictability and motivational influences on proactive control adjustments. 
Finally, this dissertation also aimed to further our understanding of some of 
the underlying neural mechanisms involved in proactive and reactive 
control, by applying the event-related potential technique (Chapter 5). Apart 
from this Introduction (Chapter 1) and a General Discussion (Chapter 7), 
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there are five empirical chapters bundled in this dissertation. Each of these 
chapters was written as an individual paper. In the following, these empirical 
studies are briefly outlined.   
In Chapter 2, two behavioural experiments are reported that aimed to 
critically contrast three different explanations for the congruency sequence 
effect (CSE). In order to control for confounding effects of feature 
integration and associative learning, we construed a vocal Stroop task with 
eight different colours, so that no stimulus feature was repeated over 
consecutive trials. As to adjudicate between an interpretation of the CSE in 
terms of conflict monitoring and one in terms of repetition expectancy, 
participants’ expectancies for the congruency level to repeat or alternate 
across consecutive trials were implicitly manipulated. To this end, the 
probability for congruency level repetitions was either raised or decreased, 
and the influence of this manipulation was probed in a test block, for which 
the probability of a congruency level repetition was reset to 50%. If 
repetition expectancy crucially drives sequential effects, a transfer of the 
induced expectancies to performance in the test blocks was predicted.  
In Chapter 3, the role of expectancies in cognitive control was put to 
the test more directly. Participants were asked to explicitly indicate their 
prediction for the congruency level of the upcoming trial. This allowed a 
more direct test of the assumption made by Gratton et al. (1992) that 
participants in a conflict task display the counterintuitive tendency to expect 
repeating stimulus conditions. Whereas a proactive account predicts a 
repetition bias and an influence of these expectancies on subsequent Stroop 
performance, a reactive account does not. To further probe the influence of 
episodic memory effects and feature integration, we investigated the effect 
of predictions on performance in a 2-colour and 4-colour Stroop task, as well 
as in the 8-colour Stroop task employed in the previous chapter.  
In parallel to the experiments of Chapter 3, an identical procedure was 
applied on a task-switch paradigm combining magnitude and parity 
judgments in Chapter 4. Here too, participants’ expectancies about the 
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upcoming task were explicitly measured. Irrespective of participants’ task 
predictions, the colour of the target indicated which task participants were 
supposed to perform. The switch rate was varied in three between-subjects 
conditions (30, 50, & 70%). The aim of the study was to relate the finding of 
decreased switch costs with increasing switch rate (Mayr, 2006; Monsell & 
Mizon, 2006) to variations in participants’ expectancy for a task alternation. 
It was hypothesized that following a task alternation prediction, the cost of 
task switch would be reduced (or the benefit for task repetitions reduced). 
This would lend further credit to the role of expectancy in the context-
sensitive adjusting of task switching performance.  
In Chapter 5, the effect of explicit congruency level predictions on 
Stroop conflict resolution was further investigated using EEG. The interplay 
between proactive and reactive effects on Stroop task performance was 
verified by looking for prediction-driven differences in advance preparation 
during the pre-stimulus interval (reflected in the contingent negative 
variation (CNV) component) as well as by disentangling the impact of 
predictions and previous conflict on markers of cognitive control in the 
Stroop task (e.g., the N450 and conflict slow potential). 
Next, Chapter 6 tested the hypothesis that proactive cognitive control 
not only benefits from knowing what to expect (as in the previous chapters), 
but will also be more optimally recruited when one knows when the event is 
likely to occur. In a recent study, Egner, Ely, & Grinband (2010) varied the 
response-to-stimulus (RSI) interval to show that congruency effects decline 
over time, which was interpreted as evidence for rapidly decaying, reactive 
adjustments in cognitive control. In this chapter, an RSI proportion 
manipulation was applied to verify whether increasing the probability of 
stimulus appearance at the longer RSI promoted the chance (and potentially 
also the will) to engage in a proactive control strategy.  
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BOX 2 – EVENT-RELATED POTENTIALS 
In Chapter 5, we recorded the electroencephalogram (EEG). EEG 
visualizes the electrical activity on the scalp while information travels 
through the brain. Its main advantage is the high temporal resolution, 
which allows dissociating the flow of information time-locked to events 
(stimuli or responses) that often only last for several milliseconds. 
Electrical waves are averaged over multiple occurrences of the same 
event for each psychological condition of interest, creating event-related 
potentials (ERPs), as illustrated below.  
 
Figure 1. From EEG to ERP. Image taken from: https://uwaterloo.ca/event-related-potential-lab 
The resulting ERPs reflect the neural manifestation of the 
information processing associated with the stimulus events. The 
amplitude and latency of the averaged voltage deflections are then 
quantified and compared over the different experimental conditions. For 
example, in a traditional Stroop task, average ERP waveforms for low-
conflict congruent (‘BLUE’ in blue) and high-conflict incongruent 
(‘BLUE’ in yellow) conditions are created. The negative peak around 450 
milliseconds has been consistently found to be more pronounced for 
incongruent trials compared to congruent trials, supposedly reflecting the 
detection of conflict (Larson et al., 2009). The scalp map shows that this 
difference is most pronounced along fronto-central electrodes.  
 
Figure 2: Grand Average ERP waveforms for congruent and incongruent trials at electrode FCZ 
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 CHAPTER 2 
THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT: IT IS NOT 
WHAT YOU EXPECT
1
 
 
In two experiments, a vocal Stroop task with eight different colours 
was employed in order to put two core assumptions of the original 
interpretation of the congruency sequence effect (CSE; Gratton, Coles, & 
Donchin, 1992) to the test. We verified whether control processes can elicit 
this sequential modulation when episodic memory effects are controlled for, 
and to what extent proactive adjustments driven by participants’ 
expectancies for congruency level repetitions contribute to the CSE. To this 
end, we presented Stroop stimuli without feature repetitions and investigated 
whether the induced expectancy manipulation of raising the amount of either 
congruency level repetitions or alternations in a training phase transferred 
to an unmanipulated test phase. Over the two experiments, a sequential 
modulation of the Stroop effect was found in the absence of stimulus feature 
repetitions, strongly confirming a share for attentional control processes in 
bringing about the CSE. In the condition where congruency level repetitions 
were raised, a strong CSE was found. When congruency level alternations 
outnumbered repetitions, the CSE disappeared completely. However, this 
difference seemed mainly due to cumulative effects of local, dynamic trial-to-
trial control adjustments rather than expectancy-induced attentional 
shifting. Once the transition probability changed back to 50% in the test 
phase of each experiment, a similar CSE was found in both conditions. 
Taken together, these results are best explained in terms of dynamic reactive 
control. 
                                                     
1
 This chapter is based on: Duthoo, W., & Notebaert, W. (2012). Conflict adaptation: 
It is not what you expect. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 65, 1993-
2007. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Adaptively dealing with situations in which two incompatible action 
tendencies compete for execution is one of the central challenges of human 
cognition. When driving carefully on the freeway, for example, the cars 
speeding by might urge you to push the gas pedal down further, whereas the 
speedometer might instruct you otherwise. In the light of how the cognitive 
system solves these kinds of response conflict, existing theoretical accounts 
can be discerned on the basis of the relative emphasis they place on two 
different control processes (see e.g., Wühr & Kunde, 2008). Reactive control 
processes, on the one hand, ensure that the cognitive system adjusts 
information-processing after the occurrence of an action conflict. Proactive 
control processes, on the contrary, aim to adaptively optimize the system in 
anticipation of an expected conflict. One can indeed slow down in reaction 
to the incompatibility between the speedometer and the surrounding cars or, 
alternatively, decide to concentrate more heavily on the speedometer in 
advance, in order to avoid a possible action conflict. 
When investigated within a laboratory setting, these response conflicts 
are mostly experimentally induced by means of a conflict paradigm, like the 
Simon, Stroop or flanker task. To shed some light on how the human 
cognitive system adapts to these conflicts, the congruency sequence effect 
(CSE), first reported in the study of Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) and 
hence later on termed the Gratton effect, quickly became central to the 
cognitive control research (for a review, see Egner, 2007). Gratton and 
colleagues applied a standard flanker task, in which reactions to the central 
target of compatibly flanked trials (e.g., <<<) are generally faster and less 
error-prone than reactions to trials containing incompatible flankers (e.g., 
<><). Beyond this general congruency effect, the authors reported an 
interaction between previous and current trial congruency: the congruency 
effect was found to be smaller following an incongruent stimulus than 
following a congruent one. They theorized that these sequential differences 
in the size of the congruency effect reflected strategic cognitive control 
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adaptations brought about by the optimization of attentional strategies and 
that this optimization process relied on participants’ expectancies regarding 
the nature of the upcoming trial. This Gratton effect, visualized in Figure 1A, 
has been replicated for conflict tasks other than the flanker paradigm, 
including the Simon (Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer, 
2002) and the Stroop (Kerns et al., 2004) task.  
 
 
Figure 1: Three explanations for the congruency sequence effect. For the repetition expectancy account 
(A), reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials are plotted in function of a congruency level 
repetition or alternation. The conflict adaptation account (B) takes the congruency level of the previous 
trial into account. For the feature integration account (C), the amount of stimulus feature overlap in 
consecutive trials is highlighted. RT = reaction time. C = congruent. I = incongruent. 
 
One of the more crucial hypotheses concerning this expectancy 
account is the underlying assumption that participants tend to expect that a 
particular stimulus condition on a given trial will be repeated on the next 
one, as evidenced by Remington (1969). So even when congruent (C) and 
incongruent (I) trials are objectively equally likely to be presented, subjects 
still predict that the trial following a congruent one will be another congruent 
trial, whereas incongruent trials are expected to be followed by incongruent 
ones. Applied to the flanker task, this repetition expectancy suggests that 
participants adaptively shift their attention to a focused processing strategy 
when anticipating an incongruent stimulus, as to weaken the impact of the 
misleading flanking stimuli hindering performance (Gratton et al., 1992). In 
anticipation of a congruent trial, Gratton and colleagues suggested that 
participants change to a more parallel attentional focus, so that facilitation 
from congruent flanker information on response selection is increased. This 
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adaptive regulation of attentional strategies leads to relatively faster reaction 
times on CC and II transitions compared to IC and CI sequences, since 
expectations are confirmed in the former, but violated in the latter. In sum, 
this repetition expectancy account (Egner, 2007) predicts faster reaction 
times for congruency level repetitions than for congruency level alternations, 
as depicted in the illustration of the Gratton effect in Figure 1A. Importantly, 
this expectancy-driven account clearly emphasizes proactive control 
processes. 
The theoretical considerations of Gratton and colleagues (1992), 
however, quickly faded to the background of the theoretical discussion with 
the formulation of the highly influential conflict monitoring theory 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). These authors agreed 
that the CSE provided a direct window onto attentional online adaptations in 
cognitive control, but the conflict monitoring loop they proposed 
emphasized the experienced conflict rather than participants’ expectancies 
and thus shifted the theoretical emphasis towards reactive control processes. 
According to this account, the need for cognitive control is signalled by an 
evaluative mechanism (situated in the anterior cingulate cortex, ACC) 
constantly monitoring for internal processing ‘conflict’. The model 
conceptualized this ‘conflict’ as the simultaneous activation of mutually 
incompatible neural representations. Once conflict is detected, a signal is 
sent to a regulative control component (thought to be implemented by the 
lateral prefrontal cortex) that in turn triggers strategic top-down adjustments 
in processing, thus lowering the impact of subsequent conflict. The model 
implements this enhancement in cognitive control by adjusting attentional 
weights of task-relevant and task-irrelevant stimulus dimensions, so that 
information processing becomes more in line with the current task demands.  
Applied to performance in a congruency task, the conflict monitoring 
theory states that cognitive control enhances the processing of task relevant 
stimulus information after high-conflict incongruent trials, irrespective of 
participants’ expectancy for the upcoming trial. This transient control up-
regulation leads to a speed-up on an upcoming incongruent trial (II 
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compared to CI trial transitions) by reducing the interference from the 
irrelevant stimulus dimension or to a slowdown on the next congruent trial 
(IC compared to CC trial transitions) by reducing the facilitation of 
congruent irrelevant stimulus information. In contrast, low conflict 
congruent trials result in a down-regulation, so that control is weaker on 
subsequent trials and a stronger interference effect is predicted. This 
interpretation of the congruency sequence effect is visualized in Figure 1B. 
By emphasizing reactive, post-conflict adaptation processes, the conflict 
monitoring theory introduced a shift away from the proactive control view 
proposed by Gratton and colleagues (1992). 
In recent theorizing, proactive and reactive control processes are 
treated more and more as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. De 
Pisapia and Braver (2006), for example, hypothesized that transient, trial-by-
trial reactive adaptations occur simultaneously with a superimposed 
proactive, probability-exploiting control strategy. In their computational 
model, reactive control is conceptualized as a short-lived, transient activation 
of the prefrontal cortex (PFC) triggered by conflict detection in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). Proactive control, on the other hand, is implemented 
as a sustained maintenance of the task-set within a different PFC module that 
is triggered by a separate ACC unit sensitive to conflict over a longer time-
scale. Their model successfully fitted the variations in reaction time as well 
as the patterns of PFC and ACC activity found within humans performing 
the Stroop task. It remains unclear, however, whether probabilities or 
expectancies can also proactively regulate attentional processing on a trial-
by-trial basis, as no study has yet attempted to disentangle reactive and 
proactive trial-to-trial control processes within a conflict task. 
Still, the repetition expectancy account as well as the conflict 
adaptation hypothesis has been challenged by alternative explanations in 
terms of episodic memory effects of stimulus-response associations, 
excluding the role of higher-level attentional control mechanisms 
completely. On the basis of Hommel’s feature integration account (1998), it 
has been argued that the reaction time pattern of the CSE is due to the 
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sequence of specific stimulus features that may or may not (partially) 
overlap (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; see also Notebaert, Soetens, & 
Melis, 2001). According to this theory, features of stimuli and responses that 
co-occur in time get temporarily integrated into a common episodic memory 
representation. Crucially, activation of any of those features on the 
subsequent trial automatically co-activates the remaining features. Therefore, 
complete stimulus-response feature repetitions (e.g., GREEN in red ink 
followed by GREEN in red ink in a traditional Stroop colour naming task), 
as well as complete alternations (e.g., GREEN in red ink followed by BLUE 
in yellow ink) lead to relatively faster responses because no previous feature 
binding needs to be overcome. Partial stimulus feature repetitions (e.g., 
GREEN in red ink followed by GREEN in blue ink), on the other hand, give 
rise to relatively slower reactions, since previous binding of features has to 
be undone. As shown in Figure 1C, the interaction between previous and 
current congruency depicted in Figure 1B can be re-interpreted in terms of 
complete and partial stimulus feature repetitions or alternations. 
Following a similar reasoning, Mayr, Awh, and Laurey (2003) pointed 
out that in an interference task employing only two stimulus values, 
sequences involving complete stimulus (and response) repetitions may lead 
to repetition priming effects that mimic the pattern of a typical CSE. When 
the authors excluded direct repetitions from the analyses, no sign of conflict 
adaptation was found. Nevertheless, studies that aimed at explicitly 
controlling for repetitions of stimulus and response features as well as for 
transitions involving negative priming, either by experimental (Akçay & 
Hazeltine, 2007; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006) or 
statistical control (Notebaert & Verguts, 2007) still reported evidence for a 
CSE, suggesting that sequential modulations are not entirely due to stimulus 
and/or response repetition effects. However, as these studies all rely on the 
analysis of the highly selective data set that remains after exclusion of all 
trial transitions in which features repeat, a more stringent and elegant test is 
needed to better evaluate the contribution of cognitive control processes in 
bringing about the CSE. 
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The aim of this study was to critically evaluate the relative 
explanatory value of the repetition expectancy and conflict adaptation 
account within the same experiment, while at the same time controlling for 
the feature integration account. In this way, two core assumptions of the 
original interpretation of the CSE (Gratton et al., 1992) are put to the test. 
Firstly, and most fiercely debated, does this effect reflect a genuine 
attentional control mechanism, rather than more basic episodic memory 
processes (i.e., the binding and unbinding of stimulus features)? Secondly, 
and practically uninvestigated, to what extent do proactive adjustments 
driven by participants’ expectancy for the congruency level to repeat 
contribute to conflict adaptation? 
Therefore, a vocal Stroop task with eight different colour words was 
employed. In order to better control for potentially confounding episodic 
memory effects, the experiments were set up so that all possible stimulus 
feature repetitions were excluded beforehand, instead of excluded post hoc. 
If a CSE would still emerge within the present design, an explanation in 
terms of attentional control adjustments rather than episodic memory 
processes seems more apt. Since all transitions were programmed to be 
complete stimulus feature alternations, findings of a CSE in the two 
experiments would evidence a contribution of cognitive control processes 
more convincingly and elegantly than previous attempts (i.e., post hoc 
exclusion of certain trial transitions or stepwise multiple regression 
approaches). 
In order to further clarify the role of participants’ expectancies in 
bringing about the CSE, we set up an experimental design with two 
conditions differing only in the probability of congruency level repetitions 
during a training phase, while keeping the overall proportion of congruent 
and incongruent trials equal. In the repetition condition we raised the 
probability of repeating stimuli of the same congruency level, so that after a 
congruent trial there was a higher chance to encounter another congruent 
trial, whereas incongruent trials were mostly followed by incongruent trials 
(the congruency level repeated in on average 70% of the trial transitions). 
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The alternation condition, on the other hand, raised the probability of 
alternating the congruency level, leading to alternations in on average 70% 
of the transitions.  
However, it is hard to isolate a potential effect of repetition 
expectancy within these manipulated trial sequences, as the manipulation 
might also change reactive control processes (e.g., Durston et al., 2003). To 
better evaluate the effect of the induced expectancies, we introduced a test 
phase, during which the transition manipulation was left out and standard 
experimental conditions with a 50% chance of a congruency level repetition 
or alternation were created. If differential expectancies are sufficiently 
induced, we then can look for a transfer effect from the manipulated training 
phase to the unmanipulated test phase. In the first experiment, the last two 
out of six experimental blocks formed this test phase, whereas during the 
second experiment these trials were integrated at the halfway point of each 
of the five experimental blocks. 
Over the two experiments, we investigated whether the manipulation 
of transitional probabilities led to behavioural differences (variations in the 
size of the CSE between the two conditions), both in the manipulated 
stimulus lists and in the trials of the test phase. If the CSE is driven by 
expectancy-induced attentional control strategies, we predict to find a 
stronger CSE in the repetition condition compared to the alternation 
condition in the training phase, and a transfer of this difference to the test 
phase. Alternatively, if participants are more sensitive to the local previous 
trial congruency level than to the global congruency level repetition 
probabilities, we predict to find no difference between the two conditions in 
the test phase, nor in a specific subset of trial transitions with an identical 
conflict history in the manipulated phase. The former would be evidence in 
favour of a share of proactive control processes in bringing about the CSE, 
whereas the latter would strongly confirm that reactive control processes are 
more dominant in congruency task performance. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
In the first experiment, we set out to investigate if the manipulation of 
participants’ expectancy for the congruency level to repeat leads to 
differences in the size of the CSE, and if these differences persist during a 
test phase when the expectation manipulation was left out. The first four of 
six experimental blocks served as the training phase, in which the transition 
manipulation was present, whereas the last two blocks formed a test phase, 
where the amount of congruency level repetitions was identical between the 
two conditions. In the training phase of the repetition condition, the amount 
of congruency level repetitions was raised, whereas for the alternation 
condition a higher amount of congruency level alternations was presented. 
We predict the CSE to be larger in the repetition condition than in the 
alternation condition. Investigation of a potential transfer of this difference 
between the two conditions to the test phase can critically differentiate 
between the conflict adaptation and repetition expectancy account.  
METHOD  
Participants. A group of 32 Ghent University students signed up to 
participate in the experiment that lasted for approximately one hour. They 
received either course credits or a monetary payment in return. Prior to the 
testing, participants provided written informed consent. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. The stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch 
monitor of a Pentium processor using T-scope software (Stevens, 
Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 2006), with a viewing distance 
of approximately 50 centimetres. Each Stroop stimulus consisted of one out 
of eight possible colour words (‘RED’, ‘GREEN’, etc.) printed out centrally 
on a black background in one of the eight possible colours (red, green, blue, 
yellow, pink, brown, purple or grey) and was presented in Courier font, size 
20. Participants had to react by saying out loud the colour of the words. The 
responses were detected by means of a Sennheiser MD 421-U-4 microphone 
placed slightly below the participants’ mouth, triggering in turn an adapted 
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voice key optimized for reaction time experiments (i.e., a noise elimination 
voice key, see Duyck et al., 2008). The experiment was run in a regular, 
dimly lit, quiet office room. 
Design and Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 
the two experimental conditions, differing only in the probability of a 
congruency repetition in the course of the first four blocks (referred to as the 
training phase). In the repetition condition, the program raised the 
probability of repeating stimuli of the same congruency, so that after a 
congruent trial (‘GREEN’ in green ink) there was more chance to encounter 
another congruent trial, whereas incongruent trials (‘GREEN’ in red ink) 
were mostly followed by incongruent trials (the congruency level repeated in 
on average 70% of the experimental transitions). In the alternation 
condition, on the other hand, we raised the probability of alternating the 
congruency level, leading to alternations in on average 70% of the 
transitions. In both conditions, the overall proportion of congruent and 
incongruent trials was equal (i.e., 50%). During the last two blocks of both 
experimental conditions (referred to as the test phase), the sequence 
manipulation was left out, creating the standard random succession of trials 
with the percentages of congruency repetitions and alternations being equal. 
The experiment thus consisted of six blocks of 146 trials each, adding up to a 
total of 876 trials. Colour word and ink colour were randomly filled in by the 
program on a trial-by-trial basis, with the restriction of neither complete 
stimulus repetitions nor relevant, irrelevant, relevant-to-irrelevant or 
irrelevant-to-relevant feature repetitions occurring, as to eliminate the effects 
of stimulus feature repetitions hindering the interpretation in terms of 
conflict adaptation (as discussed in Mayr et al., 2003).  
The participants’ task was to verbally identify the colour in which the 
words appeared on the screen as fast as possible, while ignoring the 
irrelevant word meaning. Speed and accuracy were equally stressed. Verbal 
instructions were provided by the experimenter. Before the actual 
experiment, participants received some practice with the voice key and the 
task during 24 practice trials. Each experimental trial started with the 
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presentation of a fixation dot for 500 ms, after which the stimulus word 
appeared on screen until a response was registered by the microphone, with 
the maximal reaction time restricted to 2000 ms. The moment the voice key 
was triggered, the stimulus word shortly tilted 20° to the right for 300 ms 
before the screen turned black and the experimenter coded the actual 
response given by the participant. When the voice key was triggered too 
early (caused by a noise other than the participant’s voice) or too late 
(because of the participant hesitating, hissing or raising his or her voice 
during the response), the experimenter coded the trial as a false alarm. After 
coding, another 500 ms passed before the next trial begun. No error feedback 
was provided. In between two blocks, the participants took a short, self-
paced break. 
RESULTS 
Before conducting statistical analyses, the data were subjected to a 
trimming procedure. First of all, the misses and false alarms caused by voice 
key malfunctioning were eliminated, amounting to a total exclusion of 6.7% 
of the data. Errors were also excluded from the analyses (1.9%). However, 
the distinction between these performance errors and errors due to erroneous 
voice key registration is rather blurry (i.e., when participants correct their 
responses). Therefore, and also because of the overall small amount of 
errors, we decided not to include error analyses in the studies reported here. 
Then, the first trial of each block and RT outliers (± 2.5 SD, calculated 
separately per condition, subject and congruency level) were removed 
(adding up to 3% of the remaining data). Since we focus on sequential 
analyses, the responses immediately following an error trial or non-response 
were eliminated as well (another 6.2%). Even though this removal procedure 
led to the exclusion of relatively more incongruent trials compared to 
congruent ones (18% and 15%, respectively), the data loss was of equal size 
in both conditions (F(1, 30) < 1, ns). Taken together, the data analysis was 
thus carried out on the remaining 83.3% of the trials. 
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A mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the within-
subject factors Experimental Phase (two levels: training and test), Previous 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and Current 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and the between-
subject factor Experimental Condition (two levels: repetition and alternation) 
was carried out. Firstly, a Stroop effect of 159 ms was found, F(1, 30) = 
374.4, p < 0.001, that did not differ between the two experimental 
conditions, F(1, 30) < 1, ns. This congruency effect interacted significantly 
with Previous Congruency, F(1, 30) = 33.73, p < 0.001, indicating an overall 
CSE. Importantly, the four-way interaction between Experimental Phase, 
Current Congruency, Previous Congruency and Experimental Condition 
reached significance, F(1, 30) = 5.81, p < 0.05. This four-way interaction 
stemmed from a difference between the repetition and the alternation 
condition, but only within the first four experimental blocks. Mean reaction 
times and standard deviations for the different conditions are summarized in 
Table 1. 
During those first four blocks, a significant interaction between 
Previous and Current Congruency emerged, F(1, 30) = 23.46, p < 0.001. 
Most important, the significant three-way interaction with Experimental 
Condition indicated that this CSE was much larger in the repetition condition 
compared to the alternation condition, F(1, 30) = 17.65, p < 0.001. The 
Stroop congruency effect in the repetition condition was strongly reduced 
after incongruent compared to congruent predecessors: a reduction from 195 
ms to 151 ms, and thus a CSE of 44 ms, t(15) = 5.41, p < 0.001. In the first 
four blocks of the alternation condition there was no sign of a CSE: the 
Stroop effect following congruent and incongruent predecessors was not 
significantly different: 176 ms and 173 ms, respectively, t(15) < 1, ns. 
For the last two blocks constituting the test phase, again a significant 
CSE was found, F(1, 30) = 14.7, p < 0.001, but contrary to the findings of 
the training phase, this effect did not vary significantly between the two 
experimental conditions, F(1, 30) < 1, ns. This indicates the presence of a 
comparable CSE for both conditions. For the repetition condition the Stroop 
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effect was reduced from 176 ms after congruent trials to 150 ms after 
incongruent trials, t(15) = 3.82, p < 0.01. For the alternation condition, the 
reduction from 188 ms to 166 ms was also significant, t(15) = 2.11, p = 0.05. 
 
Table 1: Mean reaction times and standard deviations as a function of the congruency level of the 
previous and current trials for the training and test phases of the repetition and alternation conditions in 
Experiment 1. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Importantly, the finding of a significant CSE in the absence of 
stimulus feature repetitions clearly supports an explanation of this effect in 
terms of attentional control. Secondly, the frequency manipulation did have 
an impact on the size of the CSE, appearing only in the repetition condition 
and not in the alternation condition. However, this difference in the CSE is 
not unequivocally attributable to differential expectancies about the 
upcoming congruency level in the two conditions, as previous research (e.g., 
Durston et al., 2003) has shown that long repeated sequences of congruent or 
incongruent trials evoke cumulative effects on reaction times. Consequently, 
the observed difference in the CSE might equally well be due to reactive, 
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local trial-to-trial changes compatible with the conflict monitoring theory 
(Botvinick et al., 2001).  
In order to verify whether the overall congruency level repetition 
probability had an impact on the CSE in trial sequences with an identical 
conflict history, we ran another mixed-design ANOVA on trial transitions 
involving a local congruency level repetition from trial n-2 to n-1. As this 
local repetition will mostly be preceded by a much longer run of repetitions 
in the repetition condition, we only included the transitions that involved a 
congruency alternation at trial n-3. In other words, we restricted the analysis 
of the Gratton effect to the following specific set of transitions: ICCC; ICCI, 
CIIC and CIII. Any remaining difference in the CSE between the two 
conditions for these identical transitions would then point to an effect of 
congruency level expectancies on attentional control. However, even though 
a significant interaction between the factors Previous Congruency and 
Current Congruency still emerged, F(1, 30) = 9.35, p < 0.01, the three-way 
interaction with Experimental Condition did no longer appear, F(1, 30) < 1, 
ns. The mean reaction times and standard deviations for the different 
conditions are summarized in Table 2. Even though carried out on a limited 
amount of trials, this extra analysis suggests that reactive processes sensitive 
to the local conflict history rather than proactive processes dependent on 
global conflict repetition probabilities have driven the difference in the CSE 
between the conditions in the training phase. Moreover, the lack of a transfer 
effect of the induced expectancies from the training to the test phase pointed 
in a similar direction.  
However, as we assume that effects of expectancies become more 
pronounced when more preparation time is provided (see also Egner, Ely, & 
Grinband, 2010, for a similar reasoning), we tried to encourage participants 
to build up congruency level expectancies more strongly by stretching the 
presentation of the fixation dot to 2000 ms in Experiment 2. Moreover, due 
to the late timing of the test phase (i.e., the last two blocks) in Experiment 1, 
effects of practice, fatigue or boredom might have obscured the transfer 
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effect. Therefore, training and test phases alternated earlier and more 
frequently in Experiment 2.  
 
Table 2: Mean reaction times and standard deviations as a function of conflict history on the previous 
three trials and the congruency level of the current trial for the training phases of the repetition and 
alternation conditions in Experiment 1. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
In Experiment 2, we further optimized the experimental design of an 
otherwise identical vocal Stroop task, by mixing in a separate test phase 
during each of the five experimental blocks. At the halfway point of each 
block, the transitional probabilities changed to 50% for 36 trials, after which 
the sequential manipulation of the training phase was reintroduced until the 
break. In line with the findings of Experiment 1, we predicted an overall 
greater CSE in the repetition condition. Because the two phases smoothly 
ran over into each other and expectancies were allowed to grow stronger 
during the prolonged fixation interval, we also predicted a transfer effect of 
the transitional manipulation. 
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METHOD  
The design and procedure of Experiment 2, as well as the 
stimuli and apparatus used, closely resembled those of Experiment 1. 
In what follows, only the specific modifications made in procedure 
and design are described.  
Participants. A group of 30 Ghent University students signed up to 
participate in the experiment, lasting approximately one hour. They received 
either course credits or a monetary payment in return. Prior to the testing, 
participants provided written informed consent. 
Design and Procedure. Again, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of the two experimental conditions (15 in the repetition condition, 15 in 
the alternation condition). In each of the training phases, the congruency 
level either alternated or repeated with a 70% probability. For each of the 
test phases, the standard random succession of trials (i.e., 50%) was applied. 
Colour word and ink colour were again randomly filled in by the program on 
a trial-by-trial basis. Each block started with a training phase of 74 trials 
with either more repetitions or alternations. Then, the test phase followed, 
containing 36 trials. For the last 38 trials, the transitions changed again from 
50 to 70% of either congruency level repetitions or alternations. For the 
statistical analyses, these last 38 trials were added to the training phase. The 
experiment thus consisted of five blocks of 148 trials each, adding up to a 
total of 740 trials.  
Each experimental trial started with the presentation of a fixation dot 
for 2000 ms. Then, the screen turned black for 500 ms, after which the 
stimulus word appeared on screen until a response was registered by the 
microphone, with the maximal reaction time restricted to 2000 ms. The 
moment the voice key was triggered, the stimulus word shortly tilted 20° to 
the right for 300 ms before the screen turned black and the experimenter 
coded the actual response given by the subject. After coding, another 100 ms 
passed before the next trial started. In between two blocks, the participants 
were allowed a short, self-paced break. 
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RESULTS 
Again, we first subjected the data to a trimming procedure. A total of 
5.3% of the data was excluded due to misses and false alarms caused by 
voice key malfunctioning. Then, trials on which participants made an error 
were eliminated, amounting to a total of 2.8%. Furthermore, the first trial of 
each block, as well as RT outliers (± 2.5 SD, calculated separately per 
condition, subject and congruency level) was removed (another 4.4% of the 
remaining data). Responses immediately following an error trial or non-
response were eliminated as well (another 7.5%). Contrary to Experiment 1, 
slightly more congruent trials were removed (20% compared to 18% 
incongruent trials), but this was again proportional in both experimental 
conditions (p > .05). In sum, the data analysis was thus carried out on the 
remaining 81.3% of the trials. 
We again performed a mixed-design ANOVA with the within-subject 
factors Experimental Phase (two levels: training and test), Previous 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and Current 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and the between-
subject factor Experimental Condition (two levels: repetition and 
alternation). Firstly, a Stroop effect of similar size as in Experiment 1 (i.e., 
157 ms) was found, F(1, 28) = 284.79, p < 0.001, that did not differ between 
the two experimental conditions, F(1, 28) < 1, ns. This congruency effect 
interacted significantly with the factor Previous Congruency, F(1, 28) = 
30.56, p < 0.001, indicating an overall CSE. Importantly, the four-way 
interaction between experimental phase, congruency, previous congruency 
and experimental condition again turned out to be significant, F(1, 28) = 
4.48, p < 0.05.  
In the training phase, a significant interaction between previous and 
current congruency emerged, F(1, 28) = 31.63, p < 0.001. The higher-order 
interaction with condition, however, indicates that this CSE was much larger 
in the repetition condition compared to the alternation condition, F(1, 28) = 
11.76, p < 0.05. As summarized in Table 3, the Stroop congruency effect in 
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the repetition condition was strongly reduced after incongruent compared to 
congruent predecessors: a reduction from 179 ms to 130 ms, resulting in a 
CSE of 49 ms, t(14) = 6.84, p < 0.001. For the alternation condition, this 
reduction did not reach significance (a CSE of 11 ms, t(14) = 1.45, p = 
0.170).  
In the test phase, a significant CSE was again found, F(1, 28) = 21.7, 
p < 0.001, but contrary to the findings in the training phase, this effect did 
not vary significantly between the two experimental conditions, F(1, 28) < 1, 
ns. For both conditions, the Stroop effect was diminished following 
incongruent compared to congruent predecessors: in the repetition condition, 
the reduction from 181 ms to 135 ms was significant, t(14) = 3.21, p < 0.01. 
For the alternation condition, the comparable reduction from 176 ms 
following congruent trials to 135 following incongruent ones turned out 
significant as well, t(14) = 3.42, p < 0.01. Mean reaction times and standard 
deviations are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Mean reaction times and standard deviations as a function of the congruency level of the 
previous and current trials for the training and test phases of the repetition and alternation conditions in 
Experiment 2. 
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Yet, this analysis does not take into account cumulative effects of 
longer series of repeated congruency level repetitions during the course of 
the training phase. Therefore, we again ran an extra mixed-design ANOVA 
on the same specific set of transitions within the training phase that are 
matched on recent conflict history. As in Experiment 1, we found a 
significant CSE within these trial transitions, F(1, 28) = 11.91, p < 0.01, that 
however did not interact with condition, F(1, 28) < 1, ns, again suggesting 
that recent conflict history affected reaction times more than repetition 
probability. Mean reaction times and standard deviations of this analysis are 
summarized in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Mean reaction times and standard deviations as a function of conflict history on the previous 
three trials and the congruency level of the current trial for the training phases of the repetition and 
alternation conditions in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
In this view, reaction times should decrease as the amount of 
congruency level repetitions increases, irrespective of expectancies. To put 
this to the test, we ran a mixed-design ANOVA with the within-subjects 
factors Experimental Phase (two levels: training and test), Current 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and Repetition (the 
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amount of congruency level repetitions following an alternation; four levels) 
and the between-subjects factor Experimental Condition (two levels: 
repetition and alternation). So for the training and test phases in both 
conditions, the following transitions entered the ANOVA: IC; ICC; ICCC; 
ICCCC and CI; CII; CIII; CIIII. The analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of Repetition, F(3, 81) = 13.9, p < 0.001, that did not interact with 
Experimental Phase, Current Congruency nor Experimental Condition, each 
F(3, 81) < 1, ns. In both conditions, participants’ reactions to congruent or 
incongruent trials were progressively faster as the amount of preceding 
repetitions increased, even in the training phase of the alternation condition 
in which 70% of congruency level alternations were presented. Table 5 
displays the mean reaction times and standard deviations to these sequences 
for both phases in each condition.  
 
Table 5: Mean reaction times and standard deviations as a function of the amount of congruency level 
repetitions for the training ant test phases of the repetition and alternation conditions in Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from the results of the second 
experiment. On the one hand, the significant CSE provides further evidence 
for an interpretation in terms of attentional control. On the other hand, as 
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was the case in Experiment 1, the frequency manipulation did have an 
impact on the size of the CSE, but this difference did not transfer to the 
unmanipulated test phase. Further analyses showed that the same trial-to-
trial dynamic adjustments influenced Stroop performance in the training 
phase, irrespective of the expectancy manipulation in the two conditions. 
Taken together, the results thus again suggest that reactive control processes 
dominate adaptive behavioural adjustments within the Stroop conflict task. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In two experiments, we critically contrasted the repetition expectancy 
and conflict monitoring account for the CSE, while controlling for the 
feature integration account. By administering a vocal Stroop task without 
stimulus feature repetitions, we first verified whether the Gratton effect 
would still emerge when episodic memory effects are controlled for. In order 
to investigate the role of congruency level expectancy in bringing about this 
effect, we manipulated participants’ expectancies for the congruency 
sequence by raising the amount of either congruency level repetitions or 
alternations. The results revealed two interesting effects. 
ATTENTIONAL CONTROL VERSUS EPISODIC MEMORY 
First, the finding of a significant CSE throughout the two experiments 
can be seen as strong evidence for an underlying cognitive control 
mechanism, as episodic memory effects were controlled for. By using a 
vocal Stroop task with eight different colours, we were able to leave out 
trials with stimulus feature repetitions prior to the testing while keeping the 
response mapping intuitive. This enabled us to evaluate the contribution of 
cognitive control processes more clearly and elegantly than previous 
attempts. Other studies that applied the strategy of expanding the stimulus 
set face the disadvantages of further complicating the response mapping as 
well as losing a lot of data after exclusion of trial transitions involving 
stimulus feature overlap. Moreover, the studies that have followed this logic 
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drew some remarkably inconsistent conclusions. On the one hand, a series of 
studies reported no remaining sign of a CSE after post hoc exclusion of 
response or feature repetitions in various variants of the flanker (Mayr et al., 
2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006) or Simon (Chen & Melara, 2009) paradigm. 
On the other hand, other studies still observed a CSE for a subset of trial 
transitions with an equal amount of stimulus feature overlap (Wühr, 2005) or 
when analyzing specific transitions where stimulus or response features 
alternated (Kerns et al., 2004; Kunde & Wühr, 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & 
Botvinick, 2005).  
Problems with this experimental control approach were summarized 
by Notebaert and Verguts (2007). They argued that the main difficulty lies in 
the lack of consensus about how the selection of trials should be 
implemented. As discussed above, one can either exclude only complete 
repetitions, or continue excluding partial repetitions too. Notebaert and 
Verguts (2006) as well as Akçay and Hazeltine (2007) went even further by 
also excluding negative priming transitions, in which the distractor of the 
previous trial becomes the target on the current trial. The practice of 
expanding the stimulus set and then excluding more and more potential 
bottom-up confounds does not only lead to unnecessarily complicating the 
experimental design and response mapping, but also to the removal of more 
and more data from the analyses. Consequently, another issue arises: the 
decision on the presence or absence of sequential effects has to be made on a 
very limited and thus special subset of trial transitions in which absolutely 
no feature is repeated. Notebaert and Verguts (2007) proposed a multiple 
regression solution to this problem, statistically separating the influences of 
stimulus feature repetition and top-down control. In this study, we got 
around this issue by presenting only trial transitions in which no stimulus 
features repeated while keeping the response mapping intuitive. Therefore, 
we were able to avoid the methodological and theoretical shortcomings and 
conclude that a CSE still emerges in the complete absence of potentially 
confounding episodic memory effects.  
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It should be noted that even for sequences with no repeated stimulus 
features, episodic effects of feature integration and retrieval cannot be 
overlooked (Dutzi & Hommel, 2009). According to the Theory of Event 
Coding (TEC; Hommel et al., 2001), reaction times in decision-making tasks 
are essentially depending on the competition between candidate codes. In the 
case of stimulus alternations, the theory claims that the binding of competing 
stimulus and response features on the previous trial that are unrelated to the 
present stimulus and response features will facilitate, through the workings 
of ‘integrated competition’, handling the current trial. When stimuli are 
alternated, binding processes will thus bias behaviour towards response 
alternations. Since in the present design all trial transitions involve a 
complete stimulus alternation, these processes are however held constant 
throughout the experiment. Therefore, control processes rather than episodic 
memory effects seem critically involved in the variations in the CSE found 
in the experiments. 
The fact that CSEs are observed in the absence of stimulus feature 
repetitions does however not imply that the feature integration hypothesis 
should be rejected: both accounts are far from mutually exclusive, but rather 
influence performance simultaneously. In a three-colour Stroop experiment, 
Notebaert et al. (2006) showed that bottom-up modulation and top-down 
control additively contributed to the reported CSE. The size of this conflict 
adaptation on complete alternation trials (in the absence of any feature 
integration effects) was found to be smaller than on partial repetition trials 
(entailing feature integration effects). By means of a response-stimulus-
interval (RSI) manipulation they further differentiated both influences, 
showing that attentional control modulation only occurred with relatively 
long RSI’s, while bottom-up repetition effects were found for both the short 
and long RSI’s. In later theorizing, Verguts and Notebaert (2008; 2009) 
proposed an associative cognitive control model to capture both conflict-
modulated control and binding processes. 
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PROACTIVE VERSUS REACTIVE CONTROL 
A second important contribution of this study is that we observed 
evidence for reactive, conflict-induced control adjustments irrespective of 
congruency level expectations. By either raising or reducing the amount of 
congruency repetitions during a training phase, we aimed to respectively 
confirm or discourage participants’ repetition expectancy. Over the two 
experiments, the same pattern of results emerged. In each of the manipulated 
phases, the size of the CSE was much larger in the repetition condition 
compared to the alternation condition, but this seemed mainly due to 
cumulative effects of longer series of congruency level repetitions. Further 
analyses revealed that even within the alternation condition, in which 
expectancies were biased towards congruency level alternations, reactions to 
both congruent and incongruent trials were increasingly faster when the 
amount of preceding congruency level repetitions increased. The lack of a 
transfer effect from the training to the test phase, in which a CSE of 
comparable size was found for both conditions, further suggested that the 
amount of conflict (or lack thereof) in the recent trial history is driving these 
control adjustments. 
In this view, it seems that raising the amount of congruency level 
repetitions not only induced differential expectancies about the upcoming 
trial, but also changed reactive control processes, as captured in the models 
of Botvinick et al. (2001) and Verguts and Notebaert (2008; 2009). In the 
case of longer series of repeated congruent trials, for instance, the amount of 
conflict and thus control settings will become increasingly lower. As a 
consequence, the irrelevant stimulus dimension influences response selection 
more heavily, so that ICCC transitions will lead to faster reaction times on 
the final congruent trial compared to ICC trial transitions. A sequence of 
repeated incongruent trials, on the other hand, magnifies the amount of 
conflict in the system, leading to tighter control settings and a strong focus 
on the relevant stimulus dimension, resulting in faster reactions to the final 
incongruent trial in CIII transitions compared to CII trial sequences.  
THE ROLE OF EXPECTANCY IN THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT 69 
Interestingly, a recent alternative theoretical framework of 
Schlaghecken and Martini (2011) also pointed out the importance of the 
context for adaptive behaviour. According to their model, the visuo-motor 
system continuously adapts to the situational demands by tightening or 
relaxing its responsiveness in a context-dependent fashion, rather than 
through a conflict detecting and resolving mechanism. The authors stress 
that adjustments following congruent (and thus conflict-free) trials are more 
frequently and robustly observed in the literature. In a series of three 
experiments, they found that trial-type repetition benefits were much more 
pronounced for congruent than incongruent trials, irrespective of 
expectancies (as similar results were obtained when the proportion of 
congruent trials was manipulated). Over the two experiments presented here, 
the trial-type repetition effect (calculated separately for each phase and 
condition) was indeed numerically larger for congruent compared to 
incongruent trials, but not statistically so (all ps > .05). Moreover, analysis of 
the repeated sequences in Experiment 2 revealed that reaction times 
decreased linearly with each consecutive repetition to the same extent for 
congruent and incongruent trials. 
In a recent paper, Egner, Ely, and Grinband (2010) also questioned 
explanations of the CSE in terms of proactive, epxectancy-guided 
preparatory biasing on the basis of their findings in two studies that 
systematically varied the size of the inter-stimulus-interval (ISI, between 500 
and 7000 ms) or response-stimulus-interval (RSI, between 500 and 5000 
ms). In their view, a proactive, expectancy-based account would assume the 
preparatory processes to grow stronger over time, leading to a more 
pronounced CSE with increasing intervals. However, the size of the CSE 
steadily diminished with increasing intervals, and was completely absent at 
the longer intervals in both experiments. According to the authors, an 
explanation in terms of a conflict adaptation process with a fairly steep and 
time-bound decay function best fitted the data. Even though stretching the 
presentation of the fixation dot from 500 ms (Experiment 1) to 2000 ms 
(Experiment 2) did not diminish the size of the Gratton effect in the current 
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studies (44 ms and 49 ms, respectively), the experiments of Egner and 
colleagues (2010) also suggest that conflict level expectancies do not drive 
control adjustments in regular conflict tasks. 
Yet, contrary to our findings, other recent studies do report evidence 
for the idea that information from internal sources can strategically optimize 
attention allocation in anticipation of the specific to-be-expected difficulty of 
the upcoming task. Rather than manipulating repetition expectancy, Wendt 
and Kiesel (2011) manipulated associations between stimulus foreperiods of 
different length and the proportion of conflict trials. When the long 
foreperiod was associated with an 80% chance of an incongruent trial, the 
authors found a reduced flanker interference effect compared to the short 
foreperiod associated with 20% conflict trials. They suggest that participants 
use the foreperiod as a contextual cue steering attentional adjustments, and 
re-adjust their attentional set during the trial dependent on the expected 
difficulty of the upcoming condition. Expectancy-based attentional control 
has also recently been suggested to drive proportion congruency effects (to 
some extent; Bugg & Chanani, 2011), and has been well investigated in 
several experiments in which the upcoming congruency level was cued 
(Aarts & Roelofs, 2011; Correa, Rao, & Nobre, 2009).  
In light of these results, it remains a question for further research 
which conditions call for proactive, expectancy-based adjustments in the 
attentional weighting of perceptual dimensions, and in which situations 
participants rely more heavily on reactive control processes. One potential 
answer is given by the dual mechanisms of control theory (Braver, Gray, & 
Burgess, 2007), that suggests that a proactive control strategy is presumably 
very resource demanding and metabolically costly, whereas reactive control 
processes are less capacity-demanding and more readily available. 
Moreover, according to that theoretical framework, a proactive control 
strategy requires predictive contextual cues that are highly reliable. As 
participants in our experiments were not informed or explicitly cued about 
the transitional probabilities, they might have refrained from adopting a 
metabolically costly proactive control strategy. However, future research is 
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needed to further disentangle situations that elicit a proactive control strategy 
more heavily from situations in which reactive control processes are 
dominant.  
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 CHAPTER 3 
THE HOT-HAND FALLACY IN COGNITIVE CONTROL: 
REPETITION EXPECTANCY MODULATES THE 
CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT 1 
 
In this study, the role of expectancies in cognitive control was tested. 
On the basis of the original interpretation of the congruency sequence effect 
(Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992), we sought evidence for a repetition bias 
steering attentional control. In a series of four Stroop experiments, we 
investigated how participants’ explicit predictions about the upcoming 
(in)congruency proactively influenced subsequent Stroop performance. 
Similar to the fallacious hot-hand belief in gambling, repeating stimulus 
events were overpredicted, as participants consistently expected more 
repetitions of the congruency level than the actual presented number of 
congruency level repetitions (50%). Moreover, behavioural adjustments 
(i.e., a congruency sequence effect) were only found when participants 
anticipated a congruency level repetition, whereas no modulation of the 
Stroop effect was found following alternation predictions. We propose that 
proactive control processes in general, and repetition expectancy in 
particular, should be given more attention in current theorizing and 
modelling of cognitive control, which is characterized by an emphasis on 
reactive, conflict-induced control adjustments.  
                                                     
1
 This chapter is based on: Duthoo, W., Wühr, P., & Notebaert, W. (2013). The hot-
hand fallacy in cognitive control: Repetition expectancy modulates the congruency 
sequence effect. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1-8.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive control allows us to adaptively adjust to an ever-changing 
environment. Therefore, the cognitive system not only monitors the 
environment, it also generates predictions. Research has predominantly 
focused on the monitoring aspect, by studying reactive, post-conflict 
adjustments. Recent influential models (e.g., Alexander & Brown, 2011) 
have stressed the importance of learning on the basis of prediction-driven 
outcomes. Still, experimental work on how expectancies can steer attentional 
control is relatively scarce.  
Human predictions themselves have been widely investigated. 
Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), for instance, convincingly showed 
that predictions are inherently biased. When predicting random events, 
people often expect too many alternations (Nickerson, 2002). Faced with a 
run of ‘heads’ in coin tossing, for example, the gambler will believe that the 
run will be broken (the gambler’s fallacy). On the other hand, one expects a 
winning poker player to keep on winning (the hot-hand fallacy). According 
to Kareev (1995), human predictive behaviour reveals a tendency towards 
expecting repeating events, in line with the hot hand fallacy.  
These biased predictions can influence reaction times (RTs) in 
relatively simple tasks. In serial two-choice RT tasks, for example, responses 
to stimulus repetitions are typically faster than responses to stimulus 
alternations (e.g., Remington, 1969). Soetens, Boer, and Hueting (1985) 
explained this repetition effect in terms of subjective expectancy. However, 
once the inter-trial-interval was sufficiently stretched, Soetens et al. 
demonstrated an alternation effect, corresponding to faster responses to 
different than to repeated stimuli. These authors assumed that, in accordance 
with the gambler’s fallacy, participants expect too many alternations in a 
random run of binary stimuli. 
According to Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992), biased expectancies 
also drive the congruency sequence or Gratton effect. Applying a flanker 
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task, in which participants have to react to the central target flanked by either 
congruent (<<<) or incongruent (><>) flankers, they found a reduced 
congruency effect after incongruent trials. The authors theorized that these 
sequential modulations reflect strategic adjustments in cognitive control. 
Gratton et al. presumed a congruency repetition bias: Despite objectively 
equal chances of encountering a congruent (C) or an incongruent (I) trial, 
participants tend to expect easy (congruent) trials after easy trials, and 
difficult (incongruent) trials after difficult trials. Participants strategically 
narrow attention to the central target when anticipating an incongruent 
stimulus, thereby minimizing the impact of the misleading flankers. In 
anticipation of a congruent trial, participants broaden their attentional focus, 
so that the congruent flanking information is allowed to contribute more to 
response selection. This proactive, expectancy-based regulation of 
attentional strategies leads to faster responses on trial transitions involving a 
congruency level repetition (i.e., on CC and II trial transitions). When 
expectancies are violated (i.e., on CI and IC trial transitions), these 
preparatory adjustments backfire and impair performance in terms of slower 
responses or higher error rates.  
A recent test did not support the existence and influence of such a 
congruency level repetition bias. Jiménez and Méndez (2013) interleaved 
blocks of standard Stroop trials with blocks in which participants were asked 
to indicate which trial (congruent or incongruent) would come next. The 
results revealed that participants fell into the gambler’s fallacy after only one 
sequence of repeated congruency. Moreover, analysis of the separate Stroop 
blocks suggested a dissociation between expectancies and performance: 
Following sequences of repeated congruency, performance benefitted from a 
congruency level repetition, despite an expectancy for congruency level 
alternations.  
Since evidence supporting the proactive repetition expectancy account 
is rather scarce, the congruency sequence effect (CSE) is predominantly 
conceptualized in terms of reactive, conflict-induced adjustments (Botvinick, 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). According to a reactive account, the 
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detection of response conflict on incongruent trials leads to a temporary up-
regulation in the control settings, enhancing the processing of task-relevant 
stimulus information, irrespective of participants’ expectancies for the 
upcoming trial. 
In the present article, we aimed to investigate the impact of 
expectancies on attentional control more directly, by presenting participants 
with a vocal Stroop task and asking them explicitly to predict the 
congruency level of the upcoming Stroop trial. Contrary to Jiménez and 
Méndez (2013), we measured predictions and performance on the same 
trials.  
We predicted a repetition bias, in the sense that participants would 
expect the congruency level of the last encountered trial to repeat on the next 
trial. We also investigated the influence of these predictions on task 
performance, by calculating the CSE separately for repetition expectancies 
and alternation expectancies. Importantly, while a proactive account predicts 
a repetition bias and an influence of these predictions on subsequent task 
performance, a reactive account does not.  
EXPERIMENTS 1A AND 1B 
In Experiment 1A, we ran an eight-colour Stroop task in which 
participants were asked to try to predict the congruency level before the 
actual presentation of the colour word. We verified whether participants 
were biased to expect repeated congruency level in successive trials and 
probed how the CSE is influenced by this repetition expectancy. In order to 
assess a pure measure of the CSE, we constrained random selection of the 
colour word and colour so that no stimulus feature was repeated relative to 
trials n-1 and n-2 (see also, e.g., Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012). In the 
otherwise identical Experiment 1B, we used only four colours and allowed 
complete and partial stimulus feature repetitions. Apart from verifying the 
replicability of our results, we also tested how these stimulus feature 
repetitions influenced predictions. 
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METHOD  
Participants. A group of 15 Ghent University students (11 females, 
four males; ages 18-24 years) provided written informed consent to 
participate in Experiment 1A. Another fifteen (12 females, three males; ages 
18-25 years) were recruited for Experiment 1B. 
Stimuli and Apparatus. Stimuli were displayed on a 17-inch monitor, 
with a viewing distance of approximately 50 cm. In Experiment 1A, the 
stimuli consisted of eight (Dutch) colour words printed in one of the eight 
possible colours (red, green, blue, yellow, pink, brown, purple, or grey). For 
Experiment 1B, the selection of colours and colour words was restricted to 
red, green, blue, and yellow. All text was presented in Courier font, size 20. 
Participants had to react by saying out loud the font colour, and responses 
were detected by means of a Sennheiser MD 421-U-4 microphone. 
Design and Procedure. Equal numbers of congruent and incongruent 
trials were presented. In Experiment 1A, we constrained random selection of 
the colour and colour word by precluding complete stimulus repetitions or 
relevant or irrelevant feature repetitions, relative to both trials n-1 and n-2. In 
other words, all stimulus and response features changed across three 
consecutive trials. For Experiment 1B, random selection of the colour and 
colour word was unconstrained, allowing complete and partial stimulus 
feature repetitions. 
Participants were presented with a practice block of 90 regular Stroop 
trials. The participants then completed a second practice block containing 
15, during which they not only had to predict the congruency of the 
upcoming trial by clicking the left or the right mouse button 
(counterbalanced across participants), but also to report afterwards whether 
or not their prediction was confirmed, again by mouse click. The data 
revealed that the participants understood the basic idea of the experiment, 
since all participants judged their predictions accurately above chance level. 
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Finally, four experimental blocks of 90 trials were presented, during which 
participants had to make predictions about the difficulty of the upcoming 
stimulus and subsequently to respond accurately to it.  
Each experimental trial started with the presentation of a fixation dot 
for 500 ms, followed by an instruction (‘Next trial?’) that remained visible 
until participants clicked one of the mouse buttons. Then, the screen turned 
black for 1000 ms, after which the Stroop trial appeared on screen until a 
response was registered by the microphone (max 2000 ms). The moment that 
the voice key was triggered, the stimulus word shortly tilted 20° to the right 
for 300 ms before the screen turned black and the experimenter coded the 
actual response given by the participant. When the voice key was triggered 
too early (caused by a noise other than the participant’s voice) or too late 
(because of the participant hesitating, hissing or raising his or her voice 
during the response), the experimenter coded the trial as a false alarm. After 
coding, another 500 ms passed before the next trial began. No error feedback 
was provided.  
 
RESULTS 
Data cleaning. We excluded one participant from Experiment 1A for 
not engaging in the prediction task (by ‘predicting’ all trials to be 
incongruent). Then, we removed the first trial of each block and all trials 
containing misses and false alarms caused by voice key malfunctioning 
(Exp. 1A, 11.7%; Exp. 1B, 8.2%). Next, error trials (Exp. 1A, 2.6%; Exp. 
1B, 2%) and trials with extreme RTs (<300 ms and >1500 ms; Exp. 1A, 
0.71%; Exp. 1B, 1.3%) were removed. Finally, responses following an error 
trial or non-response (Exp. 1A, 10.7%; Exp. 1B, 7.7%) were also excluded.  
Prediction performance. On average, participants’ predictions 
matched the congruency level of the previous trial on 65% of their choices in 
Experiment 1A, and on 62% of their choices in Experiment 1B. A paired-
samples t-test revealed that these percentage were significantly larger than 
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the actual numbers of presented congruency level repetitions in both 
Experiment 1A [50% on average, t(13) = 6.41, p < .001 and Experiment 1B 
(49%; t(14) = 4.66, p < .001]. For Experiment 1B, this congruency level 
repetition bias was not different following exact repetitions (59%), relevant 
feature repetitions (60%), or irrelevant feature repetitions (62%), all ps > .2. 
Contrary to the findings of Jiménez and Méndez (2013), we observed an 
even stronger repetition bias when the previous sequence (n-2 to n-1) had 
entailed a congruency level repetition than when the previous sequence had 
entailed a congruency level alternation. This difference was significant for 
Experiment 1A (69% vs. 62%, t(13) = 2.31, p < .05), yet only marginally 
significant for Experiment 1B (65% vs. 60%, t(14) = 1.88, p = .082). 
Reaction times. We ran a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with the within-subject factors Repetition Expectancy (two 
levels: repetition and alternation), Previous Congruency (two levels: 
congruent and incongruent), and Current Congruency (two levels: congruent 
and incongruent). As is depicted in Figure 1, a significant three-way 
interaction was found in both Experiment 1A, F(1, 13) = 20.02, p < .001, 
and 1B, F(1,14) = 13.92, p < .01. When participants expected a repetition of 
congruency level, a significant interaction between previous and current 
congruency (i.e., a CSE) was found [Exp. 1A, F(1, 13) = 45.05, p < .001; 
Exp. 1B, F(1, 14) = 41.26, p < .0001], that was completely absent when an 
alternation of congruency level was expected [Exp. 1A: F(1, 13)<1; Exp. 
1B: F(1, 14) < 1].  
Error percentages. For Experiment 1A, only the main effect of 
Current Congruency turned out to be significant, F(1, 13) = 20.12, p < .001. 
Neither the three-way interaction, nor the interaction between Previous and 
Current Congruency, reached significance, F(1, 13) < 1. For Experiment 1B, 
the main effect of Current Congruency, F(1, 14) = 10.47, p < .01, as well as 
the interaction between Current and Previous Congruency, F(1, 14) = 12.73, 
p < .01, turned out significant. Contrary to our predictions, the three-way 
interaction between Repetition Expectancy and Previous and Current 
Congruency was not significant, F(1, 14) = 2.35, p = .148, indicating similar 
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CSEs after repetition and alternation predictions (see Figure 1). However, 
we would stress that these results have to be interpreted with caution, since 
overall error rates were low and response errors could not be dissociated 
from technical errors. Still, the results at least suggest that the RT effects 
were not due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. Experiment 2A and 2B, in which 
manual responses were registered, were better suited for investigating error 
rates. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error percentages for incongruent (dashed line) 
and congruent (solid line) trials of Experiment 1A and Experiment 1B as a function of the congruency 
level of the previous trial, separately for repetition and alternation predictions. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the mean. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Experiments 1A and 1B provided evidence for an influence of 
predictions on cognitive control, unaffected by stimulus and/or response 
sequences. Both experiments, however, artificially increased the congruency 
rate to 50%, so that congruent trials occurred more often than they would 
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have if features had been selected randomly (i.e., 12.5% in Exp. 1A and 25% 
in Exp. 1B). As Mordkoff (2012) argued, increasing the proportion of 
congruent trials makes the irrelevant task dimension (i.e., the colour word in 
the Stroop task) informative (see also Dishon-Berkovits & Algom, 2000). As 
a consequence, participants might have been encouraged to pay more 
attention to the distractor word. In order to verify whether the results of the 
previous two experiments would replicate when the irrelevant word 
dimension did not predict the target colour, we ran a similar two-choice 
version of the Stroop task, in which every word-colour combination was 
presented equally often (Experiment 2A). Moreover, we now ran a manual 
version of the Stroop task that enabled a proper error analysis in the absence 
of the technical confounds (i.e., voice key errors) associated with our voice 
key procedure.  
In order to further investigate the discrepancy between our findings of 
a bias towards repetitions of the same congruency level over successive trials 
and recent results of Jiménez and Méndez (2013), showing a bias towards 
alternations after one repetition, we also ran a second version of the 
experiment (Exp. 2B) that more closely resembled the procedure applied by 
Jiménez and Méndez.  
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B 
We tested whether the findings reported above would replicate in a 
two-choice manual version of the Stroop task (Experiment 2A). We also ran 
an otherwise identical Experiment 2B in which the expectation measure 
applied by Jiménez and Méndez (2013) was copied. Instead of the 
categorical decision about the congruency level of the upcoming trial, we 
asked participants to indicate whether they were sure, fairly sure, or guessing 
that the next trial would be congruent or incongruent. Apart from these 
differences, the methods and procedures of Experiments 2A and 2B were 
identical to those of the previous experiments.  
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METHOD  
Participants. A group of 15 Ghent University students (13 females, 
two males; ages 18-23 years) provided written informed consent to 
participate in Experiment 2A. Another fifteen (13 females, two males; ages 
18-23 years) were recruited for Experiment 2B. 
Stimuli and apparatus. The Stroop stimuli were restricted to the 
words ‘ROOD’ (Dutch for ‘red’) and ‘GROEN’ (Dutch for ‘green’) 
presented in either red or green. Participants had to react to the font colour 
by pressing the ‘S’ or the ‘D’ key on a QWERTY keyboard for red or green, 
respectively.  
Design and Procedure. Following the practice block of 90 trials, 
participants in Experiment 2A were asked to predict whether the upcoming 
trial would be easy (congruent) or difficult (incongruent) by pressing the 
‘4’or the ‘6’ key on the numeric keypad. The mapping of congruencies to the 
number keys was counterbalanced across participants. The participants in 
Experiment 2B were asked to indicate their congruency level prediction by 
pressing the appropriate key on the numeric keypad corresponding to one of 
the six points of a Likert scale, ranging from sure easy (‘1’ key) over fairly 
sure easy (‘2’ key), guess easy (3 ‘key’), guess difficult (4 ‘key’) and fairly 
sure difficult (5 ‘key’) to sure difficult (6 ‘key’). In order to make sure that 
both this extra task and its response mapping were clear, participants in both 
experiments first completed a practice block containing ten trials, during 
which they not only had to predict the upcoming trial, but also report 
afterwards whether or not their prediction was confirmed, by clicking the ‘7’ 
(yes) or ‘9’ (no) key. On the basis of the accuracy of these judgements, one 
participant whose performance did not exceed chance level was excluded 
from the analysis in both experiments. Hereafter, four blocks of 80 trials 
were presented, during which participants had to make predictions about the 
difficulty of the upcoming stimulus and respond to it accurately.  
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RESULTS 
Data cleaning. For both experiments, we excluded one participant 
who did not engage in the prediction task (by ‘predicting’ all trials to be 
incongruent in three [Exp. 2A] or four [Exp 2B] of the four experimental 
blocks) and another participant who did not grasp the basic idea of the 
experiment, as evidenced by bad performance in the practice block reported 
above. Then we removed the first trial of each block as well as all trials on 
which participants failed to respond within the response deadline (Exp. 2A, 
3.1%; Exp. 2B, 4%), error trials (Exp. 2A, 4.4%; Exp. 2B, 8.7%) as well as 
trials with extreme RTs (<200 ms and >1200 ms; another 2.9% [Exp. 2A] 
and 5.5% [Exp. 2B]) and trials following an error trial or null response (Exp. 
2A, 5%; Exp. 2B, 8.1%).  
Prediction performance. On average, participants’ predictions 
matched the congruency level of the previous trial on 56% of their choices in 
Experiment 2A. A paired-samples t-test revealed that this percentage 
exceeded the actual number of congruency level repetitions presented to the 
participants [i.e., 50%, t(12) = 2.98, p < .05]. In order to compare the 
prediction pattern of Experiment 2B with that of the previous experiments, 
we first ran a similar analysis by recoding the Likert scale scores back into 
categorical congruent or incongruent predictions. On average, the 
participants’ predictions matched the congruency level of the previous trial 
on 58% of their choices, significantly exceeding the actual number of 
congruency level repetitions presented to the participants [i.e., 50%; t(12) = 
2.78, p < .05]. 
We ran a second analysis on these expectancy scores collected in 
Experiment 2B, after recoding guess, fairly sure and sure congruent 
responses into scores of 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and guess, fairly sure and 
sure incongruent into -1, -2, and -3, respectively (e.g., similar to the 
procedure of Jiménez & Méndez, 2012). The factor Context coded the 
number of congruent or incongruent predecessors to a trial, ranging from one 
to three congruent (C) or incongruent (I) trials. A repeated-measures 
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ANOVA with the factor Context (six levels: 3C, 2C, 1C, 1I, 2i, 3I) was 
performed on the choice data. The results revealed a significant effect of the 
preceding context, F(5, 60) = 5.46, Huynh-Feldt corrected p < .05. As is 
depicted in Figure 2, participants’ expectations tended more strongly 
towards a congruent trial following one, two or three congruent trials than 
following one, two, or three incongruent trials, and vice versa (all p-values < 
.05). Moreover, the expectancy ratings did not differ between one, two or 
three consecutive congruent or incongruent trials (all ps > .13).  
  
 
 
Figure 2: Mean averaged expectancy scores of Experiment 2B as a function of the preceding context, 
ordered from three congruent predecessors to three incongruent predecessors. Postive values denote 
increased expectancy for an upcoming congruent trial, whereas negative values denote increased 
expectancy for an upcoming incongruent trial. These values are summarized in the table below the figure. 
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. 
 
Reaction times. A significant three-way interaction between 
Repetition Expectancy, Previous Congruency and Current Congruency was 
found in both Experiments 2A, F(1, 12) = 15.46, p < .01, and 2B, F(1, 12) = 
6.33, p < .05, after collapsing expectancy scores into a categorical 
predictions (see Figure 3). When participants expected a repetition of the 
congruency level, a significant interaction between previous and current 
congruency (i.e., a CSE) was found [Exp. 2A, F(1, 12) = 17.84, p < .001; 
Exp. 2B, F(1, 12) = 21.88, p < .001], that was completely absent when an 
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alternation of congruency level was expected [Fs(1, 12) < 1, in both 
experiments].  
Error percentages. As in the RT analysis, a three-way interaction 
emerged that was significant in Experiment 2A, F(1, 12) = 7.93, p < .05, yet 
only marginally significant in Experiment 2B, F(1, 12) = 4.01, p = .068 (see 
Figure 3). In anticipation of a congruency level repetition, a significant CSE 
was found [Exp. 2A, F(1, 12) = 6.17, p < .05; Exp. 2B, F(1, 12) = 7.14, p < 
.05], that was completely absent when an alternation of congruency level 
was expected [Fs(1, 12) < 1 in both experiments].  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error percentages for incongruent (dashed line) 
and congruent (solid line) trials of Experiment 2A and Experiment 2B as a function of the congruency 
level of the previous trial, separately for repetition and alternation predictions. Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals around the mean. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In a series of four experiments, we asked participants to predict the 
congruency level of the upcoming Stroop trial. The results revealed that 
participants expected the congruency level to repeat in the majority of the 
trials, and that participants’ predictions influenced their subsequent task 
performance: Only when they predicted a congruency level repetition, was a 
congruency sequence effect (CSE) observed. These results were found in 
two-, four- and eight-colour Stroop tasks.  
EXPECTANCY BIAS 
The observed congruency repetition bias confirms the assumption that 
Gratton et al. (1992) took for granted. In line with the hot hand fallacy, 
participants expected a positive autocorrelation when none was actually 
present. This finding stands in contrast to studies that have shown an 
alternation bias in the perception, prediction, and generation of randomness 
(Nickerson, 2002). In the present task, participants were asked to predict the 
upcoming event as accurately as possible, and thus were implicitly 
encouraged to look for a systematic relationship between successive trial 
events. Thus, even though the trials were generated in a random fashion, 
participants still believed that the sequence was essentially nonrandom. 
Therefore, finding a repetition bias in the present experiments does not come 
as a surprise, as we have assumed (in line with Kareev, 1995) that repetition 
expectancy is an inherent preference aiding the search for meaningful (i.e., 
causal) relations in everyday life, one that is overcompensated for by an 
alternation bias when people are asked to evaluate or produce series of 
random events. 
EXPECTANCY IN COGNITIVE CONTROL 
More important to our understanding of cognitive control processes, 
our study revealed that repetition expectancies had a crucial impact on 
subsequent performance. Our results revealed sequential adjustments in the 
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size of the Stroop effect only when participants predicted a repetition of 
congruent or incongruent trials. According to the repetition expectancy 
account (Gratton et al., 1992), participants strategically focus or widen 
attention on the basis of their implicit expectations of the congruency level 
to repeat. The results of our study both support and qualify this account, by 
showing that a CSE was present when participants explicitly expected a 
congruency repetition, and that no performance adjustments occurred when 
participants expected a change in congruency.  
Traditional reactive models, such as the conflict monitoring model 
(Botvinick et al., 2001), do not predict an influence of repetition expectancy 
on the size of the CSE: Following conflict trials, and irrespective of 
participants’ expectancy of the upcoming trial, task focus is up-regulated to 
overcome potential conflict on the subsequent trial. Therefore, a purely 
reactive account would predict CSEs of similar size following repetition and 
alternation predictions. In line with the dual-mechanisms-of-control 
framework (Braver, 2012), our results suggest that proactive, expectancy-
based control processes can complement or dominate more automatic, 
reactive control mechanisms in response to situational demands. In the 
present experiments, explicitly probing for participants’ expectancies might 
have triggered these proactive control strategies. 
The present results might reflect the net effect of simultaneously 
operating control processes, one preparatory and proactive and the other 
conflict-induced and reactive. According to this view, preparatory control 
entails focusing more strongly on the colour in expectation of an incongruent 
trial, or allowing the word reading process to contribute more strongly to 
response selection in anticipation of a congruent trial. In contrast, reactive 
conflict regulation entails increasing controlled colour processing following 
incongruent trials, and decreasing this controlled colour processing after 
congruent trials (Botvinick et al., 2001). When combined, proactive and 
reactive control processes will complement each other following repetition 
predictions, producing a strong CSE. Following alternation predictions, 
however, both control adjustments will work in opposite directions, thereby 
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cancelling each other out, reflected in the absence of sequential performance 
adjustments. 
Alternatively, our data pattern can be explained in terms of within-
trial control adjustments that carry over to the next trial for repetition 
expectancies, but not for alternation expectancies. More specifically, we put 
forward that participants adaptively focus attention during the processing of 
incongruent trials, reflecting reactive conflict adaptation processes as for 
instance described in Ridderinkhof (2002). This change to the attentional 
control settings is maintained for the next trial only if participants expect the 
congruency level to repeat, resulting in smaller congruency effects after 
incongruent than after congruent trials. This indicates a proactive attentional 
control process based on congruency level expectancies. If, however, 
participants expect the congruency level to alternate, they change their 
attentional control settings to an intermediate ‘default’ mode, thereby 
eliminating the CSE. In a similar vein, King and colleagues (2012) showed 
in a recent fMRI investigation of the context-specific proportion congruency 
(CSPC) effect that this CSPC effect emerged only when the context repeated 
from the previous to the current trial, but not when the context alternated 
between successive trials. In other words, the attentional control settings that 
were triggered by the context applied forward to the subsequent trial, but 
only when this context was repeated.  
In contrast to our findings of an increased congruency level repetition 
bias following two consecutive trials of the same type, in a recent study 
Jiménez and Méndez (2013) reported evidence suggesting that participants 
already tended to fall into a gambler’s fallacy after only one sequence of 
repeated congruency. In an attempt to clarify this discrepancy, we set up an 
experiment that bridged the methodological gap between the two studies, by 
implementing a six-point Likert scale measure of congruency predictions 
similar to that of Jiménez and Méndez. Just as in their study, this procedure 
produced scores that did not diverge much from the 0 score, reflecting pure 
guessing. The pattern of expectancy scores (see Figure 2), however, was 
qualitatively different: Participants tended to expect a repeated congruency 
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level following one, two or three congruent or incongruent trials. Moreover, 
whereas Jiménez and Méndez only found a significant CSE when taking into 
account the previous two or more trials (i.e., a progressive CSE), showing 
RT benefits in the opposite direction from expectancies, we found a robust 
CSE following repetition predictions when taking into account only one 
preceding trial. In other words, expectancies, and not previous context, 
seemed to have driven the behavioural adaptation. We suspect that in the 
study of Jiménez and Méndez the response-stimulus interval of 0 ms in the 
blocks in which no predictions were measured left no room for participants 
to prepare for what they expected. At a theoretical level, these differences 
can be interpreted in terms of the dual mechanisms of control theory (Braver, 
2012): Whereas the methodology of Jiménez and Méndez’s study mainly 
probed fast, conflict-induced reactive control processes, our prediction 
experiments might have triggered (additional) strategic, expectancy-based 
proactive control processes. 
This also brings us to a possible limitation of our study. By inserting 
congruency level predictions as a second task into the normal Stroop 
procedure, we might have introduced a procedural change that hampered a 
comparison with typical Stroop performance. Admittedly, it is not clear to 
what extent we can generalize our findings to "normal" Stroop or 
congruency tasks. Further research will be needed to verify whether 
participants actively generate predictions when they are not explicitly asked 
ti. Irrespective of this, our findings demonstrate an impact of expectancies on 
sequential modulations of congruency effects, and this finding makes a 
strong case for the cognitive malleability of the processes underlying 
transient conflict adaptation. Consequently, we propose that proactive 
control processes in general, and repetition expectancy in particular, should 
be given more attention in current theorizing and modelling of cognitive 
control, which is characterized by an emphasis on reactive, conflict-induced 
control adjustments. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
WHEN PREDICTIONS TAKE CONTROL: THE EFFECT OF 
TASK PREDICTIONS ON TASK SWITCHING 
PERFORMANCE
1
 
 
In this paper, we aimed to investigate the role of self-generated 
predictions in the flexible control of behaviour. Therefore, we ran a task 
switching experiment in which participants were asked to try to predict the 
upcoming task in three conditions varying in switch rate (30%, 50% and 
70%). Irrespective of their predictions, the colour of the target indicated 
which task participants had to perform. In line with previous studies (Mayr, 
2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006), the switch cost was attenuated as the switch 
rate increased. Importantly, a clear task repetition bias was found in all 
conditions, yet the task repetition prediction rate dropped from 78% over 
66% to 49% with increasing switch probability in the three conditions. 
Irrespective of condition, the switch cost was strongly reduced in 
anticipation of a task alternation compared to the cost of an unexpected task 
alternation following repetition predictions. Hence, our data suggest that the 
reduction in the switch cost with increasing switch probability is caused by a 
diminished expectancy for the task to repeat. Taken together, this paper 
highlights the importance of predictions in the flexible control of behaviour, 
and suggests a crucial role for task repetition expectancy in the context-
sensitive adjusting of task switching performance. 
 
                                                     
1
 This chapter is based on: Duthoo, W., De Baene, W., Wühr, P., & Notebaert, W. 
(2012). When predictions take control: The effect of task predictions on task 
switching performance. Frontiers in Cognition, 3.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A hallmark of human cognition lies in the ability to proactively 
anticipate relevant future events and steer both action and perception 
accordingly. Current influential theories of cognition advance this proactive 
prediction generation ability as a central mechanism of brain functioning, 
marking a shift away from the view of the brain passively reacting to 
incoming stimulation. Predictive representations of both visual (e.g., Bar, 
2007; Summerfield & Egner, 2009), auditory (Kumar et al., 2011) and 
olfactory (Zelano, Mohanty, & Gottfried, 2011) information have been 
shown to guide and prepare the brain for a forthcoming stimulus, aiding 
information processing in a noisy and unpredictable environment. By 
continuously generating predictions about the environment, the cognitive 
system is also able to learn and associate specific actions or stimuli with 
specific outcomes. Learning on the basis of these prediction-driven 
outcomes is ascribed a central role in optimizing action selection and 
response execution in recent modelling work (Alexander & Brown, 2011; 
Silvetti, Seurinck, & Verguts, 2011). In line with the conception of the 
predictive brain, this paper aimed to investigate how self-generated 
predictions can flexibly steer attentional control through advance 
preparation, by referring to recent empirical work in the Stroop conflict task 
(Duthoo, Wühr, & Notebaert, 2013) and providing new evidence from a task 
switching experiment. 
Attentional control is typically studied by means of a conflict 
paradigm, such as the Stroop conflict task (see MacLeod, 1991, for a 
review). In this task, participants are asked to respond to the colour of a 
colour word while ignoring its meaning. As the colour and word dimension 
of the stimulus can either overlap or not, easy (congruent) and difficult 
(incongruent) stimulus conditions are created, respectively. Optimal task 
performance requires adaptively adjusting attention to the relevant (colour) 
and irrelevant (word meaning) dimension. In general, these attentional 
adjustments can be grouped into two categories based on the underlying 
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mechanism and the moment in time they are implemented by the cognitive 
system (Wühr & Kunde, 2008; Egner, 2007). According to a reactive control 
account, adjustments to the control settings occur in response to the target, 
corresponding to the metaphor of the reactive brain. Current models 
typically assume that it is the conflict on a given trial that triggers 
subsequent control up-regulation, characterized by a strengthening of task-
relevant associations (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; 
Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). This theoretical framework has been 
successfully applied to many attentional control phenomena, including the 
reduction of the congruency effect following high-conflict incongruent trials 
in single-task paradigms (i.e., the congruency sequence effect (CSE); 
Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992; for a review, see Egner, 2007), but also 
the increase of the switch cost following high-conflict incongruent stimuli in 
dual-task paradigms (e.g., Goschke, 2000; Braem, Roggeman, Verguts, & 
Notebaert, 2012). Alternatively, control adjustments can also be triggered in 
anticipation of the upcoming task or target, biasing the task or attentional set 
proactively. These proactive control adjustments, captured by the metaphor 
of the predictive brain described above, have received considerably less 
attention in the cognitive control literature.  
In order to investigate this type of expectancy-induced control, two 
different strategies have been pursued. On the one hand, participants’ 
expectancies can be manipulated implicitly. Studies on attentional control 
have, for example, manipulated the proportion of incongruent trials (Logan 
& Zbrodoff, 1979) or congruency level transitions (Duthoo & Notebaert, 
2012) to induce preparatory strategic control adjustments. Whereas the first 
manipulation successfully triggered anticipatory control, reflected in faster 
reactions to highly expected incongruent trials than to unexpected congruent 
trials, the second, more subtle manipulation appeared not strong enough to 
elicit expectancy-induced adaptation effects that were clearly dissociable 
from reactive, conflict-induced adjustments (see also Jiménez & Méndez, 
2013). Alternatively, a more common and widespread experimental tool to 
probe anticipatory control adjustments is to cue participants explicitly about 
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the upcoming stimulus event (for some early experimental work with the 
cueing paradigm, see Harvey, 1984; Neill, 1978; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1982). 
More recently, Aarts and Roelofs (2011) applied a probabilistic cueing 
procedure to a Stroop-like task to point out that the anticipation of upcoming 
conflict (or lack of conflict) can trigger similar sequential adjustments as 
experienced conflict (or lack thereof) on the previous trial, both 
behaviourally and in the activation pattern of the anterior cingulate cortex 
(ACC). In similar vein, Correa, Rao, and Nobre (2009) found that 
anticipating conflict in a cued congruency task sped up both conflict 
detection and conflict resolution. 
However, investigating proactive control by means of a cueing 
paradigm is not really testing the implications of a predictive brain, as it is 
assumed that we constantly generate predictions ourselves. Compared to the 
large amount of studies concerning cue-induced attentional control, few 
studies have centred on the effect of self-generated predictions on 
subsequent processing. Yet, human predictive behaviour itself has been the 
focus of much experimental work outside the field of cognitive control. 
Interestingly, an influential line of research revealed that people’s 
predictions and expectancies are often strongly biased (e.g., Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982), as they either overestimate or underestimate the 
actual probability of events to occur (see also Ayton & Fischer, 2004). When 
confronted with a random run of stimuli, participants will typically indicate 
that longer runs of a particular event have to be balanced out by the 
occurrence of the alternative event, a phenomenon known as the gambler’s 
fallacy. This tendency for negative recency is also typically found when 
people are asked to generate or identify a random sequence (see Nickerson, 
2002, for a review). However, other studies have shown that people can also 
display the opposite expectancy bias, the tendency to predict positive 
recency. A study of Kareev (1995), for example, in which participants were 
asked to predict the next item on the list, revealed that subjects typically 
overestimate repeating events. According to Kareev, this repetition bias 
stems from a persistent tendency to perceive or find patterns and causality in 
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the environment (note, however, that the same tendency, seen from another 
perspective, can also result in probability matching behaviour at the outcome 
level, the strategy to predict the events in proportion to their probability of 
occurrence; see Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008). Apart from its impact on 
simple serial 2-choice reaction time tasks (Remington, 1969; Soetens, Boer, 
& Hueting, 1985), the impact of this expectancy bias on information 
processing and attentional control remains still relatively uninvestigated. 
Given both these persistent prediction biases and the cognitive system’s 
inherent prepotency to generate predictions and evaluate its outcomes, 
investigating self-generated expectancies and comparing their impact on 
subsequent processing to that of exogenously triggered expectancies might 
reveal new insights into how the brain implements proactive control.  
In a previous study (Duthoo et al., 2013), we undertook a first attempt 
to measure these biased predictions explicitly and verify their influence on 
cognitive control by subjecting participants to a Stroop task and letting them 
predict the congruency level of the upcoming Stroop stimulus. Interestingly, 
after recoding participants’ predictions (‘Do you expect a congruent or 
incongruent trial?’) relative to the congruency level of the previous trial, 
results revealed a clear repetition bias in the prediction pattern: in line with 
Kareev (1995), participants expected the congruency level to repeat from 
one trial to the next in 65% of all cases, even though congruency level 
repetition probability was set at 50%. Moreover, attentional adjustments 
(i.e., a CSE) were only found when they anticipated a congruency level 
repetition. Participants showed both a reduced interference of repeating 
conflict trials (by proactively narrowing attention to the stimulus colour) and 
increased facilitation of repeating non-conflicting trials (by proactively 
allowing the word meaning to influence response selection). In case of an 
unexpected congruency level alternation, these preparatory adjustments 
backfired and longer reaction times were registered, resembling the results of 
Aarts and Roelofs (2011) in a probabilistic cueing experiment. Interestingly, 
analyses of the congruency alternation predictions also suggested that in 
anticipation of an alternation, participants seemed to switch to a default 
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control mode, as no sequential adjustments were found. In sum, the study 
revealed a clear bias towards predicting repeating events, and an 
optimization of control processes (i.e., a CSE) in anticipation of such 
repeating events.  
Contrary to the literature on conflict control, the contribution of a 
preparatory component in task switching research has played a central role in 
the theoretical debate (e.g., see Karayanidis et al., 2010 and Kiesel et al., 
2010 for recent overviews), overshadowing research on the reactive priming 
effects of the previous task set on current task performance. In order to 
investigate these proactive adjustments, similar strategies have been 
implemented, aimed at inducing expectancies either implicitly or explicitly. 
As an example of the former strategy, fixed (predictable) task sequences 
(i.e., the alternating-runs paradigm; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) have been 
introduced to compare predictable task switch trials to predictable repetition 
trials. Even though two simple tasks were used and the task sequence was 
entirely predictable, this paradigm consistently evoked increased reaction 
times and higher error rates on switch compared to repetition trials (i.e., 
robust switch costs). To probe the impact of explicit expectancies on these 
switch costs, the explicit cueing paradigm (Meiran, 1996) was developed, in 
which cues specified the required task in a random run of task repetitions 
and switches. This cueing paradigm has been extensively used to evidence 
preparatory reductions in switch costs (e.g., Meiran, 1996; Koch, 2003), 
albeit not without its own set of methodological pitfalls (see Logan and 
Bundesen, 2003; but see also De Baene & Brass, 2011 and Jost, De Baene, 
Koch, & Brass, 2013). 
Research on task switching has convincingly shown how increasing 
the preparation interval prior to an anticipated task alternation led to more 
controlled processing (i.e., a reduced switch cost). Monsell, Sumner, and 
Waters (2003), for example, reported performance benefits for predictable 
compared to unpredictable task switches, suggesting that participants can 
strategically control their task-set readiness in function of their expectation, 
and, more precisely, in function of the probability of encountering a task-
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switch on the upcoming trial. In similar vein, further research has robustly 
found a reduced switch cost with increasing switch probability (Bonnin, 
Gaonac’h, & Bouquet, 2011; Mayr, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; 
Schneider & Logan, 2006). Others have pointed out that not only when 
expecting a task alternation, but also in anticipation of an expected task 
repetition, task-set readiness can be adjusted for optimal task performance, 
resulting in strong repetition benefits (Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002). 
In sum, more so than in single-task paradigms, dual-task performance seems 
to rely on a strong anticipatory control component.  
Even though the theoretical debate about this anticipatory control 
component is still ongoing, a key role is usually attributed to repetition 
expectancy. For example, the smaller difference between switch and repeat 
trials in a context with a 50% compared to a 30% switch probability is 
sometimes explained by the fact that participants match their task 
preparation to the probability of the switch and repeat conditions, thus 
equally preparing both tasks in a 50% switch probability context (Dreisbach 
et al., 2002; Brass & von Cramon, 2004; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). 
Alternatively, other authors suggested that people prepare the other task on 
part of the trials (e.g., Monsell & Mizon, 2006), resulting in extra 
preparation and thus longer reaction times on task repetition trials (when 
their guess was wrong) and less preparation and thus faster reactions to task 
switch trials (when their guess was right). Importantly, both explanations 
stress the importance of expectancies about the upcoming task. However, as 
indicated above, past research has consistently found that people’s 
predictions are biased and therefore often do not match the actual probability 
in a given context (especially in the context of a random sequence of events; 
but see the work of Gaissmaier and Schooler, 2008, showing that the search 
for patterns can also result in probability matching at the outcome level). 
Moreover, the abovementioned studies never measured expectancies 
themselves, so that it remains a question for further research how 
expectancies can steer task preparation.  
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To shed some light on this issue, as well as to compare self-generated 
predictions in a dual-task paradigm to previous findings in a single-task 
paradigm, we decided to apply a similar procedure as our previous study on 
prediction-driven adjustments in the Stroop task (Duthoo et al., 2013). 
Therefore, we asked participants to try to predict the upcoming task on a 
trial-by-trial basis in one of three between-subjects conditions varying in 
switch rate (30%, 50% and 70%), and probed both how these contexts 
affected the prediction pattern and how these predictions themselves 
influenced the task switch cost. Similar to our previous findings in the 
Stroop task, we expected predictions to evoke advance preparation for the 
upcoming target. More specifically, we expected repetition predictions to 
induce a strong reaction time benefit when a task repetition was actually 
presented, and a huge cost when one had to unexpectedly switch tasks, 
irrespective of condition. In contrast with the strong switch costs (and 
repetition benefits) following repetition predictions, we expected that 
alternation predictions evoke less strong preparatory effects (Duthoo et al., 
submitted), thereby reducing the switch cost, irrespective of condition. 
Consequently, assuming that participants’ tendency to predict task 
repetitions is attenuated with increasing switch probability, we predicted to 
replicate the finding of a reduced switch cost in contexts of higher switch 
probabilities (Mayr, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Schneider & Logan, 
2006). 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
A group of 48 Ghent University students (30 females; 14 males; ages 
17-28 years) signed up to participate in one of the three conditions (n = 16) 
of the experiment, lasting approximately 45 minutes. They received a 
monetary payment in return. Prior to the testing, participants provided 
written informed consent. 
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STIMULI AND APPARATUS 
A program written with T-scope software (Stevens, Lammertyn, 
Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 2006) controlled the experiment. All stimuli 
were displayed on a 17-inch monitor, with a viewing distance of 
approximately 50 centimetres. The numbers 1 to 9, with the exclusion of 5, 
served as the target stimuli, presented in Arial, font size 32. These stimuli 
were presented centrally on a black background in yellow (for the magnitude 
task) or blue (for the parity task). Responses were registered by means of a 
QWERTY keyboard. 
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental 
conditions, differing only in the amount of task switches during the three 
blocks where an explicit task prediction was registered. In the repetition 
condition, the task switch probability was restricted to 30%. In the 
intermediate condition, participants were confronted with an equal amount 
of task repetitions and alternations (50%). The alternation condition 
increased the task switch probability to 70%.  
Throughout all blocks of the experiment, each target number was 
equally often presented in blue and yellow, implying that within each block 
participants performed an equal amount of magnitude and parity judgements. 
Selection of the target number was pseudo-random, with the restriction that 
each of the eight possible number targets appeared an equal amount of times 
in each of the two possible colours within one block. In all dual-task blocks, 
consisting of 80 trials, each target number was thus presented five times in 
both blue and yellow. Participants had to respond by pressing the E or U 
keyboard key for small or even target numbers and the R or I keyboard key 
for large or odd target numbers. The mapping of the task (magnitude or 
parity) to the middle and index finger of the left hand (keys E and R, 
respectively) or index and middle finger of the right hand (keys U and I, 
respectively) was counterbalanced across participants. In order to indicate 
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which of the two tasks they expected, participants had to press the V or N 
key with their thumbs. The mapping of these keys to either a magnitude or 
parity task prediction was compatible with the mapping of the left or right 
hand to one of the two tasks.  
In all conditions, participants were first trained on each of the two 
tasks separately during 40 trials of first magnitude and then parity 
judgements, adding up to 80 single task practice trials. Hereafter, the two 
tasks where combined during two blocks of 80 trials, as to familiarize 
participants with the dual task procedure. For these dual task training blocks 
the task switch probability was kept at 50% in all three conditions. The 
colour in which targets were presented indicated the task participants had to 
perform. A yellow number target asked for a magnitude judgement, whereas 
a blue target required a parity response. In the final phase of the experiment, 
three blocks of 80 trials were presented during which participants first had to 
predict which of the two tasks they expected to come next. Irrespective of 
their choices, the colour in which the upcoming target was presented again 
indicated which of the two task participants had to perform, thereby serving 
as a feedback signal for their task predictions. For their performance on the 
target numbers no error feedback was provided. A store coupon was 
promised to the participant who performed best in the three last blocks for 
each condition, taking into account both the amount of correct predictions 
and mean reaction times and error percentages. In between blocks, 
participants took a short, self-paced break. After completing the experiment, 
participants filled in a short questionnaire, probing their awareness of the 
switch probability manipulation and their use of strategies in predicting the 
task sequence. 
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross for 500 
milliseconds. In the training blocks, this was followed by the target, which 
appeared on the screen until a response was registered, with the maximal 
reaction time restricted to 2500 milliseconds. Next, the screen turned black 
for 500 milliseconds, serving as the inter-trial-interval. In trials in which 
participants also had to predict the task on the next trial, a fixation cross was 
THE EFFECT OF PREDICTIONS ON TASK SWITCHING PERFORMANCE    107 
first presented for 500 milliseconds, after which an instruction appeared on 
the screen (‘Next trial?’) that remained visible on the screen until 
participants clicked one of the two designated keyboard keys. Hereafter, a 
fixation cross was again displayed for 500 milliseconds, after which a 
number target appeared on the screen, with identical timing values as 
described above. 
RESULTS 
In the results section, we focus on the three experimental blocks in 
which predictions were also registered. Two participants who did not engage 
in the prediction task (by ‘predicting’ the same task throughout at least one 
of the three experimental blocks) were removed from the analysis, restricting 
the number of participants in the intermediate and alternation condition to 
15. Non-responses and badly recorded data (adding up to 1.6%) were 
excluded from both the reaction time and performance error analysis. We 
applied the multiple comparison correction method put forward by Holm 
(1979) in order to control for the family-wise error rate, adjusting the p-
values of the post tests in the reaction time and error analysis accordingly. 
DATA CLEANING 
Before conducting the reaction time analysis, the data were subjected 
to a trimming procedure. We first excluded the trials on which participants 
committed an error (8.1% of the remaining data; distributed equally over the 
three conditions). Hereafter, the first trial of each block and RT outliers (± 
2.5 SD, calculated separately per condition, subject and task) were removed 
(another 3.9%). Taken together, the analysis was thus carried out on 86.9% 
of the complete data.  
REACTION TIMES AND PREDICTIONS 
First, a mixed-design analysis of variance with the between-subjects 
variable Condition (three levels: repetition, intermediate and alternation) and 
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the within-subjects variables Task (two levels: magnitude and parity) and 
Sequence (two levels: repetition and alternation) was carried out. Results 
revealed main effects of Task, F(1, 43) = 57.36, p < .0001, reflecting faster 
magnitude than parity judgments (757 and 877 ms, respectively) and 
Sequence, F(1, 43) = 116.95, p < .0001, indicating the presence of a switch 
cost of 106 ms, but not a main effect of Condition, F(2, 43) < 1, ns. The two-
way interaction between Task and Sequence turned out significant as well, 
F(1, 43) = 5.47, p < .05, reflecting a larger switch cost for the parity task 
compared to the magnitude task (120 and 93 ms, respectively), irrespective 
of Condition, F(2, 43) < 1, ns. Most importantly, the analysis revealed a two-
way interaction between Sequence and Condition, F(2, 43) = 11.05, p < 
.0001, implying that the size of the switch cost was significantly affected by 
the transitional manipulation. Further independent-samples t-tests showed 
that, compared to the switch cost of 112 ms in the intermediate condition, the 
switch cost was significantly reduced to 52 ms by increasing the switch 
probability in the alternation condition, t(28) = 3.5, p < .01. Decreasing the 
switch probability to 30% in the repetition condition significantly increased 
the switch cost to 166 ms compared to the alternation condition, t(29) = 4.5, 
p < .0001. The increase in switch cost of 54 ms in the repetition compared to 
the intermediate condition was only marginally significant, t(29) = 2.0, p = 
.056. These differences in the switch cost over conditions are depicted in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error percentages for task alternations (dashed 
line) and task repetitions (full line) in the three conditions varying in switch probability. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.  
 
Next, we took a deeper look into participants’ task prediction patterns. 
Irrespective of condition, participants predicted the magnitude and parity 
task equally often (i.e., 50%, on average, SD = 5.4%). These task predictions 
were then recoded into repetition or alternation predictions, relative to the 
task presented on the previous trial. In line with our manipulation of task 
switch probability, participants in the repetition condition predicted more 
task repetitions (78%), both compared to participants in the intermediate 
(66%, independent-samples t(29) = 3.1, p < .001) and participants in the 
alternation condition (51%, independent-samples t(29) = 7.63, p < .0001). 
Remarkably, in all three conditions a task repetition bias was found, as 
comparisons between the task switch prediction rate and the actual task 
switch probability indicated that both in the intermediate condition (66% 
compared to 50%, t(14) = 6.77, p < .0001), repetition condition (78% 
compared to 70%, t(15) = 2.86, p < .05) and alternation condition (51% 
compared to 30%, t(14) = 8.39, p < .0001) the amount of task repetitions was 
consistently overpredicted. 
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Finally, we examined the effect of these task predictions on task 
performance, by investigating how repetition and alternation expectations 
impacted the switch cost. To this end, we ran a mixed-design analysis of 
variance with the between-subject variable Condition (three levels: 
repetition, intermediate and alternation) and the within-subjects variables 
Prediction and Sequence (two levels: repetition and alternation)
2
. Apart from 
the main effect of Sequence, F(1, 43) = 59.89, p < .0001, reflecting a switch 
cost, the analysis also revealed a marginally significant main effect of 
Prediction, F(1, 43) = 3.87, p = .056, indicating that number targets were 
responded to 17 ms slower following alternation predictions than following 
repetition predictions. Importantly, a significant interaction between 
Prediction and Sequence was also found, F(1, 43) = 88.75, p < .0001. The 
three-way interaction with Condition did not reach significance, F(2, 43) < 
1, ns, suggesting that participants’ predictions influenced the switch cost 
similarly in all three conditions. Following an alternation prediction, the 
switch cost, calculated as the difference between an expected task alternation 
and an unexpected task repetition, disappeared completely. Even though 
inspection of the reaction times suggested a switch benefit numerically (24, 
31 and 32 ms in the repetition, intermediate and alternation condition, 
respectively), post tests indicated that this difference did not reach statistical 
significance in any of the conditions (all ps > .62). Following a repetition 
prediction, a huge and significant repetition benefit, calculated as the 
difference between an unexpected task alternation and an expected task 
repetition, was found in all conditions (222, 116 and 147 ms in the 
                                                     
2
 We did not include the variable Task in this analysis, as this would cause some of 
the cells of the ANOVA to be calculated on a very limited amount of observations 
(for instance: a switch to the parity task following an alternation prediction in the 
repetition condition). We therefore collapsed observations over the two tasks. Still, 
running the analysis with the Task variable included did not change the pattern of 
the results. Importantly, the Task variable did not interact significantly with any of 
the other variables (all ps > .14). 
THE EFFECT OF PREDICTIONS ON TASK SWITCHING PERFORMANCE    111 
repetition, intermediate and alternation condition, respectively; all ps < 
.0001). This pattern of reaction times is visualized in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) and error percentages for task alternations (dashed 
line) and task repetitions (full line) following repetition and alternation predictions, separately for the 
three conditions varying in switch probability. Under each of the graphs, the corresponding overall 
percentage of alternation predictions is presented. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around 
the mean.  
  
ERROR PERCENTAGES 
First, we ran a mixed-design ANOVA with the between-subjects 
variable Condition (three levels: repetition, intermediate and alternation) and 
the within-subjects variables Task (two levels: magnitude and parity) and 
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Sequence (two levels: repetition and alternation) on the aggregated error 
scores. Similarly to the reaction time analysis, we found main effects of 
Task, F(1, 43) = 36.61, p < .0001, reflecting worse performance on parity 
than magnitude judgments (12% and 4.6%, respectively) and Sequence, F(1, 
43) = 9.51, p < .01, indicating higher error rates on task alternations than on 
task repetitions (9.2% and 7.4%, respectively), but no main effect of 
Condition, F(2, 43) < 1, ns. The two-way interaction between Task and 
Sequence also reached significance, F(1, 43) = 5.07, p < .05, indicating that 
switching to a parity task (compared to repeating this task) increased the 
error rate (3.2%), whereas switching to a magnitude task did not. Most 
importantly, we again found a significant interaction between Sequence and 
Condition, F(2, 43) = 3.22, p < .05, indicating that the size of the error 
switch cost differed significantly between the three conditions, irrespective 
of task, F(2, 43) < 1, ns. Further independent-samples t-tests revealed that 
this interaction was brought about by a significant increase in the error 
switch cost (3.7%) in the repetition condition compared to the intermediate 
condition, t(29) = 2.09, p < .05, whereas the error switch cost was not 
statistically lower in the alternation condition compared to the intermediate 
condition, t(28) < 1, ns. The error rates for task repetitions and task 
alternations in each of the three conditions are visualized in Figure 1. 
In order to investigate how participants’ predictions had an impact on 
the error rates, we conducted another repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
between-subjects variable Condition (three levels: intermediate, repetition 
and alternation) and the within-subjects variables Prediction and Sequence 
(two levels: repetition and alternation). This analysis revealed only a main 
effect of Prediction, F(1, 43) = 5.73, p < .05, indicating that an alternation 
prediction produced more erroneous responses compared to a repetition 
prediction (9.6% and 7.8%, respectively). The two-way interaction between 
Prediction and Sequence was only marginally significant, F(1, 43) = 3.3, p = 
.076. The data pattern closely resembled the reaction pattern, showing a 
trend for the error switch cost to be absent following alternation predictions, 
and present following repetition predictions. Again, this pattern did not 
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differ significantly between the three conditions, F(2, 43) < 1, ns. The error 
rates for task repetitions and task alternations following repetition and 
alternation predictions in each of the three conditions are presented in Figure 
2. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the present study, we aimed to investigate how self-generated 
predictions influence conflict and task control, expanding previous research 
on expectancy-induced proactive control. To do so, we inserted explicit task 
predictions into a task switching procedure, thereby complementing as well 
as elaborating on a previous experiment in which the influence of 
congruency level predictions on subsequent Stroop performance was put to 
the test (Duthoo et al., 2013). Results revealed three interesting findings.  
Firstly, analysis of participants’ prediction patterns exposed a bias 
towards predicting task repetitions in all three conditions. In the intermediate 
condition, in which the two tasks alternated in 50% of all transitions, 
participants displayed a clear task repetition bias (66%). Also in the 
alternation condition, participants still predicted a task repetition in 51% of 
all transitions, when only 30% were actually presented. Moreover, reaction 
times and error rates showed that irrespective of condition, reactions 
following a task alternation prediction were slower. At first sight, this 
tendency to predict repeating stimulus events, or ‘hot hand fallacy’, might 
seem at odds with the literature on probability matching (Gaissmaier & 
Schooler, 2008), revealing participants’ tendency to match their choice 
behaviour to the actual probability of two stimuli that are not equally likely 
to be presented. Yet, given that participants in the current experiment were 
asked to predict the upcoming task rather than the task transition, 
participants matched probabilities quite well, as irrespective of condition the 
two tasks were predicted equally often (i.e., 50%). Still, further insight into 
the transitional probabilities could help them predicting the upcoming task 
more accurately. Yet, these transitional probabilities were less readily picked 
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up, since the experiment revealed a clear bias towards expecting repetitions. 
Interestingly, participants’ prediction error rate only dropped from 50% to 
38% in the repetition condition (t(15) = 8.9, p < .0001), in which transitional 
probability was in line with their repetition expectancy bias. 
Secondly, our manipulation of switch probability affected the switch 
cost as predicted: compared to the switch cost in the intermediate condition 
with a 50% switch probability, increasing this switch probability decreased 
the switch cost significantly, whereas decreasing the switch probability 
strongly amplified the switch cost. Put differently, the switch cost is 
attenuated under conditions of high switch probability, replicating previous 
studies (Bonnin et al., 2011; Mayr, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Schneider 
& Logan, 2006). Moreover, results also revealed that switching to the parity 
task came at a greater cost than switching to the magnitude task, both in 
reaction time and accuracy. This corresponds well with previous research on 
asymmetries in switch costs showing that separating the response set of the 
two tasks results in greater costs in switching to the more difficult task 
(Yeung & Monsell, 2003). In the current experiment, response set overlap 
was reduced in terms of response decisions (parity versus magnitude 
judgments) and stimulus-response mapping (both tasks were mapped to 
separate hands). Most importantly, this task asymmetry did not interact with 
predictions, which formed the main focus of this study. 
Thirdly, by inserting explicit predictions into the dual task procedure, 
we were able to identify a potential mechanism underlying the finding of 
reduced switch costs in conditions with high switch probability. In all three 
conditions, the same prediction-driven behavioural adjustments were found: 
following an alternation prediction, the difference between repetition and 
switch trials disappeared, whereas repetition predictions were followed by a 
large switch cost (or a large repetition benefit). Participants in the alternation 
condition expected more alternations, thereby reducing the switch cost 
significantly. In other words, the reduction in switch cost in a context of high 
switch probability might stem from proactively switching to a more 
controlled processing strategy when expecting task alternations. However, 
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preparing for a task alternation still comes at a cost, as comparisons between 
correctly predicted task repetitions and alternations revealed a significant 
residual task switch cost (all ps < .001). This finding is in line with studies 
using the explicit cueing paradigm that consistently show that even validly 
cued task alternations robustly slowed down responses compared to validly 
cued task repetitions (Meiran, 1996).  
On an important note, part of the speed-up in reaction time following 
correct predictions might reflect an effect of hand priming, as in the current 
design correct predictions involved the finger of the same hand needed for 
subsequent task execution, whereas incorrect predictions entailed a switch of 
hand (e.g., Cooper & Marí-Beffa, 2008). Still, this definitely cannot account 
for the whole pattern of findings, since predicting the other task relative to 
the task on the previous trials correctly (i.e., a task alternation in which the 
same hand was used for predicting and responding to the target) did not 
produce reactions that were significantly faster than following incorrect task 
alternation predictions, in which the task repeated but the hand used for 
predictions differed from the hand used for responding to the target. Taken 
together, this study suggests that in a dual-task environment, participants 
expect the task to repeat, leading to improved performance when it does and 
a large cost when it alternates. Still, in anticipation of a task alternation, 
participants respond equally fast to a task alternation as to a task repetition. 
These conclusions are clearly in line with a proactive, expectancy-based 
account of task switching. 
Moreover, the current findings allow drawing interesting parallels 
between this experiment and the aforementioned previous Stroop 
experiment, both in the patterns of self-generated expectancies as in their 
effect on subsequent processing. Compellingly, we found a robust bias 
towards overpredicting repeating events that was also present in congruency 
level predictions in the Stroop task. This bias towards expecting task 
repetitions coincided with a clear processing benefit for these repetition 
predictions, as alternation predictions typically induced higher errors rates 
and increased reaction times, irrespective of condition. Interestingly, the 
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observation of reaction time benefits following repetition expectations but 
not after alternation expectations also bears a striking resemblance to 
findings within the voluntary task switching paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 
2004). In this paradigm, participants can choose which task to perform on a 
series of bivalent stimuli, with the instruction to perform both tasks equally 
often. In line with the inherent bias towards repetitions defended in this 
paper, Arrington and Logan found that the subjects produced more task 
repetitions (i.e., 68%) than expected if the tasks were performed in a pure 
random sequence. Moreover, deliberately choosing to switch tasks slowed 
down task performance significantly (i.e., a significant switch cost was 
found). Taken together, the experiment revealed that participants displayed a 
clear reluctance to switch tasks. 
Similar to the voluntary task repetition and switch decisions, repetition 
and alternation predictions clearly produced a differential effect on 
subsequent processing: repetition predictions were followed by a strong 
reaction time benefit when an actual task repetition was presented, and a 
large cost when one then had to (unexpectedly) switch. Again, this pattern 
closely resembled findings in our previous Stroop study (Duthoo et al., 
2013), where a clear congruency level repetition benefit and congruency 
level alternation cost were found following repetition predictions. Yet, 
whereas congruency level alternation predictions were, on first sight, not 
followed by behavioural adaptations in the Stroop task (or cancelled out by 
reactive control adjustments evoked by conflict on the preceding trial), the 
current experiment showed that following task alternation predictions the 
difference between an actually presented task alternation and an unexpected 
task repetition disappeared.  
Crucially, this pattern of results did not differ between the three 
conditions varying in switch probability. Therefore, the present experiment 
suggests an explanation for the often replicated finding of reduced switch 
costs in conditions with a higher switch probability (Monsell & Mizon, 
2006; Mayr, 2006; Schneider & Logan, 2006): increasing the switch 
probability increases the expectancy for task alternations, which was found 
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to be followed by a reduction in the switch cost. However, the interpretation 
of this reduced switch cost in anticipation of a task alternation is still open to 
debate.  
One possible explanation, as was also put forward by Monsell and 
Mizon (2006), is that participants adopt a ‘neutral control state’, right in 
between the two task sets. When the colour of the target then indicated 
which of the two task sets was appropriate, reactions to either one of the two 
tasks would be equally fast. This is exactly the pattern of results we found 
following alternation predictions, and it emerged in all three conditions. 
Moreover, this corresponds well with the absence of sequential modulations 
of the Stroop effect following congruency level alternation predictions, 
which can also explained by participants adopting a ‘neutral control mode’ 
(Duthoo et al., 2013).  
Alternatively, one can assume that both repetition and alternation 
predictions lead to advance preparation of the upcoming task, yet preparation 
for task alternations is never complete (i.e., there is a residual switch cost, 
e.g., Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000). Also in our experiment, correctly 
predicted task alternations were responded to much slower than correctly 
predicted task repetitions, irrespective of condition. In case of a correctly 
predicted task alternation, advance preparation speeds up responding 
compared to an unexpected task alternation (i.e., following a task repetition 
prediction). Yet, because of a residual switch cost, these reactions are not 
significantly faster than those to unexpected task repetitions (i.e., following a 
task alternation prediction), where preparation misfires, but no residual 
switch cost affects performance. The same logic holds if one assumes the 
difference between switch and repeat trials to arise from adaptation to the 
task set on repetition trials, reflected in a repetition benefit, rather than from 
reconfiguration of the task set on switch trials, reflected in a (residual) 
switch cost (De Baene, Kühn, & Brass, 2012). In the case of an unexpected 
task repetition following a task alternation prediction, reaction times will be 
relatively slower than for expected task repetitions, yet equally fast to an 
expected task alternation, where no task-set adaptation benefit was present. 
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However, the current data do not allow differentiating between the 
adaptation and reconfiguration view, as both predict the same data pattern: 
following correct repetition predictions, both preparation and task set 
adaptation (or lack of reconfiguration) will speed up an actual task 
repetition, whereas following correct alternation predictions, preparation and 
the lack of task-set adaptation (or need for reconfiguration) have effects in 
opposite directions, explaining the intermediate reaction times. Whether this 
explanation in terms of equal preparation for switch and repeat trials 
following both types of predictions is to be favoured over an explanation in 
terms of a lack of specific preparation for alternation predictions (i.e., a 
neutral control mode) is an interesting question for future research. 
Yet, the current experiment applied a 1:1 mapping between the cue 
(i.e., the colour of the target) and the task (i.e., a magnitude or parity 
judgment), so that task repetitions were confounded with repetitions of the 
cue. Therefore, this design does not allow teasing apart the facilitatory effect 
of repeated-cue-encoding in task repetitions from the effect of executive 
control processes reconfiguring the cognitive system in task alternations. In 
order to disentangle cue repetitions from task repetitions, some previous 
studies have introduced multiple cues per task (e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 
2003; Mayer & Kliegl, 2003; see Schneider & Logan, 2011, for a 
comparison between 1:1 and 2:1 cue-to-task mappings). This approach has 
led to a rich body of empirical evidence showing that repetition priming of 
cue encoding is indeed an important component of task switching. Note, 
however, that these studies have also demonstrated that there are usually also 
substantial ‘true’ task switch costs remaining (for a review of this evidence, 
see Jost et al., 2013). 
Important in the light of the current results is a study of Schneider and 
Logan (2006), in which this 2:1 cue-to-task mapping was combined with a 
transitional probability manipulation similar to ours. In line with the current 
findings, switch costs were smallest in the condition with a high switch 
probability and largest when the amount of task repetitions was increased. 
Modelling of their data led these authors to conclude that the difference in 
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the switch costs between different frequency conditions reflected (automatic 
or strategic) priming of cue encoding for the frequent transitions. Therefore, 
an interesting avenue for future research lies in combining a 2:1 mapping 
strategy with our prediction manipulation to elucidate whether the 
prediction-driven adjustments in task switching performance reported in this 
paper were driven by facilitating the speed of cue encoding rather than by 
promoting advance configuration of task-set.  
Given the emphasis recent theories place on prediction-driven 
adjustments in brain functioning, the paradigm to assess self-generated 
predictions and probe their impact presented in the current article seems a 
particularly promising tool for further research. Applying this method, we 
were able to pinpoint structural biases in human predictions and measure 
their influence on subsequent processing in a direct way, rather than 
inferring explanations in terms of expectancy indirectly from the data. Yet, 
one outstanding question remains whether participants will make similar 
predictions when they are not explicitly asked to generate them, and, 
consequently, to what extent these expectancy-driven attentional adjustments 
can also be found in ‘normal’ Stroop or dual-task behaviour.  
In conclusion, the research presented in this paper advocated viewing 
the brain as a predictive rather than a purely reactive device. In this light, the 
overestimation of repeating events (also referred to as ‘the hot hand fallacy’) 
should not necessarily be considered as a weakness of our predictive brain. 
In real life, there is a much stronger correlation between sequential events 
than in our artificial lab tasks. For instance, when the road is slippery 
because of wet conditions in one turn, it is usually a good idea to predict that 
also the next turn will be slippery and adjust accordingly. It therefore 
appears adaptive that the cognitive system is more readily optimized in 
anticipation of a repeating event. This is reflected in a strong repetition 
benefit for both congruency level and task repetitions. Yet, when interpreting 
the lack of conflict adaptation and the reduced difference between task 
repetition and alternations following alternation predictions in terms of 
participants adopting a neutral control mode, it remains an extremely 
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interesting question to what extent our brain can also prepare for expected 
changes.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
ERP CORRELATES OF PROACTIVE AND REACTIVE 
CONTROL IN THE STROOP TASK
1
 
 
In the present study, we aimed to investigate the neural correlates of 
proactive and reactive control by recording the EEG in a vocal Stroop task. 
Before responding to the Stroop stimulus, participants were asked to predict 
the upcoming congruency level, as to elicit proactive adjustments. 
Replicating previous work (Duthoo, Wühr, & Notebaert, 2013), behavioural 
results revealed that participants were biased to expect repetitions of the 
congruency level over successive trials and that sequential adjustments in 
Stroop performance (e.g., a congruency sequence effect) were only evident 
following these repetition predictions – and absent with alternation 
predictions. To better understand this pattern, we investigated the influence 
of conflict on the previous trial and prediction type on known EEG markers 
of Stroop performance. Analysis of the N450 component revealed an 
influence of predictions on reactive control adjustments: For alternation 
predictions, the N450 on congruent trials following an incongruent trial was 
significantly reduced. The conflict slow potential, on the other hand, was not 
modified by predictions, yet showed to be sensitive only to the congruency 
level of the previous trial. We also compared the CNV to look for differences 
in preparation between repetition and alternation predictions. Results 
suggested that alternation predictions elicited stronger anticipatory activity, 
and that this difference was more pronounced the stronger participants were 
biased towards expecting repetitions. Taken together, these findings suggest 
an intricate interplay between proactive and reactive control influences. 
 
                                                     
1
 This chapter is based on: Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E.L.., Deschuymer, M., & 
Notebaert, W. (Manuscript in preparation). ERP correlates of proactive and reactive 
control in the Stroop task.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Cognitive control entails selecting the appropriate action while at the 
same time shielding the cognitive system from various distracters that 
concurrently compete for attention in a stimulus-rich environment. Such acts 
of control typically benefit from prior knowledge about which events are 
likely to come across. Indeed, as highlighted in Kunde et al. (2007), 
anticipating the appropriate environmental conditions in order to efficiently 
prepare goal-directed actions is one of the prime abilities of the human 
neurocognitive system. Research on cognitive control has long been 
dominated by exploring how it is optimized in reaction to past events, 
thereby overlooking anticipatory control. The latter, however, has recently 
attracted renewed interest: Various experiments have shown that predictions 
about what future event is likely to happen (Duthoo, Wühr, & Notebaert, 
2013; Duthoo, De Baene, Wühr, & Notebaert, 2012; Kemper et al., 2012; 
Umbach, Schwager, Frensch, & Gaschler, 2012) as well as expectancies 
about when these stimulus events will likely happen (Thomaschke, Wagener, 
Kiesel, & Hoffmann, 2011; Wendt & Kiesel, 2011) have a significant impact 
on stimulus encoding, response preparation and interference control. 
Building on our previous work (Duthoo et al., 2013), the current study 
recorded the EEG in order to investigate the neural correlates of prediction-
driven adjustments in attentional control and elucidate how these interact 
with reactive, conflict-induced signals. 
In the study of Duthoo et al. (2013), participants performed a Stroop 
conflict task in which they were asked on each trial to predict the 
congruency level of the upcoming stimulus. This revealed that participants 
display a bias towards expecting repeating congruency levels. Furthermore, 
much like in the studies of Umbach et al. (2012) and Kemper et al. (2013), 
participants seemed to have used these expectancies in preparing their 
response or attentional settings, even though they were not valid in 
predicting the stimulus. Interestingly, it was found that only when 
participants anticipated a repetition of the congruency level (after recoding 
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participants’ absolute predictions into predictions relative to the previous 
trial), strong behavioural adjustments were found. More specifically, a 
congruency sequence or Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) – 
the finding of a reduced congruency effect following incongruent (I) as 
compared to congruent (C) trials – only emerged following repetition 
predictions. This sequential modulation has been typically interpreted as a 
reactive upregulation of control following conflict (Egner, 2007). The 
question that follows is precisely how these prediction-driven attentional 
adjustments interacted with reactive, conflict-induced control signals. 
In line with the conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, 
Carter, & Cohen , 2001), reactive conflict regulation here refers to increasing 
controlled colour processing following incongruent trials, and decreasing 
this controlled colour processing after congruent trials. This model was 
further extended by Verguts & Notebaert (2008; 2009), who specified that 
conflict will strengthen the currently active task representations. In reaction 
to conflict, attention to the relevant dimension will thus be enhanced, and the 
influence of the irrelevant dimension reduced. This model similarly predicts 
a reduced congruency effect following incongruent trials. Taking reactive 
control one step further, Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke 
(2011) proposed that participants can reactively detect and resolve conflict 
within the current trial (see also Ridderinkhof, 2002). These within-trial 
adaptations are then carried over to the next trial, leading to sequential 
adjustments in the size of the congruency effect (i.e., a CSE). In contrast to 
reactive control, proactive control is triggered by expectancy, rather than 
conflict on the previous trial. Proactive control here refers to preparatory 
attentional orienting, through which expectancies trigger top-down biases of 
relevant stimulus-response associations (see Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). 
Such proactive adjustments can be systematically induced by, for example, 
providing informative or probabilistic cues (Aarts & Roelofs, 2011; Wühr & 
Kunde, 2008). Alternatively, proactive control can follow from more 
subjective biases. In the present study, such subjective biases were directly 
assessed, by measuring participants’ predictions explicitly. 
132     CHAPTER 5 
In our prediction Stroop task (Duthoo et al., 2013), these proactive and 
reactive control adjustments can be traced by verifying how known Stroop 
EEG markers are selectively affected by conflict on the previous trial and/or 
prediction type. Based on previous EEG investigations of Stroop conflict 
control (Larson, Kaufman, & Perlstein, 2009; Liotti, Woldorff, Perez III & 
Mayberg, 2000; Tang et al., 2013), we looked for interactions between 
predictions and previous conflict in an early, frontocentral component (the 
N450) suggested to reflect conflict detection, as well in a late, more 
sustained slow wave (the conflict slow potential; conflict SP), hypothesized 
to reflect Stroop conflict resolution on incongruent trials. The present 
investigation of these EEG markers has the further advantage of controlling 
for potentially confounding influences of feature integration (Hommel, 
Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003), since no relevant or 
irrelevant feature repeated over three consecutive trials (Duthoo & 
Notebaert, 2012). Importantly, this allowed a first ‘pure’ test of sequential 
modulation in the Stroop task, as previous EEG investigations included both 
colour/word repetition and negative priming transitions in their design 
(Larson et al., 2009; Tang, Hu, Zhang, & Chen, 2013). These previous 
studies reported that the conflict slow potential was modulated by the 
previous trial, thought to reflect reactive adaptation to conflict. The N450, on 
the other hand, appeared only sensitive to conflict on the current trial. 
We further explored the anticipatory effects of predictions prior to 
stimulus onset by looking at the contingent negative variation (CNV) for 
repetition and alternation predictions. Previous studies have already 
suggested that the CNV not only reflects motivation or motor preparation 
(Leuthold & Jentschz, 2001; Lorist et al., 2000), but also anticipatory 
attention and preparatory control (Fan et al, 2007; Strack, Kaufmann, 
Kehrer, Brandt, & Stürmer, 2013). More specifically, we investigated 
potential differences in preparation following alternation and repetition 
predictions. This allowed differentiating between two alternative 
interpretations for the absence of a CSE following alternation predictions 
(Duthoo et al., 2013). First, this could reflect the net effect of simultaneously 
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active reactive, conflict-induced adjustments and proactive, expectancy-
based adjustments cancelling each other out following an alternation 
prediction. Alternatively, this could be explained by assuming that 
participants refrain from preparing when predicting an alternation, and adopt 
a ‘neutral’ control mode – thereby blocking the control processes that were 
reactively elicited on the previous trial (Scherbaum et al., 2011). In case 
participants equally prepare proactively for congruency level alternations 
and repetitions, we predict to find no early, preparatory differences between 
alternation and repetition predictions. If, however, participants refrain from 
preparing following an alternation, we expect stronger preparation (i.e., a 
stronger CNV) for repetition compared to alternation predictions. As we can 
consider the measured predictions as an extra index of cognitive control, we 
also looked how preparation for repetition and alternation trials is influenced 
by the strength of the repetition bias. Therefore, individual differences in 
participants’ bias to expect repeating congruency level are also taken into 
account. 
METHOD 
PARTICIPANTS 
A group of 17 Ghent University students (12 females; 5 males; 
ages 18-23) provided written informed consent to participate in the 
experiment, approximately lasting one hour and a half. They received 
25 euro as compensation. All participants reported to have normal of 
corrected-to-normal vision. None of the patients had a history of 
neurological or psychiatric disease. One participant, whose mean error 
rate exceeded more than 2 SD of the grand mean, was rejected from 
further analysis.  
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STIMULI AND APPARATUS 
A program written with T-Scope software controlled the experiment 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 2006). Stimuli were 
displayed on a 17-inch monitor, with a viewing distance of approximately 60 
cm. All text was presented in Courier, size 20. Stimuli consisted of eight 
(Dutch) colour words presented in one of the eight possible colours (red, 
green, blue, yellow, pink, brown, purple or gray). Participants had to react by 
saying out loud the font colour, and responses were detected by means of a 
Sennheiser MD 421-U-4 microphone optimized for reaction time 
experiments (e.g., Duyck et al., 2008).  
 
DESIGN AND PROCEDURE 
Equal numbers of congruent and incongruent stimuli were presented. 
In order to rule out an explanation of sequential modulations in terms of 
episodic memory bindings (see, e.g., Hommel et al., 2004), we constrained 
random selection of colour and colour word by precluding complete stimulus 
repetitions or relevant or irrelevant feature repetitions, relative to both trial 
n-1 and n-2. In other words, all stimulus and response features changed 
across three consecutive trials (see Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012).  
Participants were presented with two practice blocks of 90 regular 
Stroop trials. They then completed a second practice block containing 15 
Stroop trials, during which they not only had to predict the congruency level 
of the upcoming trial (congruent or incongruent), by clicking the left or right 
button of a response box (counterbalanced) that was placed on the table in 
front of the participants, but also to report afterwards whether or not their 
prediction was confirmed, again by clicking the appropriate response box 
button. The data revealed that all participants understood the basic idea of 
the experiment, since all participants judged their predictions accurately 
above chance level. Finally, six experimental blocks of 90 trials were 
presented, during which participants had to make predictions about the 
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difficulty (congruent was termed ‘easy’, incongruent ‘difficult’) of the 
upcoming stimulus and subsequently respond accurately to it. They were 
supposed to predict the next trial correctly and instructed to respond as fast 
as possible while at the same time minimizing their number of errors. A 
store coupon was rewarded to the participants who performed best, taking 
into account both the number of correct predictions, mean reaction times and 
error percentages.  
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation dot for 700 ms. 
For the two practice blocks of regular Stroop trials, the stimulus word then 
appeared on screen until a response was registered by the microphone, with 
the maximal reaction time restricted to 2000 ms. During the six experimental 
blocks, participants’ predictions were probed before the actual Stroop 
stimulus appeared on screen, by presenting the instruction ‘Next trial?’ on 
screen until participants clicked one of the two response box buttons, 
followed by a fixation dot for 1000 ms. The moment the voice key was 
triggered in response to the Stroop stimuli, the stimulus word shortly tilted 
20° to the right for 300 ms before the fixation dot reappeared on the screen 
and the experimenter coded the actual response given by the subject (thereby 
jittering the RSI). When the voice key was triggered too early (caused by a 
noise other than the participant’s voice) or too late (because of the 
participant hesitating, hissing or raising the voice during the response), the 
experimenter coded the trial as a false alarm. A scheme of the experimental 
procedure described above is visualized in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Timing values and sequence of events for one trial of the experimental procedure. The 
prediction prompt ‘Next Trial’ remained on the screen until a prediction response was detected. Similarly, 
the Stroop trial remained on screen until a vocal response was detected by the voice key. Following 
response registration, the Stroop stimulus shortly tilted to the right for 300 ms, after which the 
experimenter coded the response, thereby jittering the response-to-stimulus interval.  
 
EEG DATA PROCESSING 
All EEG processing was performed using the MATLAB extension 
EEGLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and the EEGLAB plug-in ERPLAB 
(Lopez-Calderon & Luck, 2010). The continuous EEG signal was filtered 
off-line with a high-pass filter of 0.16 Hz and down-sampled to 256 Hz. 
Independent component analysis (ICA) was conducted to identify and 
remove stereotypical eye blink and horizontal eye movement components. 
Next, a blind source separation algorithm on the basis of canonical 
correlation analysis (BSS-CCA; De Clercq, Vergult, Vanrumste, Van 
Paesschen, & Van Huffel, 2006) was applied in order to reduce the EMG 
artefacts in the EEG at the moment of the response, induced by articulation 
during our vocal Stroop task procedure (see also De Vos et al., 2010; Riès, 
Janssen, Dufau, Alario, & Burle, 2010). Remaining artefacts were rejected 
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by visual inspection of all traces, guided by automatic artefact detection 
algorithms that marked segments with amplitudes exceeding ±200 μV or 
transitional sample-to-sample thresholds of 150 μV, as well as segments for 
which the difference between the most positive and most negative peak in a 
moving window of 200 ms exceeded 150 μV.  
 ERP DATA ANALYSIS 
We first recoded participants’ absolute predictions about the 
upcoming congruency level relative to the congruency level of the previous 
trial, thereby creating congruency level repetition and alternation 
predictions. For the pre-stimulus EEG data, we focused on predictions that 
followed on correct Stroop trials, excluding segments following on an 
incorrect response or voice key error. Predictions faster than 200 ms or 
slower than 1000 ms were not analyzed. As a consequence, the data of one 
participant did not enter the prediction analysis, because of a data rejection 
rate that was more than 2 SD higher than the grand mean. For the other 15 
participants, this data trimming procedure excluded on average 16.7% (SD = 
6.7) of segments. In a next step, artefact detection routines described above 
led to the removal of another 3.3% (SD = 2.7) of the remaining data.  
Next, cue-locked segments starting 200 ms before until 2200 ms after 
the onset of the prediction prompt (i.e., ‘Next trial?’) were created. The 200 
ms prior to cue onset served as a baseline. Effects of predictions were 
analyzed at electrode Cz and the two adjacent electrode sites C1 and C2 
(similar to Fan et al., 2007), in the time-window between 400 and 1200 ms. 
The latter time-point (1200 ms) refers to the earliest moment in time (given 
the fastest prediction reaction time of 200 ms and a 1000 ms preparatory 
interval) where sensory processing of the Stroop stimulus influenced the 
ERP
2
. Measured voltages were averaged across sites prior to analyses.  
                                                     
2
  We opted for a cue-locked analysis of the data rather than prediction-locked 
analysis for two reasons. First, we assumed that preparatory activity started before 
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For the post-stimulus EEG analysis of Stroop performance, incorrect 
trials, trials following on an error or voice key failure, as well as reaction 
times not fitting the outlier criterion (<300 ms or >1500 ms) were excluded 
from the individual-subjects ERP averages (M = 14. 3%, SD = 5.4). In a next 
step, the artefact detection routines described above led to the exclusion of 
one participant, since more than half of the available trials were 
contaminated by artefacts. For the remaining 15 participants, artefact 
detection led to the exclusion of 4.7% (SD = 6.7) of the remaining data.  
The EEG was segmented into condition-related epochs time-locked to 
stimulus presentation, starting from 200 ms before until 1500 ms after 
stimulus offset. Then, averages for each congruency sequence (CC, CI, IC, 
II) were derived separately for repetition and alternation predictions. The 
resulting ERPs were baseline-corrected using the 200 ms pre-stimulus 
window. Selection of the electrode sites for the electrophysiological analysis 
was based on previous findings reporting early fronto-medial and late 
posterior-parietal Stroop conflict ERP modulations (Larson et al., 2009; 
Liotti et al., 2000), confirmed by inspection of the scalp distribution maps of 
the current data (see Figure 4). The phasic fronto-central N450 was 
quantified as the mean voltage between 350 and 500 ms at FCz and adjacent 
FC1 and FC2 electrode sites. Following visual inspection of the incongruent 
minus congruent difference wave, the more tonic conflict SP was quantified 
as the mean voltage from 600 to 850 ms at Pz and adjacent P1 and P2 
electrode sites. Measured voltages for both components were averaged 
across sites prior to analyses.  
                                                                                                                            
participants made the prediction. Second, cue-locked analysis allowed a ‘neutral’ 
baseline period before cue-onset, whereas prediction-locked segments did not allow 
an easy choice of baseline. Still, an identical analysis on the prediction-locked data 
(corrected with respect to a longer baseline period between 1000 and 200 ms prior to 
predictions) yielded similar results. 
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RESULTS 
BEHAVIOURAL 
Predictions. On average, participants’ predictions matched the 
congruency level of the previous trial on 62% (SD = 9.7) of their choices, 
replicating the congruency level repetition bias reported in Duthoo et al. 
(2013). A one-sample t-test revealed that this percentage exceeded chance 
level significantly, t(15) = 5.1, p < .001. Moreover, there was no significant 
difference between participants’ repetition bias following congruent (61%, 
SD = 12) or incongruent trials (64%, SD = 11), t(15) < 1, ns. 
Stroop Performance. For the RT analysis, we first excluded voice key 
failures (M = 5.4%, SD = 2.4), errors (M = 2.1%, SD = 1.4), reaction times 
not fitting the outlier criterion (<300 ms or >1500; M = .09%, SD = 1.1) as 
well as trials following on an error or voice key failure (M = 6%, SD = 2.5), 
amounting to a total of 14.3% (SD = 5.4). Then, we ran a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with the within-subjects factors Prediction Type (two levels: 
repetition and alternation), Previous Congruency (two levels: congruent and 
incongruent) and Current Congruency (two levels: congruent and 
incongruent). After standardization, the actual amount of expected 
congruency level repetitions entered the ANOVA as a covariate Results 
revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(1, 14) = 16.82, p < .01. When 
participants expected a repetition of congruency level, a significant 
interaction between previous and current congruency (i.e., a CSE) was 
found, F(1,14) = 88.79, p < .001, that was absent when an alternation of 
congruency level was expected, F(1,14) = .27, p  = .6. This difference in the 
CSE between alternation and repetition predictions is depicted in Figure 2. 
The repetition bias did not interact with any of the interactions above (all p > 
.58).  
Mean accuracy was near ceiling (97.9%, SD = 1.4). Running the same 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean error rates, revealed only a 
significant effect of Current Congruency, F(1, 14) = 12.38, p < .01. The 
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interaction between Previous and Current Congruency, indicating a CSE, 
revealed only a trend, F(1, 14) = 2.79, p = .12. No significant three-way 
interaction was found, F(1, 14) = .46, p = .51. However, as the distinction 
between technical errors and performance errors is blurry (e.g., when 
participants correct their responses), these results have to be interpreted with 
caution (but see Duthoo et al., 2013, for evidence that error percentages 
follow a similar pattern as reaction times in a manual version of the 
prediction Stroop task that allowed proper error analysis). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Mean reaction times (RTs, in milliseconds) incongruent (dashed line) and congruent (solid line) 
trials as a function of the congruency level of the previous trial, separately for alternation and repetition 
predictions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean. 
  
ERPS 
Predictions. A repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects 
factor Prediction Type (two levels: repetition and alternation) and 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) on the averaged mean 
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voltages over the selected central electrodes during the pre-stimulus interval 
tested whether the CNV differed between experimental conditions. After 
standardization, the amount of actually predicted congruency level 
repetitions entered the ANOVA as a covariate
3
. For plotting purposes (but 
not for statistical analyses), the ERP data was filtered with a 5 Hz low-pass 
filter. 
The repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
Prediction Type, F(1, 13) = 5.79, p < .05. This indicated that the mean 
voltage was significantly more negative for alternation than repetition 
predictions, as visualized Figure 3A. This main effect of Prediction Type 
further interacted significantly with the participants’ actual amount of 
repetition predictions, F(1, 13) = 6.24, p < .05. This interaction pointed to 
the fact that this difference in the CNV between predictions was more 
pronounced the stronger participants displayed a repetition bias. When 
subtracting the mean amplitude voltage for repetition predictions from that 
of alternation predictions, the obtained difference score significantly 
correlated with participants’ repetition bias, r = -.52, p < .05, as visualized in 
Figure 4B. Both the main effect of Congruency and the interaction between 
Congruency and Prediction Type did not reach significance (ps > .30). 
 
 
                                                     
3
 We used these standardized values for the ANOVA. For plotting purposes, 
however, we used the actual (not standardized) values. 
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Figure 3: Cue-locked grand-average ERPs for repetition and alternation predictions averaged over 
selected central electrodes (A). The CNV was calculated as the mean amplitude between 400 and 1200 
ms, visualized by the grey box. The scatter plot (B) depict the correlation between participants’ 
congruency level repetition bias and the mean amplitude difference of the CNV (alternation minus 
repetition predictions). Negative values denote a larger CNV for alternation compared to repetition 
predictions. 
 
Stroop Performance. The grand average waveforms for congruent 
and incongruent trials and scalp distribution maps of the incongruent minus 
congruent (i.e., Stroop conflict) difference wave in the time window of 
interest are depicted in Figure 4, revealing the classic N450 in the 350-500 
ms time-window as well as a conflict slow potential in the 600-850 ms time-
window.  
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Figure 4: Stimulus-locked grand-average ERPs averaged over selected fronto-central and parietal 
electrodes for incongruent (dashed line) and congruent (solid line) trials. On the right, the scalp 
distribution maps for the incongruent minus congruent difference wave between 350 and 500 ms and 
between 600 and 850 ms are depicted. 
 
We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the within-subjects factor 
Prediction Type (two levels: repetition and alternation), Previous 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and Current 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) on the N450 and 
conflict SP mean voltages. Again, the amount of actually predicted 
congruency level repetitions entered the ANOVA as a covariate. For plotting 
purposes (but not for statistical analyses), the ERP data was filtered with a 
15 Hz low-pass filter. 
Analysis of the N450 revealed a significant main effect of Current 
Congruency, F(1,13) = 20.30, p < .01, indicating a more negative mean 
amplitude for incongruent compared to congruent trials. The main effect of 
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Previous Congruency also was significant, F(1,13) = 9.05, p < .05, 
indicating a stronger N450 for trials having incongruent compared to 
congruent predecessors. The interaction between Current and Previous 
Congruency did not reach significance, F(1,13) = .60, p = .45. However, 
mirroring the RT results, a significant three-way interaction between 
Prediction Type, Previous Congruency and Current Congruency, F(1,13) = 
5.11, p < .05, was found. Following repetition predictions, the main effect of 
Current and Previous Congruency were both significant [F(1,13) = 14.67, p 
< .05 and F(1,13) = 10.64, p < .05, respectively]. The interaction between 
Previous and Current Congruency was marginally significant, F(1,13) = 
3.74, p = .075. Following alternation predictions, only a significant main 
effect of Current Congruency was found, F(1,13) = 19.09, p < .01. All other 
effects were nonsignificant (all Fs < 1.56, ps > .23). Follow-up paired-
samples t-tests revealed that this difference in the sequential modulation of 
the N450 between repetition and alternation predictions, depicted in Figure 
5, was mainly due to a more negative N450 amplitude for IC compared to 
CC transitions following repetition predictions, t(14) = 3.32, p < .01, that 
was absent following alternation predictions, t(14) = .61, p = .55. 
Comparisons between CI and II trial transitions were not significant for both 
prediction types (all ts < .16, ps > .12). 
 
 
Figure 5: Stimulus-locked grand-average ERPs averaged over selected fronto-central electrodes for 
incongruent (dashed line) and congruent (solid line) as a function of whether the previous trial was 
congruent (black line) or incongruent (grey line), separately for alternation (A) and repetition (B) 
predictions. 
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Next, the conflict SP mean amplitude data entered the repeated-
measures ANOVA. In contrast to the RT and N450 data, the three-way 
interaction between Prediction Type, Previous Congruency and Current 
Congruency was not significant, F(1,13) = .78, p = .39. Yet, the interaction 
between Previous Congruency and Current Congruency, F(1,13) = 6.259, p 
< .05, was significant, indicating the presence of a congruency sequence 
effect in the conflict slow potential, irrespective of predictions. Follow-up 
paired-samples t-tests revealed that the sequential modulation of the CSP is 
mainly driven by a reduction in mean amplitude for II compared to CI trial 
transitions, t(14) = 2.51, p < .01. The reduction in mean amplitude for CC 
compared to IC trial transitions was not significant, t(14) = 1.69, p = .11. 
 
 
Figure 6: Stimulus-locked grand-average ERPs averaged over selected parietal electrodes for incongruent 
(dashed line) and congruent (solid line) as a function of whether the previous trial was congruent (black 
line) or incongruent (grey line), separately for alternation (A) and repetition (B) predictions. 
 
 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current study investigated how predictions about the upcoming 
congruency level influenced subsequent Stroop processing and interacted 
with reactive control adjustments (i.e., conflict adaptation or congruency 
sequence effects (CSEs); Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 2007; 2008). To this 
end, we verified the impact of predictions in reference to the congruency 
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level of the previous trial and contrasted the congruency sequence effect for 
repetition and alternation predictions. Replicating our previous results 
(Duthoo et al., 2013), we showed that participants were biased to predict 
congruency level repetitions. Only following these repetition predictions, a 
reliable CSE was found. Following alternation predictions, this CSE was, on 
average, absent. To better understand this pattern, we investigated whether 
repetition and alternation predictions differed in the relative amount of 
preparatory control, as reflected in the CNV, and traced the influence of 
conflict on the previous trial and prediction type on known EEG markers of 
Stroop performance.  
 PREPARING FOR SELF-PROPHESISED CHANGE 
When looking at the interval during which predictions were assumed 
to evoke preparatory activity in anticipation of the upcoming trial (see 
Umbach et al., 2012, for further evidence), results revealed a modulation of 
the contingent negative variation (CNV; Walter, Cooper, Aldridge, 
McCallum, & Winter, 1964) for repetition and alternation predictions. 
Previous studies have already suggested that not only motivation or motor 
preparation (Leuthold & Jentschz, 2001; Lorist et al., 2000), but also 
anticipatory attention (Fan et al, 2007; Strack et al., 2013) are indexed by the 
CNV  (see Brunia, van Boxtel, & Böcker, 2011, for a review). The CNV 
data indicated that alternation predictions, on average, elicited stronger 
preparatory activity. Moreover, the difference in the CNV between repetition 
and alternation predictions crucially depended on participants’ bias to expect 
congruency level repetitions.  
These findings are reminiscent of study by Vandamme, Szmalec, 
Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck (2010), who looked at EEG correlates of the 
task repetition bias in voluntary task switching (Arrington & Logan, 2004). 
These authors found that when participants voluntarily decided to switch 
tasks, a stronger CNV was observed. However, they did not correlate this 
difference in CNV to participants’ task repetition bias. As Stroop task 
performance also involves task conflict (Aarts, Roelofs, van Turennout, 
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2009; Steinhauser & Hübner, 2009), our findings may similarly suggest that 
predicting (and preparing) a task switch (changing from word reading to 
colour naming or vice versa) elicited stronger CNV activity, or, more 
generally, that context alternations increase demands on cognitive control. 
A recent study on anticipatory control in the Simon task by Strack et 
al. (2013) reported that rule (i.e., congruency) cues elicited a larger CNV 
compared to non-informative cues as well as cues signalling the position of 
the upcoming Simon conflict trial. As subsequent Simon conflict was 
effectively abolished following these rule cues, it was also assumed that 
stronger CNV activity reflected active preparation for the upcoming trial. 
However, much like in our study and in their previous research (Alpay, 
Goerke, & Stürmer, 2009), they failed to find differences in preparatory 
CNV activity between cues signalling congruent and incongruent trials.  
The current data do not suggest that participants refrained from 
preparing in anticipation of a congruency level alternation, but rather point 
to the contrary, especially when a strong repetition bias had to be overcome. 
This suggests that the lack of CSE for alternation predictions more likely 
reflects interactive effects between proactive, prediction driven adjustments, 
and reactive signals triggered by processing conflict on the previous trial. 
These interactions were further explored in known markers of Stroop 
conflict processing and resolution, reported below. Yet, one could also argue 
that the CNV does not reflect preparation but rather the prediction process 
itself. The correlation between the CNV effect (alternation minus repetition) 
and the choice bias speaks in favour of this hypothesis, as it is reasonable to 
assume that predicting an alternation requires more processing when one is 
biased more strongly to predict repetitions. In this view, the larger CNV for 
alternations might reflect the process of overcoming the repetition bias. 
However, the temporal pattern of the CNV suggests otherwise. The fact that 
the CNV effect lasts over the preparatory interval indicates that this process 
continues even after the prediction has been made, and therefore favours an 
interpretation in terms of preparatory processes. Initial attempts to correlate 
the CNV effect with neural or behavioural indices of Stroop performance, 
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however, failed. The correlation between the choice bias and the CNV effect 
could be interpreted as reduced preparation for repetition predictions 
(compared to alternation predictions) for participants with a strong repetition 
bias. This would indicate that the stronger the repetition bias, the more 
participants are tuned towards congruency level repetitions, both in terms of 
predictions and in terms of preparation, hence requiring less additional 
preparatory processes. However, more research will be needed to fully 
understand the functional meaning of the CNV and its relation to behaviour.  
SEQUENTIAL STROOP PERFORMANCE 
The vocal 8-colour Stroop task that was applied in the present study 
effectively excluded all potentially confounding influences of feature 
integration (Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012), and therefore was ideally suited to 
investigate both reactive, conflict-induced sequential modulation, and the 
impact of predictions on these reactive adjustments. Analysis of the mean 
N450 amplitude showed a modulation of the influence of previous 
congruency that was dependent on the preceding prediction type, much like 
the reaction time analysis. Crucially, the analysis revealed that following 
repetition predictions, both current incongruent trials and trials following on 
an incongruent trial showed a strong N450 (compared to CC trial 
transitions). Following alternation predictions, the N450 was not modulated 
by the previous trial’s congruency level, and no difference between IC and 
CC trials was found. Both aspects of these results – the difference in N450 
between CC and IC trials following repetition predictions and its absence 
following alternation predictions – merit some further discussion. 
Even though the overall interaction between previous and current 
congruency did not reach significance, replicating previous research in the 
Stroop task for both the visual (Larson et al., 2009) and auditory modality 
(Donohue, Liotti, Perez III, & Woldorff, 2012), the pattern of the N450 
following repetition predictions clearly suggested an influence of the 
previous trial on the processing of the current trial. Whereas Donohue et al. 
(2012) did not provide figures or further statistics, the plot of the sequential 
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N450 effect in the study of Larson et al. (2009; p. 666) suggests a 
descriptively similar pattern (i.e., a more negative N450 peak for IC 
compared to CC trials). Consistent with our findings, previous studies that 
manipulated the proportion of incongruent trials (and, consequently, the 
proportion of IC versus CC trial transitions) have generally found that the 
difference in the N450 between congruent and incongruent trials disappeared 
in conditions with a high proportion of incongruent trials (Lansbergen, van 
Hell, & Kenemans, 2007; Tillman & Wiens, 2011). Indeed, under such 
conditions, congruent trials are more often preceded by an incongruent trial, 
as reflected in a negative deflection of comparable size as for incongruent 
trials. Tillman and Wiens (2011) found opposite effects for the N2 amplitude 
(e.g., a more pronounced difference in high conflict conditions) in a flanker 
task, and previous studies consistently revealed a sequential modulation (CI 
compared to II trials) of the N2 (Clayson & Larson, 2012; Larson, Clayson, 
& Baldwin, 2012). This suggests that the N450 and N2 do not reflect the 
same underlying mechanism.  
Importantly, our findings question the notion that the N450 reflects 
the detection of conflict. Conflict detection is not assumed to play a role in 
the processing congruent trials, but still we observed a strong N450 for 
congruent trials following on an incongruent trial (after repetition 
predictions). Furthermore, an explanation of the difference between IC and 
CC transitions following repetition predictions in terms of expectancy 
violation (see Kemper et al., 2013) or inappropriate strategy implementation 
(Bartholow et al., 2005) would predict and equally strong effect for 
unexpected CC compared to IC trials following alternation predictions, and 
an even larger N450 for unexpected CI compared to II trials following 
repetition predictions. Instead, the N450 pattern is more consistent with a 
reactive control account, postulating increased control (e.g., suppression of 
the word reading process), that is activated in reaction to processing the 
current incongruent trial as well as triggered (or carried over) by the 
processing of incongruent Stroop words on the previous trial (Scherbaum et 
al., 2011; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009).  In this light, proactive control 
150     CHAPTER 5 
processes in the current study then entailed selectively overriding this 
controlled suppression of word reading following alternation predictions, 
thereby reducing the N450 for IC trials. In the RT pattern, this was reflected 
in a speed-up of IC trials following alternation compared to following 
repetition predictions, t(15) =  4.40, p < .01. 
In line with previous investigations (Donohue et al., 2012; Larson et 
al., 2009; Tang et al., 2012), analysis of the conflict SP revealed an 
interaction between previous and current congruency. This slow potential 
component, characterized by a parietal positivity and accompanying frontal 
negativity, has been consistently found in conditions where interference is 
increased (Liotti et al., 2000; West, 2003) and has also been suggested to 
reflect control processes implemented to resolve interference in conflicting 
(Larson et al., 2009) or bivalent (Rey-Mermet, Koenig, & Meier, 2013) 
stimuli. The observation that it was modulated by the congruency level of 
the previous trial, irrespective of participants’ expectancies, corroborates the 
suggestion that this component crucially reflects reactive adaptation to 
conflict. This was reflected in a less pronounced conflict SP for II compared 
to CI trials. Therefore, we interpret this finding to reflect activity of an 
attentional control system that biases attention to relevant stimulus 
information (Egner & Hirsch, 2005), in line with the notion that the parietal 
cortex is crucially involved in the resolution of stimulus-based conflict 
(Egner, Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Tang et al., 2013). 
In conclusion, our results suggest that alternation predictions do evoke 
preparatory activity, as reflected in a stronger CNV for predicted 
incongruent alternations. Yet, the EEG analysis revealed that performance in 
our prediction Stroop task seems to reflect an intricate interplay between 
proactive and reactive control processes. Firstly, the N450 appeared both 
sensitive to prediction type and the congruency level of the previous trial. 
More specifically, next to being more pronounced for incongruent than 
congruent trials, the N450 was enhanced for IC compared to CC trials. This 
finding questions the notion that this component reflects conflict detection 
(Larson et al, 2009; West, 2003), but rather suggests it to reflect a form of 
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control implemented to avoid early response capture by the word’s meaning. 
The N450 also seemed sensitive to expectancy-based adjustments, as it was 
greatly reduced for IC trials following alternation predictions. This was 
interpreted as a proactive, strategic tuning down of reactive control, speeding 
up performance on these IC trial transitions. Contrary to the N450, the 
conflict SP was only modulated by the congruency level of the previous trial, 
irrespective of participants’ expectancies. This is best captured in terms of 
reactive control models (Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 
2009), according to which attention to the task-relevant stimulus dimension 
is strengthened following conflict on the previous trial. Taken together, the 
present study showed that proactive and reactive control processes can 
tightly work together in order to engage in an optimal processing strategy to 
better adapt to the task at hand.  
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 CHAPTER 6 
GOING, GOING, GONE? PROACTIVE CONTROL 
PREVENTS THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT 
FROM RAPID DECAY
1
 
 
The congruency sequence effect, the finding of a reduced congruency 
effect following incongruent trials in conflict tasks, has dominated the 
research on cognitive control over the last two decades. This effect can 
reflect either expectancy-guided preparatory biasing in anticipation of the 
upcoming stimulus (i.e., proactive control), or phasic enhancement of the 
attentional set in response to conflict on the previous trial (i.e., reactive 
control). A recent study by Egner, Ely, & Grinband (2010) set out to 
contrast these two alternatives, by exploring the congruency sequence effect 
across a wide range of inter-trial intervals. It was found that congruency 
sequence effects were subject to rapid decay over time. This decay fits well 
with the notion of reactive control, while at the same time speaking strongly 
against the involvement of proactive regulation – which should also (and 
even mainly) be evident at longer intervals. In the present study, we first 
replicate a reduction of the congruency sequence effect over successive 
response-to-stimulus intervals (RSI) in a face-word Stroop task. In a second 
experiment, we then show that congruency sequence effects are observed at 
longer intervals, too, when the proportion of trials involving longer intervals 
is increased. These findings suggest a contribution of proactive regulation to 
congruency sequence effects, once conditions are rendered more favourable 
to commit to such.     
                                                     
1
 This chapter is based on: Duthoo, W., Abrahamse, E.L., Braem, S., & Notebaert, 
W. (Manuscript submitted for publication). Going, going, gone? Proactive control 
prevents the congruency sequence effect from rapid decay.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Attention regulation and action planning is determined by situational 
factors in our everyday environment. Past studies have mainly focused on 
describing these phenomena as simple action-reaction mechanisms, while 
the role of proactive, anticipatory action and attention regulation remain 
insufficiently explored (but see Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2007). In the present study, we set out to contribute to this issue by 
investigating the role of expectancies in trial-to-trial adaptations of cognitive 
control. More specifically, we explored the influence of a response-to-
stimulus interval (RSI) proportion manipulation on  the congruency 
sequence effect (CSE), an influential marker of cognitive control that 
inspired a wealth of behavioural and theoretical studies over the last two 
decades (see Egner, 2007; 2008, for a review).  
Congruency sequence effects (CSEs; also known as sequential or 
Gratton effects; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) refer to the observation 
that congruency effects are typically smaller after an incongruent than after a 
congruent trial. The mechanisms driving these sequential effects are subject 
to some major debates. Most prominently, the theoretical discussion centred 
on the question whether top-down, attentional control modulation 
(Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001) or bottom-up, associative 
learning (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; 
Schmidt & Besner, 2008) is the driving force behind these adjustments. 
Empirical studies aimed at disentangling these influences rendered it 
unlikely that the CSE can solely be explained by bottom-up effects of feature 
binding (Akçay & Hazeltine, 2011; Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Kerns et al., 
2004; Notebaert, Gevers, Verbruggen, & Liefooghe, 2006; Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2007; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005). The experiments 
reported in the current study, following Egner, Ely, & Grinband (2010), were 
designed to keep associative effects constant across trial transitions. 
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Therefore, we do not provide an in-depth discussion of possible feature 
integration effects (see Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Schmidt, 2013). 
Instead, we focused on a second major debate, situated within the 
perspective that CSEs reflect top-down attentional modulation rather than 
bottom-up associative learning. Specifically, it has been extensively 
discussed whether this attentional modulation is applied proactively or 
reactively. When the CSEs were first reported by Gratton et al. (1992), these 
authors interpreted them from a proactive, expectancy-based account, in 
which attention modulation is driven by active preparation for the upcoming 
stimulus, under the assumption that participants expect the congruency to 
repeat (as recently evidenced by a general congruency level repetition bias; 
see Duthoo, Wühr, & Notebaert, 2013, for support). However, others soon 
proposed a more reactive account, according to which the CSE is thought to 
reflect conflict-triggered enhanced attention to task-relevant information in 
order to maintain goal-directed behaviour – so-called conflict adaptation 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). More 
specifically, these theories postulate that the detection of concurrently 
activated and incompatible stimulus or response representations (i.e., 
conflict) results in a transient strengthening of the current task set. 
In a recent study, Egner et al. (2010) aimed to contrast proactive and 
reactive attention modulation accounts by exploring the time-course of 
CSEs. Specifically, they reasoned that whereas reactive effects can be 
assumed to be phasic, short-lived and thus subject to decay over time, 
proactive effects would take time to develop and remain more stable over 
time. By manipulating the inter-stimulus-interval (ISI) or response-stimulus-
interval (RSI) they showed that – in line with reactive accounts – CSEs are 
observed with short intervals (from 500 ms up to 3000 ms for ISI and up to 
2000 ms for RSI), yet disappear with longer ISIs and RSIs. Hence, as was 
later also emphasized by Van den Wildenberg, Ridderinkhof and Wylie 
(2012), this strongly suggests that adaptive attentional control is transient in 
nature. 
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However, this conclusion from Egner at al. (2010) and Van den 
Wildenberg et al. (2012) does not fit well with a small set of studies that 
provided support for proactive control in CSEs. Aarts and Roelofs (2011), 
for example, demonstrated that explicit cues predicting the upcoming 
congruency level with a certain probability also give rise to CSEs (see also 
Gratton et al., 1992), suggesting that not only experienced but also expected 
conflict (or absence thereof) can drive these sequential adjustments. Next, 
Duthoo et al. (2013) showed that self-generated congruency level repetition 
predictions also produced CSEs. Finally, Wendt and Kiesel (2011) reported 
support for the idea that proactive, temporal expectations can also 
strategically optimize attention allocation in anticipation of the specific to-
be-expected congruency level of the stimulus. To this end, they manipulated 
associations between stimulus foreperiods of different length and the 
proportion of conflict trials. When the long foreperiod was associated with 
an 80% chance of an incongruent trial, the authors found a reduced 
interference effect compared to the short foreperiod associated with 20% 
conflict trials. Importantly, no conflict modulation was found when the short 
foreperiod was associated with a high conflict probability, implying that 
expectancy-based interference control benefitted from longer preparation 
time. 
Moreover, the conclusion of Egner et al. (2010) and Van den 
Wildenberg et al. (2012) that adaptive attentional control is transient in 
nature may be premature when one considers the experimental design of the 
former study. Egner et al. (2010) themselves actually claimed that it was 
“quite favourable to the possibility of expectation-mediated improvements in 
performance at longer intervals, because the uniform distribution of ISI/RSI 
intervals produced an exponentially growing hazard function across the post-
stimulus/response intervals”. Indeed, as also suggested by the study of 
Wendt and Kiesel (2011), proactive, expectancy-based attention modulation 
may be optimally exploited when one not only knows what to expect (i.e., 
the congruency level), but also when to expect this. Yet, proactive control 
should also be considered more effortful than reactive control (Braver, 2012; 
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Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Locke & Braver, 2008). This suggests that it 
is most efficiently applied when preparation can be timed as well: knowing 
when it is most needed, avoids the high effort of needing to be prepared all 
the time. Apart from the fact that the probability of stimulus presentation in 
the study by Egner et al. (2010) increased with each passing interval, the 
random distribution of 10 different RSI or ISI levels may have hindered the 
formation of accurate temporal predictions, as the stimulus may occur at any 
moment in time. Under these circumstances, active and constant preparation 
becomes a requirement for effective proactive control, and this would – 
possibly – render it too effortful for people to commit to it. We here 
hypothesized that participants do not always take this effort – especially not 
in a demotivating laboratory task – and thus rely more heavily on reactive 
control. Indeed, as also indicated by Egner et al., Wühr and Ansorge (2005) 
employed ISIs of 1500 and 6000 ms and still witnessed a CSE at the longer 
interval – possibly because proactive control could be prepared for and 
implemented at a very specific point in time, thereby decreasing the overall 
effort as compared to more gradual interval transitions. 
To firmly enable the conclusion that CSEs are reactive rather than 
strategic in nature, one should also explore a design that is customized to 
optimally induce and/or steer proactive regulation. In the literature, 
proportion manipulations are typically employed to this purpose. For 
example, increasing the proportion of incongruent trials in the context of a 
conflict task reduces the congruency effect, and this is typically attributed to 
proactive, sustained cognitive control (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Bugg & 
Chanani, 2011; see Bugg & Crump, 2012, for a review). Moreover, within 
the domain of cognitive control, the proportion manipulation has also been 
applied to fore-periods (Wendt & Kiesel, 2011), or the proportion of 
congruency level repetitions/alternations (Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; 
Jiménez & Méndez, 2013). The idea is always that proportion manipulations 
render a particular task or attentional set more or less favourable, and 
proactive regulation is assumed to be at play only when the participant can 
use this to strategically adapt performance. The proportion manipulation has 
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also been applied across other domains to test for influences of strategic 
control, for example in multi-sensory integration (e.g., Van den Burg 
Olivers, Bronkhorst, & Theeuwes, 2008). 
In the present study, we first aimed to replicate the findings of Egner 
et al. (2010), by showing a reduction of the CSE with increasing RSIs in a 
slightly adapted design (Experiment 1). In a next step, we applied an RSI 
proportion manipulation to more optimally induce and/or steer proactive 
regulation, and verified how this manipulation affected the CSEs across the 
same intervals (Experiment 2). We hypothesized that the RSI manipulation 
would allow proactive control to be more efficiently and effectively timed, 
while at the same time enhance the motivation to commit to such. Apart 
from verifying the presence of a CSE at each interval, we also tested the 
hypothesis that CSEs decay over time more directly, by analyzing the slope 
of the CSE development across the four RSIs in both experiments. Whereas 
a purely reactive account of CSEs would predict a similar and negative slope 
in both experiments, an account that includes proactive regulation (affecting 
CSEs at the longer intervals) would predict the slope to be more negative in 
Experiment 1 than in Experiment 2. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Experiment 1 aimed to replicate Egner et al. (2010)’s findings of a 
gradual decrease in the congruency sequence effect (CSE) with increasing 
RSIs, using a slightly modified design. Whereas Egner et al. (2011) varied 
the RSI in a face-gender Stroop task across 10 levels between 500 and 5000 
ms, we restricted the RSI variable to four levels (ranging between 750 and 
3000 ms). As the CSE was effectively abolished in the 2500-3000 ms time 
bin in the study of Egner et al. (2010), we chose not to include longer RSIs. 
The method and procedure described below closely follow the method 
section of Egner et al. (2011). 
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METHOD  
Participants. A group of 29 Ghent University students (20 females; 9 
males; ages 17-25 years) provided written informed consent to participate in 
the experiment, lasting approximately 45 minutes.   
Stimuli and Apparatus. A program written with T-Scope software 
(Stevens, Lammertyn, Verbruggen, & Vandierendonk, 2006) controlled 
stimulus presentation and response registration. The stimuli, consisting of 
the word ‘man’ (Dutch for ‘male’) or ‘vrouw’ (Dutch for ‘female’) 
superimposed on a picture of a male or female face, were displayed on a17-
inch monitor. The pictures were randomly drawn from a stimulus set 
comprising 24 black and white pictures (12 of each gender). Each of these 
pictures could be coupled with a congruent or incongruent gender label that 
was either printed in upper or lower case (in red Ariel font), resulting in a 
total of 96 unique stimuli. These gender labels were placed on the centre of 
the face (approximately at the bridge of the nose) on all 24 individual faces 
so that the eyes and mouth were not obscured. Stimuli were presented on a 
grey background. Participants viewed these stimuli at a distance of 
approximately 60 centimetres. The face stimuli subtended between circa 
eight and nine visual degrees vertically, and between circa five and six visual 
degrees horizontally. The gender labels subtended circa two visual degrees 
vertically, and between circa five and seven vertical degrees horizontally. 
Responses were detected by means of the ‘K’ and ‘L’ keys of a Dell 
QWERTY keyboard. 
Design and Procedure. Participants performed a gender face-word 
Stroop task (Egner et al. 2008). On each trial they were presented a 
compound face-word stimulus, consisting of a face with a gender label 
superimposed onto, and were asked to react to the gender of the face as fast 
and accurately as possible while ignoring the meaning of the gender label. 
The relation between the gender label and the face’s actual gender could 
either be congruent (e.g., a male face overlaid with the word ‘man’) or 
incongruent (e.g., a male face overlaid with the word ‘female’). In response 
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to a female face, participants were asked to press the ‘K’ key with their right 
index finger, whereas in response to a male face they were supposed to pres 
the ‘L’ key with their right middle finger. The stimuli remained on screen 
until a response was recorded. In between two trials, there was a variable 
interval during which a centrally presented white fixation cross was 
presented. This response-to-stimulus-interval (RSI) varied between 750, 
1500, 2250 and 3000 ms. Participants performed four blocks of 161 trials. In 
between two blocks, participants were allowed a short, self-paced break. 
Speed and accuracy were equally stressed. A store coupon was rewarded to 
the participant who performed best, encouraging participants to respond fast. 
For each of the four blocks, the 161 stimuli were presented in pseudo-
random sequences that obeyed to some specific constraints. Congruency 
level and gender of the first trial, which was excluded from the statistical 
analysis, were randomly selected. Of the remaining 160 stimuli, half were 
congruent (C) and half incongruent (I). Taking into account the congruency 
level of the previous trial, each of the four possible sequences (CC, CI, IC, 
II) was presented with equal probability (e.g., 40 trials in each cell). 
Furthermore, each of these four cells was equally often paired with each of 
the four possible RSIs, resulting in equal cell counts across our three-
factorial previous congruency (two levels) x current congruency (two levels) 
x RSI (four levels) repeated-measures design. Over the course of the four 
blocks of the experiment, this procedure thus amounted to a total number of 
40 trials for each sequence-RSI pair. Next, each of the four sequences was 
equally often paired with a female and a male face target stimulus. These 
face target stimuli were randomly drawn from the stimulus set on each 
individual trial, with the restriction that the same face never repeated over 
successive trials. Moreover, for each successive trial pair, the gender label 
switched between upper and lower case. These constraints to the random 
selection ensured that no exact stimulus features were ever repeated on 
consecutive trials. Finally, each of the cells was on average associated with a 
50% chance of response repetition. In sum, following closely the design by 
Egner et al. (2010), we assured that potential associative influences (e.g., 
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Hommel et al., 2004) on the CSE were balanced out, leaving their impact 
equal for each cell of interest in our design. 
RESULTS 
Data Cleaning. Mean RTs and error percentages were calculated for 
each cell of the design. Before entering the statistical analyses, the data were 
subjected to a trimming procedure. First, extreme RTs
2
 (>3000 ms; .1%) as 
well as the first trial of each block were removed from the analyses, 
amounting to .7%. Next, we excluded performance errors (2.6%) as well as 
data points that deviated more than 2 SD from the subject’s grand mean RT 
(4.1%). In analyzing sequential effects, the common procedure is to further 
eliminate the response following an error trial as well (another 2.3%). Taken 
together, the RT analysis was thus carried out on the remaining 90.3% of 
data.    
Reaction Times. We ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factors RSI (four levels: 750 ms, 1500 ms, 2250 ms and 
3000 ms), Previous Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and 
Current Congruency (two levels, congruent and incongruent) on the mean 
RTs to verify the impact of the four RSIs on the size of the CSE. In order to 
correct for violations of sphericity, Huynh-Feldt corrected p-values are 
reported. For the sake of clarity, we report the nonadjusted degrees of 
freedom for the accompanying F-values. Follow-up analyses included 
planned tests verifying whether the CSE score [calculated with the following 
formula: (CI-CC)-(II-IC)] significantly deviated from zero for each of the 
RSI bins separately, as well as planned pair-wise comparisons between CSE 
scores at different RSI levels. We also calculated the slope of the CSE scores 
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 Because we did not implement a response deadline, extreme RTs (up to 11.4 
seconds) were registered. These nonrepresentative trials disproportionally affected 
the SDs and thus were first excluded from the analysis. 
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over these four time bins. A one-sample t-test was carried out to verify 
whether this slope was significantly different from zero. 
The three-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of Current Congruency, F(1, 28) = 67.81, p < .001, evidencing a 
standard Stroop interference effect: responses to congruent trials (M = 568, 
SD = 11) were faster than responses to incongruent trials (M = 593, SD = 
13). The two-way interaction between Previous and Current Congruency 
was also significant, F(1, 28) = 18.14, p < .001, reflecting a standard CSE. 
As is depicted in the upper left panel of Figure 1, the Stroop interference 
effect was significantly smaller following incongruent (18 ms) than 
following congruent trials (33 ms). The significant three-way interaction 
between RSI, Previous and Current Congruency indicated that the CSE 
varied in size over the four RSI intervals, F(3, 84) = 3.37, p < .05. Planned 
one-sample t-tests indicated that the CSE was significantly different from 
zero only at the shorter RSIs: a CSE of 24 ms at RSI 750, t(28) = 3.84, p < 
.01, and of 26 ms at RSI 1500 ms, t(28) = 4.41, p < .001. For the two other 
RSIs, no sign of a CSE was found [t(28) = .40, p = .69 and t(28) = .44, p = 
.67, for RSI 2250 and RSI 3000, respectively]. Pair-wise t-tests between 
CSE scores showed that the effect was larger at RSI 750 that at RSI 2250, 
t(28) = 2.09, p < .05, whereas the difference in CSE between RSI 750 and 
RSI 2250 was only marginally significant (t(28) = 1.96, p = .060. The CSE 
at RSI 1500 was significantly larger than both the CSE at RSI 2250, t(28) = 
2.53, p < .05, and the CSE at RSI 3000, t(28) = 2.22, p < .05. The variation 
in the size of the CSE as a function of RSI is visualized in the upper right 
panel of Figure 1. 
To further characterize this variation in the CSE, we calculated the 
slope of this decrease in CSEs across the four RSI time bins (M = -8.4, SD = 
18.0). A one-sampled t-test confirmed that this negative slope was 
significantly different from zero, t(28) = 2.48, p < .05. 
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Figure 1: The congruency sequence effect in RTs and errors of Experiment 1. Left: Mean RT data (top) 
and error percentages (bottom) for incongruent (dashed line) and congruent (solid line) trials, as a 
function of the congruency level of the previous trial, displaying the classic CSE pattern. Right: The 
magnitude of the CSE (calculated as [(CI-CC)-(II-IC)]) as a function of RSI. Positive values denote the 
magnitude of the reduction in RTs (top) or error percentages (bottom) following an incongruent compared 
to a congruent trial. Error bars reflect the 95% confidence interval around the mean. Note:  º = p < .1  / * 
= p < .05 / ** = p < .01. 
  
Error percentages. Overall accuracy was near ceiling (M = 97.4%, 
SD = 1.6). In order to test whether error rates followed a similar trend as the 
reaction time analysis, we ran an identical three-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA on participants’ mean error percentages. The analysis revealed that 
incongruent trials evoked more erroneous responses (M = 3.4%, SD = 0.4) 
than congruent trials (M = 1.7%, SD = 0.3), reflected in a significant main 
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effect of Current Congruency, F(1, 28) = 30.49, p < .001. The two-way 
interaction between Previous and Current Congruency was also significant, 
F(1, 28) = 8.12, p < .05, indicating the presence of a classic CSE. As is 
depicted in the lower left panel of Figure 1, the difference in error rates 
between congruent and incongruent trials was significantly smaller 
following incongruent (.8%) than following congruent trials (2.4%). In line 
with the RT results, albeit only marginally significant, we found a trend 
towards a three-way interaction between RSI, Previous Congruency and 
Current Congruency, F(3, 84) = 2.59, p = .059, indicating that the size of the 
error CSE differed between the four different RSIs. One-sample t-tests 
showed that the error CSE was only significant at the shortest RSI interval, 
t(28) = 3.57, p < .01, marginally significant at both RSI 1500, t(28) = 1.87, p 
= .072, and RSI 3000, t(28) = 2.03, p = .052, and  nonsignificant at RSI 
2250, t(28) = .07, p = .94. Further pair-wise t-tests revealed only significant 
differences in the size of the CSE between RSI 750 and RSI 2250, t(28) = 
2.33, p < .05, as well as between RSI 750 and RSI 3000, t(28) = 2.26, p < 
.05. The variation in the size of the error CSE as a function of RSI is 
visualized in the lower right panel of Figure 1.  
To further characterize this pattern, we calculated the slope of the 
decrease in CSEs across the four RSI time bins (M = -.009, SD =.19). A one-
sampled t-test confirmed that this negative slope was significantly different 
from zero, t(28) = 2.63, p < .05.   
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 1, we replicated the main findings of Egner and 
colleagues (2010), using only a subset of RSIs. Results revealed a classic 
CSE pattern in both the reaction times and error percentages. Yet, a 
significant CSE in reaction times was found only at the shortest RSIs (750 
ms and 1500 ms), but not at the longer RSIs. Moreover, further analysis 
revealed that the development of CSEs across the four RSI time bins was 
characterized by a negative slope. These findings seem to corroborate the 
view of conflict adaptation as a transient and short-lived enhancement of the 
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attentional set that decays relatively fast with increasing RSI length. 
Alternatively, participants might have been inclined to ‘just’ rely on reactive 
control adjustments triggered by previous conflict, as the design did not 
sufficiently encourage expectation-driven preparatory attentional biasing: 
because the RSI varied randomly on a trial-by-trial basis, participants could 
have been discouraged to develop expectations about when the stimulus 
would appear. To put this idea to the test, we introduced a novel RSI 
proportion manipulation in the otherwise identical design of Experiment 2. 
 EXPERIMENT 2 
In a second experiment we tested the hypothesis that expectation-
guided, proactive control will emerge (and produce CSEs at larger intervals) 
under more favourable conditions. To this end, we manipulated the 
proportion of the different RSIs in the same gender face-word Stroop task: 
instead of presenting the stimulus at each RSI with equal probability, we 
increased the likelihood of stimulus appearance at the longest RSI to 55%, 
and only a 15% probability of occurrence at the other intervals. We 
speculated that this manipulation would a) allow proactive control to be 
timed more efficiently at 3000 ms after the last response (decreasing the 
overall load of preparation efforts), and/or b) enhance the motivation to 
implement proactive control at this interval (that falls beyond the range of 
reactive control) because it is presented more frequently.  
Second, we also presented participants one block of Stroop trials with 
a fixed RSI of 3000 ms, building further on the idea that proactive control 
benefits from temporal predictability. This extra block was introduced either 
before or after participants were tested on the mixed RSI blocks 
(counterbalanced). In case the CSE is purely captured in terms of conflict-
triggered, rapidly decaying attentional control adjustments, we expected to 
find only a CSE at the shortest RSIs in the mixed blocks. If, on the other 
hand, our RSI proportion manipulation induced strategic attentional control, 
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we expected a CSE pattern at the longer RSIs (either mixed or fixed) as well, 
in contrast to Experiment 1. 
 
METHOD  
Participants. A group of 50 Ghent University students (40 females; 10 
males; ages 18-38 years) provided written informed consent to participate in 
the experiment, lasting approximately 60 minutes. They received an 8 euro 
participation fee. Due to a misunderstanding of the response mapping 
instruction (indicated by an excessive error rate), the data of one participant 
was removed from the analysis. Two participants with error percentages that 
deviated more than 2 SD from the mean error percentage were also 
excluded.    
Design and Procedure. In this section, only changes to the design and 
procedure as compared to Experiment 1 are described. Participants 
performed five blocks of 161 trials. For each of the five blocks, the 161 
stimuli were presented in pseudo-random sequences that obeyed to the same 
specific constraints as described above. Congruency level and gender of the 
first trial, which was excluded from the statistical analysis, were randomly 
selected. Of the remaining trials, each of the four possible sequences (CC, 
CI, IC, II) was again presented with equal probability (e.g., 40 trials in each 
cell). For one of the five experimental blocks, the RSI was fixed to 3000 ms. 
In one condition, participants started the experiment with this fixed RSI 
block (n = 22), whereas in the other condition the block with fixed RSI was 
presented at the end (n = 25). For the other four blocks, the proportion of 
RSIs was manipulated, so that 55% of all trials were associated with the RSI 
of 3000 ms, whereas RSI 750, RSI 1500 and RSI 2250 were presented with a 
15% probability. Over the course of the four blocks, this procedure thus 
amounted to a total number of 24 trials for all sequence-RSI 750/1500/2250-
pairs, and 88 of all sequence-RSI 3000 pairs. 
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Overall, participants thus performed four blocks of the face-gender 
Stroop task in a mixed RSI context (750, 1500, 2250 and 3000 ms) as well as 
one block in a fixed RSI context (3000 ms). Again, a store coupon was 
rewarded to the participant who performed best 
RESULTS 
Data Cleaning. The data were again subjected to a trimming 
procedure. First, extreme RTs
3
 (>3000 ms; .04%) as well as the first trial of 
each block were removed from the analyses, amounting to .7%. Then, we 
excluded performance errors (4.3%) as well as data points that deviated 
more than 2 SD from the subject’s grand mean RT (3.8%) and post-error 
trials (another 3.8%). Taken together, the RT analysis was thus carried out 
on the remaining 87.4% of data.     
Reaction Times. We first ran a repeated-measures ANOVA with the 
within-subjects factors RSI (four levels: 750 ms, 1500 ms, 2250 ms and 
3000 ms), Previous Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and 
Current Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) as well as the 
between-subjects factor Order (two levels: fixed RSI first and fixed RSI last) 
on the mean RTs of the mixed blocks only. The between-subjects variable 
Order did not interact significantly with any of the within-subjects variables 
(all ps > .21) and is therefore not further discussed below. The ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Current Congruency, F(1, 45) = 49.26, 
p < .001, evidencing a standard Stroop interference effect: responses to 
congruent trials (M = 530, SD = 10) were faster than responses to 
incongruent trials (M = 554, SD = 11). The two-way interaction between 
Previous and Current Congruency was also significant, F(1, 45) = 16.49, p < 
.001, reflecting a standard CSE. As is depicted in upper left panel of Figure 
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 Because we did not implement a response deadline, extreme RTs (up to 7.2 
seconds) were registered. These nonrepresentative trials disproportionally affected 
the SDs and thus were first excluded from the analysis. 
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2, the Stroop interference effect was significantly smaller following 
incongruent (15 ms) than following congruent trials (28 ms). In contrast to 
Experiment 1, the three-way interaction between RSI, Previous and Current 
Congruency was not significant, F(3, 135) = .30, p = .81, indicating that the 
size of the CSE did not vary significantly over the four RSI intervals. 
Planned one-sample t-tests indicated that the CSE was significantly different 
from zero at all RSIs: a CSE of 17 ms at RSI 750, t(46) = 2.31, p < .05, of 12 
ms at RSI 1500 ms, t(46) = 2.20, p < .05,  of 15 ms at RSI 2250, t(46) = 
2.63, p < .05, and of 10 ms at RSI 3000, t(46) = 2.98, p < .01. Further 
planned comparisons indicated that there were no significant differences in 
the size of the CSE between any of the two RSIs, all ps > .38. The CSEs at 
the different RSIs are visualized in the upper right panel of Figure 2. 
As in Experiment 1, we also calculated the slope of the CSE scores 
across the four RSI time bins (M = -1.8, SD = 16.5). A one-sampled t-test 
confirmed that this slope was not significantly different from zero, t(47) = 
.74, p = .47, indicating that the CSE did not reliably decay over time. 
Next, we also ran a repeated measures ANOVA with the within-
subjects factor Context (two levels: fixed RSI and mixed RSI), Previous 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and Current 
Congruency (two levels: congruent and incongruent) and the between-
subjects factor Order (two levels, fixed RSI first and fixed RSI last) on the 
mean RT of all trials with an RSI of 3000 ms. Again, the between-subjects 
variable Order did not interact significantly with any of the other variables, 
all ps > .27. Results revealed a significant two-way interaction between 
Previous and Current Congruency, F(1, 45) = 6.88, p < .05, reflecting a CSE 
at the long RSI of 3000 ms, that was not significantly different between the 
four mixed blocks and the fixed block, F(1, 45) < 1, ns. However, for the 
fixed RSI block, the CSE did not reach significance, t(46) = 1.03, p = .31. 
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Figure 2: The congruency sequence effect in RTs and errors of Experiment 2. Left: Mean RT data (top) 
and error percentages (bottom) for incongruent (dashed line) and congruent (solid line) trials, as a 
function of the congruency level of the previous trial, displaying the classic CSE pattern. Right: The 
magnitude of the CSE (calculated as [(CI-CC)-(II-IC)]) as a function of RSI. Positive values denote the 
magnitude of the reduction in RTs (top) or error percentages (bottom) following an incongruent compared 
to a congruent trial. Error bars reflect the 95% confidence interval around the mean. Note:  º = p < .1  / * 
= p < .05 / ** = p < .01. 
 
Error percentages. Overall accuracy was near ceiling (M = 95.6%, 
SD = 2.7). In order to test whether error rates followed a similar trend as the 
reaction time analysis, we ran an identical three-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA on participants’ mean error percentages. The analysis revealed that 
incongruent trials evoked more erroneous responses (M = 6%, SD = 0.6) 
than congruent trials (M = 3.8%, SD = 0.4), reflected in a significant main 
effect of Current Congruency, F(1, 46) = 21.18, p < .001. The two-way 
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interaction between Previous and Current Congruency was also significant, 
F(1, 46) = 15.15, p < .001, indicating the presence of a standard CSE. As is 
depicted in the lower left panel of Figure 2, the difference in error rates 
between congruent and incongruent trials was significantly smaller 
following incongruent (.8%) than following congruent trials (3.6%). The 
three-way interaction between RSI, Previous Congruency and Current 
Congruency was marginally significant, F(3, 138) = 2.22, p = .11. One-
sample t-tests showed that the CSE was significant at the shortest RSI 
interval, t(46) = 2.96, p < .01, at the RSI of 2250 ms, t(46) = 3.18, p < .01 
and marginally significant at the longest RSI interval, t(46) = 1.96, p = .057. 
At the RSI of 1500 ms, however, the CSE did not reach significance, t(46) = 
1.00, p  = .32.  
To further characterize this pattern, we again calculated the slope of 
the decrease in CSEs across the four RSI time bins (M = -.007, SD =.36). A 
one-sampled t-test confirmed that this slope was not significantly different 
from zero, t(46) = 1.46, p = .15. 
We also ran a repeated measures ANOVA with the within-subjects 
factor Context (two levels, fixed RSI and mixed RSI), Previous Congruency 
(two levels, congruent and incongruent) and Current Congruency (two 
levels, congruent and incongruent) and the between-subjects factor Order 
(two levels, fixed RSI first and fixed RSI last) on the mean error rates of all 
trials with an RSI of 3000 ms. Results revealed that the two-way interaction 
between Previous and Current Congruency, reflecting a CSE at the long RSI 
of 3000 ms, was not significant, F(1, 45) = 1.84, p = .18, nor was it 
significantly different between the four mixed blocks and the fixed block, 
F(1, 45) = .547, p < .47.  
 Between-experiment comparison. In order to further test our a priori 
hypothesis that the relative decay of the CSE across increasing RSI time bins 
would be counteracted by the RSI proportion manipulation – and thus less 
steep in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 - we performed a planned 
independent-samples t-tests on the average slopes of both experiments (-8.4 
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in Experiment 1 versus -1.8 in Experiment 2). This showed that the 
difference in slopes between Experiment 1 and 2 was marginally significant, 
one-tailed t(74) = 1.63, p = .053. A similar analysis on the slopes of the error 
CSEs did not produce a significant result, one-tailed t(74) = .34, p = .36. 
DISCUSSION 
In Experiment 2, we introduced a novel RSI manipulation to test the 
hypothesis that increasing the frequency of stimulus appearance at a late 
interval increased the willingness to employ proactive control in order to 
cope with the high-frequent conflicting events at longer intervals – which are 
outside the range of reactive effects. In line with our hypothesis, we found 
evidence for a significant CSE at RSI 3000 that did not differ from CSEs at 
earlier intervals– thereby questioning the notion that CSEs solely reflect 
transient, rapidly decaying reactive control adjustments. In other words, the 
RSI manipulation seemed to have successfully triggered stronger strategic, 
top-down control adjustments.  
 Interestingly, even though not significantly different from the CSE at 
interval 3000 within the manipulated mixed blocks, the CSE of the fixed 
3000 RSI block failed to reach significance by itself. This seems to suggest 
that temporal predictability is not the only prerequisite for proactive control 
– the overall effort that accompanies proactive control and the willingness to 
commit to such effort might be equally crucial. Compared to the blocks of 
mixed RSI, the block with a fixed and long RSI might have been highly 
demotivating to the extent that proactive intentions for control faded. This 
trade-off between costs and benefits should be considered in future research. 
Further implications are elaborated upon in the general discussion. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the current study, we aimed to disentangle influences of proactive 
and reactive control on congruency sequence effects. Experiment 1 
corroborated the findings of Egner et al. (2010), showing that CSEs 
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disappeared at the longer RSIs. This seems to be in favour of the idea that 
CSEs primarily reflect transient, rapidly decaying reactive control 
adjustments in response to conflict on the previous trial. However, we also 
demonstrated how proactive control can be involved under specific 
circumstances. Experiment 2, in which participants were steered to expect 
longer RSIs, showed that CSEs at larger intervals will also become apparent 
under increased temporal predictability (e.g., Wendt & Kiesel, 2011) and/or 
motivation to implement control proactively. These results indicate that 
under favourable conditions, participants can be encouraged to implement 
control proactively, even in the demotivating context of laboratory 
experiments.  
By raising the probability of the longest RSI to 55%, we obtained 
robust CSEs at this interval in Experiment 2. It is interesting to note that also 
at the next-to-longest RSI of 2250 ms, associated with an overall probability 
of 15%, reliable CSEs were found (in contrast to Experiment 1). This 
suggests that proactive preparation was already effectuated at this point in 
time. As CSEs at the two earlier RSIs were significant in Experiment 2 as 
well, even though participants were primed to expect longer intervals, our 
findings do, however, indicate that the proactive, expectancy-based effects 
obtained here complement – rather than overrule – the reactive, short-lived 
control up-regulations discussed by Egner et al. (2010). Egner and 
colleagues also touched upon this topic in their discussion, raising the 
possibility that “short-lived ‘reactive’ CSEs that immediately follow a 
conflicting event might be ubiquitous, but that the presence of CSEs at 
longer intervals might be reliant on a different mechanism, such as the 
ability to maintain an attentional set over time, which may vary more widely 
across participants as well as between experimental contexts”. Given that 
intervals employed in many neuroimaging studies are typically relatively 
long, the present results now pose the intriguing question which underlying 
control mechanism these studies uncovered. 
Interestingly, the present study suggests that proactive control will be 
more effectively exploited not only when one knows what to expect, but also 
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when to expect it. Previous research primarily focused on the ‘what’ aspect, 
by either manipulating the proportion of incongruent trials (Gratton et al., 
1992; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 1982; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992) or 
the proportion of congruency level transitions (Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; 
Jiménez & Méndez, 2013). Even though the first manipulation was also 
successful in triggering anticipatory control, as reflected in faster reaction to 
highly expected incongruent trials than to unexpected congruent trials, future 
work (see, e.g., Bugg, 2012, for a review) has questioned the role of 
attentional modulation in these proportion congruent effects (but see 
Abrahamse, Duthoo, Notebaert, & Risko, 2013; Bugg & Chanani, 2011). 
The second, more subtle manipulation of congruency level transitions also 
appeared not strong enough to elicit expectancy-induced, strategic control 
effects that were clearly dissociable from reactive, conflict-induced 
adjustments (Duthoo & Notebaert, 2012; Jiménez & Méndez, 2013). The 
RSI proportion manipulation applied here thus seems a promising tool to 
further investigate strategic attentional adjustments. 
The here reported indications that proactive control can be involved 
only when rendering circumstances sufficiently favourable, align well with 
the notion that it is a more effortful procedure than is reactive control. 
Indeed, it is not so surprising that proactive control does not typically 
emerge in the enduring and uninspiring circumstances that our participants 
face while performing our laboratory tasks, with its many highly similar trial 
repetitions and low reward (punishment) for (sub)optimal performance. A 
recent study of Locke and Braver (2008) aimed to uncover the underlying 
mechanisms of how changes in motivational state modulate performance, by 
implementing reward incentives and probing for individual differences in 
motivation. Interestingly, they showed that sustained activity in cognitive 
control regions mediated motivation-induced performance boosts. More 
specifically, they linked the reward-induced behavioural improvements to 
participants relying more heavily on a more cognitively effortful proactive 
control strategy.  Even though the specific task design was different, this 
proactive control strategy also entailed “active maintenance of contextual 
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expectancies during delay periods (and even potentially across trials)” to 
prevent interference.  
Next to intrinsic motivation, we believe that also increased task 
demands may act as a call for increased effort (Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011; 
Song & Schwartz, 2008). This might be the reason why we failed to find a 
significant CSE in the block with a fixed RSI of 3000 ms. Even though this 
constant RSI allowed for a more precise temporal preparation compared to 
the mixed RSI blocks, the constant slow pace might have rendered our face-
gender Stroop task, which -due to its simple response mapping- already is 
not the hardest of all conflict paradigms, even less cognitively demanding.    
This study primarily served as a first step towards exploring if and 
under what circumstances proactive control may emerge in interference 
tasks. The RSI proportion manipulation adopted here can be seen as an 
effective approach to probe strategic control. Yet, we believe that another 
crucial aspect may be the willingness of participants to commit to the efforts 
that accompany proactive control. To further investigate these potential 
motivational aspects of proactive control, future research could, for example, 
selectively reward larger RSIs, thereby encouraging participants to prepare 
and implement control proactively in order to optimize performance on these 
long intervals. 
To conclude, we demonstrated how temporal expectancies can help 
modulate - and possibly promote a different form of - cognitive control. We 
suggest that the employment of such a proactive control mode could be 
dependent on a trade-off between task demands and the effort associated 
with proactive control. In other words, people seem eager to comfortably 
rely on the reactive mechanisms they are blessed with, until task demands 
call for more. 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
There’s a mental effect that you get from repetition over time that you 
can’t get any other way. 
. 
- Steven Drozd of the Flaming Lips. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decades, research on cognitive control has witnessed an 
enormous boost with the formulation of the influential conflict monitoring 
theory (CMT; Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). The 
intuitive and powerful feedback loop between conflict detection and 
resolution (i.e., the conflict-control loop) that lies at the core of CMT has 
inspired much of the behavioural work on the congruency sequence effect 
(CSE), the finding of a reduced congruency effects following conflict trials 
in interference tasks. The CSE seemed to neatly map onto the notion of a 
conflict-control loop, and soon became a central tool in the study of 
cognitive control. It has been used not only to inspire, advance and frame 
further theorizing about cognitive control (Egner, 2007; 2008) but also to 
garner insights into clinical pathologies as ADHD (Liotti, Pliszka, Perez, 
Kothmann, & Woldorff, 2005), schizophrenia (Carter, MacDonald III, Ross, 
& Stenger, 2001) and depression (Holmes & Pizzagalli, 2008). Moreover, 
aided by the rapid emergence of neuroscientific methods in experimental 
psychology, the theory’s clear predictions about the underlying brain 
structures spawned a vast number of studies aiming to pinpoint the neural 
markers of conflict detection (e.g., anterior cingulate cortex) and resolution 
(e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). 
Before the CMT, more descriptive theories of cognitive control 
(Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977; Norman & Shallice, 1980) ascribed a central 
role to strategic, voluntary control over attention in aligning our actions with 
goals or external task demands and overcoming automatic attentional 
capture. By means of typical tests of selective attention such as the Stroop 
(Stroop, 1935) and flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974), the early studies, 
for example, explained fluctuations in the size of the congruency effect in 
response to overall conflict frequency (i.e., to so-called proportion 
congruency effect) in terms of participants adopting response strategies. 
More specifically, these studies (Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Logan, Zbrodoff, 
& Williamson, 1984; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992) suggested that 
participants exploited the probability of the impending conflict and 
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proactively adjusted to these regularities. Similarly, in the first report on the 
CSE, Gratton, Coles, and Donchin (1992) put forward the idea that 
participants applied similar strategic adjustments following 
congruent/incongruent trials as they would do following 
congruent/incongruent cues, respectively. The CSE was thus explained by 
participants adopting either a broad, parallel processing strategy in 
anticipation of congruent trials, or a more narrow, focused processing 
strategy in anticipation incongruent trials, based on the implicit expectancy 
for successive trials with repeating congruency.  
As the CMT postulates that adaptive control adjustments occur in 
reaction to the presence or absence of conflict in the environment, 
expectancy – and the subsequent shaping of attentional settings (i.e., 
proactive control) – has since then been overlooked as a potentially critical 
player in cognitive control. Even though the CMT and related adaptation-by-
binding model (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009) offer an elegant solution 
to the question about how the cognitive system knows when and where 
control has to be upregulated in the direct face of conflict, the theoretical 
plausibility of biasing the cognitive system based on subjective expectancy 
before an upcoming stimulus event, merits further investigation. More than 
is the case for conflict tasks, research in the task switching domain has 
reported evidence for such expectancy-driven adjustments in adapting to 
situational demands (Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002; Dreisbach & 
Haider, 2006). Therefore, the present thesis reconsidered the role of 
expectancies as a possible source modulating performance in congruency 
and task switching paradigms, and set out to investigate how and to what 
extent expectancies can shape and steer attention and mental flexibility. 
Interactions between these proactive (expectancy- or prediction-driven) and 
reactive (conflict- or stimulus-driven) sources of cognitive control were also 
considered. Before discussing the broader theoretical implications, the 
empirical work on the interplay between reactive and proactive cognitive 
control presented in this thesis, is shortly reviewed. 
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RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
 In Chapter 2, the relative contributions of two possible sources of 
attentional control underlying the CSE were evaluated (while potential 
confounding effects of feature integration were optimally controlled for). We 
created experimental conditions that either favoured or discouraged 
repetition expectancies: In the repetition condition, we raised the probability 
of a congruency level repetition to 70%, whereas these repetitions occurred 
only with a 30% probability in the alternation condition. This allowed us to 
investigate whether control adjustments were triggered by participants’ 
inherent expectancy for repeating stimulus conditions, or rather merely 
reflected conflict-induced attentional focussing. Results revealed that the 
CSE was present in the repetition condition, but not in the alternation 
condition. Even though this seems suggestive of participants proactively 
exploiting the global transitional probabilities and prepare accordingly, this 
difference between conditions disappeared when looking for a transfer of the 
induced expectancies to a test block, in which repetitions and alternations of 
the congruency level were equally likely. Moreover, a comparison of trial 
sequences with a similar conflict history within each of the manipulated 
conditions revealed that the local context (i.e., recent conflict history) was 
crucially driving the CSE in the experiment. Overall, then, the study 
concluded that robust CSEs can be found in the absence of feature 
integration effects, but that the implicit manipulation of repetition 
expectancy did not modulate the CSE. In contrast, an interpretation of the 
CSE in terms of cumulative, reactive, trial-to-trial adjustments best fitted the 
data pattern. 
 In Chapter 3, a more direct approach was undertaken to investigate a) 
whether participants in congruency tasks display an inherent bias to expect 
repeating stimulus conditions, and b) whether such a bias affects the way in 
which they tackle potential interference from task-irrelevant stimulation. To 
this end, participants were asked to explicitly produce a prediction about the 
upcoming congruency level. Over four experiments, it was consistently 
found that participants indeed display a congruency level repetition bias. 
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Next, the impact of such repetition expectancy was verified by separately 
calculating the CSE for repetition and alternation predictions. Interestingly, 
only following a predicted repetition of the congruency level, a CSE 
emerged. The CSE was much smaller and mostly absent following 
alternation predictions. This differential impact of repetition and alternation 
predictions on performance was explained by assuming interactive effects of 
reactive and proactive influences, complementing each other following 
repetition predictions, yet cancelling each other out following alternation 
predictions. As an alternative explanation, the possibility was raised that 
participants switched to a neutral control mode (and refrain from preparing) 
in anticipation of a predicted change in task difficulty, but maintained 
attentional control settings when predicting a repetition.  
 Following a similar logic as the experiments described in Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 reported on a task switching study in which participants were 
asked to explicitly indicate which of the two tasks they expected on the 
following trial. Irrespective of these expectancies, the colour of the number 
target signified whether a parity or magnitude judgment had to be 
performed. Switch probability was varied from 30% over 50% to 70% in 
three between-subjects conditions. Much like in the Stroop task reported in 
Chapter 3, participants displayed a clear repetition bias. In all three 
conditions, task repetitions were significantly over-predicted. Interestingly, 
this bias was most pronounced in the condition with a high switch 
probability. Moreover, the study replicated the finding of a reduced switch 
cost with increasing switch probability (Mayr, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 
2006). In all three conditions, the difference between switch and repeat trials 
was strongly reduced in anticipation of a task alternation, whereas strong 
repetition benefits (and/or large switch costs) were found following 
repetition predictions. These findings suggested an explanation for the 
reduced switch cost with increased switch probability in terms of increased 
switch expectancy, and provided further support for prediction-driven 
control modulations. 
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 In Chapter 5, EEG was applied in an attempt to investigate the neural 
correlates of proactive and reactive control, using a similar prediction Stroop 
task as in Chapter 3. Behavioural results were replicated. In an attempt to 
better understand this pattern, we investigated the influence of conflict on 
the previous trial and prediction type on known EEG markers of Stroop 
performance. Analysis of the N450 component revealed an influence of 
predictions on reactive control adjustments: For alternation predictions, the 
N450 on congruent trials following an incongruent trial was significantly 
reduced. This suggested that alternation predictions countered or reduced the 
reactive slowing (e.g., increased control) on IC trials. The conflict slow 
potential, on the other hand, was not modified by predictions, yet showed to 
be sensitive only to the congruency level of the previous trial. We also 
compared the CNV to look for differences in preparation between repetition 
and alternation predictions. Results suggested that alternation predictions 
elicited stronger anticipatory activity, and that this difference was more 
pronounced the stronger participants were biased towards expecting 
repetitions. This again suggested that participants did not refrain from 
preparing following alternation predictions. Taken together, these findings 
suggest an intricate interplay between proactive and reactive control 
influences. 
 Finally, Chapter 6, focused on the time course of the CSE, building 
further on an article by Egner, Ely, & Grinband (2010). Here, reactive and 
proactive control accounts were played out against each other by varying the 
response-to-stimulus interval (RSI). According to a reactive account, CSEs 
primarily reflect transient strengthening of the attentional set following 
conflict. In this light, such account predicts CSEs to steadily diminish over 
time, whereas a proactive account would assume that the CSE needs some 
time before expectancies can build up and consequently grow stronger or at 
least persist over longer time intervals. In a first experiment, it was found 
that the CSE was indeed abolished at the longer intervals. However, by 
implementing an RSI proportion manipulation in Experiment 2, significant 
CSEs were found for these longer intervals. This was taken to suggest that 
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proactive influences on the CSE will emerge under more favourable 
conditions. Here, the increased temporal predictability might have 
encouraged participants to deploy proactive control over these longer 
intervals. Still, as also in Experiment 2 a CSE was found at the shortest 
intervals, this proactive influence seemed to have complemented (or 
strengthened) rather than overruled reactive control adjustments. 
THE CONGRUENCY SEQUENCE EFFECT: AN UPDATE 
Since the majority of the chapters relied on the CSE as a marker to 
probe both reactive and proactive control adjustments, an update on what the 
CSE most likely reflects seems appropriate.  
CONTROL OR EPISODIC MEMORY? 
As thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, a wealth of studies has been 
dedicated to the purpose of maintaining the CSE as a viable tool to study 
cognitive control, mostly by controlling for a broad range of possibly 
confounding episodic memory effects. Most notably, the partial or complete 
repetition of relevant and irrelevant features may evoke binding effects that 
critically mimic the pattern of the CSE. Notebaert and Verguts (2007) have 
suggested a multiple regression approach to statistically segregate influences 
of feature integration and conflict adaptation. They found that not all of the 
CSE is due to the binding and unbinding of memory traces. More 
commonly, though, researchers apply the strategy of expanding the stimulus 
set and then restrict analysis to a subset of trials with complete alternations 
(e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Kunde & Wühr, 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & 
Botvinick, 2005). However, such strategy leads to both increasingly complex 
response mappings and a less powerful statistical analysis restricted to a 
small subset of trials. To counter these shortcomings, we have construed a 
vocal 8-colour Stroop task that precluded repetitions of relevant and/or 
irrelevant stimulus features over successive intervals. This procedure 
allowed increasing the stimulus set while keeping the response mapping 
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intuitive. As has been consistently shown throughout this dissertation, the 
vocal Stroop task produces reliable CSEs, strongly suggesting a share for 
cognitive control processes contributing to the effect. 
However, the advantage of controlling for feature integration effects 
in an 8-colour Stroop task also comes at a price, which has received much 
less attention in this dissertation, and in the literature in general. Much like 
previous efforts that expanded the stimulus set, all experiments reported in 
this dissertation kept the rate of congruent/incongruent trials at 50%. With 
more than two colours, such procedure artificially increases the congruency 
rate, so that congruent trials occur more often than they would if features are 
selected randomly (i.e., 12.5% in case of an 8-colour Stroop task). As 
Mordkoff (2012) has argued, increasing the proportion of congruent trials 
forces the irrelevant task dimension (i.e., the colour word in the Stroop task) 
to become informative (see also Dishon-Berkovits & Algom, 2000, as well 
as Melara & Algom, 2003). As a consequence, participants might have been 
encouraged to pay more attention to the distractor word. 
This has been further explored in the contingency account by Schmidt 
and colleagues (Schmidt, 2013; Schmidt & Besner, 2008). The contingency 
account relates the CSEs to predictive relationships between stimuli and 
responses, rather than variation in conflict or biased expectancies. Both 
Schmidt and De Houwer (2011) and Mordkoff (2012) observed no 
remaining CSE when all contingencies had been controlled for. As a critical 
test, the vocal 8-colour Stroop task applied here could be modified to include 
only a subset of incongruent trials (fixed pairs of colour-word combinations), 
rendering contingencies for congruent and incongruent trials equal across the 
experiment, while at the same time controlling for effects of feature 
integration. If a CSE still emerges, a strong case for a cognitive control 
account would be made. 
In Chapter 3, though, behavioural effects found within the 8-colour 
Stroop task were further verified in a 4- and 2-colour Stroop task. Since all 
experimental effects were replicated, even in the 2-colour Stroop task where 
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contingencies were similar for congruent and incongruent colours, it can be 
assumed that contingency learning did not drive all of the effects reported in 
this thesis. 
CONFLICT OR EXPECTANCY? 
 As feature integration has been consistently controlled for throughout 
this dissertation, the CSE was interpreted in terms of adjustments in 
cognitive control. However, the question remained whether these 
adjustments were (partly) triggered by participants’ expectancies (Gratton et 
al., 1992) rather than (only) by the dominant notion of conflict-induced 
adjustments to the previous trial (Botvinick et al., 2001). Based on the 
findings of this dissertation, it can be concluded that he CSE is mainly 
driven by local, transient reactive control adjustments. In Chapter 2, conflict 
in the local trial history (or absence thereof) determined the reaction time 
pattern, irrespective of the global expectancies for congruency repetition that 
were induced by the manipulation. Even in a context where congruency level 
alternations were highly probable, scarce repetitions of congruent and 
incongruent trials produced increasingly shorter RTs. Also in Chapter 6, 
where the findings of Egner, Ely, & Grinband (2010) were replicated, it was 
shown that the CSE diminishes with longer intervals in standard congruency 
tasks, in line with the transient nature of reactive, short-lived enhancements 
of the attentional set. Even when participants were manipulated to expect the 
stimulus to appear at longer intervals, a reliable CSE still emerged at the 
shortest intervals. In sum, the CSE thus seems to mainly reflect the workings 
of a cognitive control mechanism that adaptively adjusts performance to 
comply with task demands in a seemingly automatic fashion, or at least 
exogenously triggered by previous trial events. 
At this point, a recent alternative account proposed by Schlaghecken 
and Martini (2011) should also be considered. According to this model, the 
visuo-motor system continuously adapts to the situational demands by 
tightening or relaxing its responsiveness in a context-dependent fashion, 
rather than through a conflict detecting and resolving mechanism. The key 
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argument was drawn from a critical review of the literature, suggesting that 
adjustments following congruent (and thus conflict-free) trials are more 
frequently and robustly observed. The authors further corroborated their 
claim in a series of three experiments, suggesting that trial-type repetition 
benefits were much more pronounced for congruent than incongruent trials, 
irrespective of expectancies (as similar results were obtained when the 
proportion of congruent trials was manipulated). Still, Chapter 2 revealed 
that reaction times decreased linearly with each consecutive repetition to the 
same extent for congruent and incongruent trials. Moreover, reactive 
accounts such as the CMT and the adaptation-by-binding model (Verguts & 
Notebaert, 2008; 2009) explicitly model such speed-ups in congruent trials 
following congruent trials, as it is assumed that control is decreased 
following low-conflict trials. 
 Therefore, we believe that our and other findings seem to be best 
captured by the CMT, or by its extension – the adaptation-by-binding 
account (ABBA; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009). This latter theory 
explains the CSE by a strengthening of stimulus-task associations through 
Hebbian learning in response to cognitive conflict. In this way, the theory 
bridges the gap between cognitive control and associative learning theories. 
The model further puts forward noradrenalin as the neuromodulatory force 
driving the adaptation. However, a study that applied the same vocal 8-
colour Stroop task to a group of Parkinson’s disease patients (Duthoo et al., 
submitted) actually suggested a crucial role for dopamine in bringing about 
the CSE. More specifically, the study found that PD patients tested off their 
regular dopamine medication regimen displayed a reliable CSE, that was 
absent in the same patients tested on medication. An explanation in terms of 
dopamine overdose seemed to best explain this data pattern. Also van 
Bochhove, Van der Haegen, Notebaert, & Verguts (2012) suggested a 
critical role for dopamine in trial-to-trial adaptations to conflict, by showing 
that blinking (assumed to reflect phasic dopamine bursts) enhanced the CSE. 
Clearly, these dopamine-driven modulations of the CSE form a challenge for 
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existing theories of cognitive control, and an interesting avenue for further 
research. 
 As a final note, the idea of reactive control adjustments has recently 
been taken one step further. Scherbaum, Fischer, Dshemuchadse, & Goschke 
(2011) discussed that conflict resolution and subsequent conflict adaptation 
might not be as clearly separable as initially thought, and proposed that 
participants can reactively detect and resolve conflict within the current trial. 
These within-trial adaptations are then carried over to the next trial, leading 
to sequential adjustments in the size of the congruency effect (i.e., a CSE). 
Within this view, the CSE more clearly reflects reactive adaptation to 
experienced conflict. A similar associative mechanism as present in the 
ABBA model to explain across-trial adaptation might be able to capture 
these within-trial adjustments, given a small tweak to the model’s 
architecture. The present dissertation also found some evidence that may 
seem compatible with the hypothesis that the CSE reflects carry-over effects 
of within-trial conflict adaptation: In Chapter 6, the CSE was found to decay 
rapidly with increasing RSI, consistent with its supposed transient nature 
(Egner et al., 2010). However, an RSI manipulation effectively counteracted 
this decay. This can be interpreted as qualitatively different proactive control 
processes complementing rapidly decaying reactive control adjustments, or, 
alternatively, as proactively maintaining these reactive (within-trial) settings 
at place during the interval. This is further discussed below.  
REACTIVE AND PROACTIVE CONTROL REVISITED 
 In this section, the evidence in favour of reactive and proactive control 
adjustments, as well as the need for such distinction, is critically discussed. 
Even though, as noted above, reactive control seems to dominate in CSEs, 
some indications for the involvement of proactive control can be identified 
in this thesis. Hence, even though in Chapter 2 the manipulation of 
expectancy failed to elicit strong expectancy-driven effects on cognitive 
control, the following three chapters (3-5) revealed evidence for prediction-
driven, preparatory control adjustments by explicitly asking participants to 
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generate predictions. Second, in Chapter 6 it was shown that under highly 
favourable conditions, proactive control adjustments might actually arise. 
However, these proactive influences seemed to complement and interact 
with reactive adjustments, rather than overruling these, and also seemed 
much more fragile than their reactive counterpart. In light of these results, 
how much explanatory power can be ascribed to expectancies? What are the 
limits of proactive, anticipatory control? And what theoretical implications 
for research on cognitive control do these findings suggest? 
ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE EXPECTANCIES 
 All of the chapters of this dissertation have looked for effects of 
expectancy on performance and measures of cognitive control. However, 
expectancy itself is not a unitary phenomenon. It can be shaped by the global 
probability or immediately preceding stimulus events, triggered by external 
cues explicitly indicating which event will follow next, or stem from 
internal, highly subjective sources. These different sources might give rise to 
expectancies that differ in strength and, consequently, their potency to elicit 
strong effects on performance. An influential framework by Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982) proposed that expectancies might vary on a continuum 
between more active and more passive forms. Passive expectancies are 
considered more automatic and effortless, while active forms of expectancy 
ask for more mental resources and draw from our limited attentional 
capacity.  
Jentzsch and Sommer (2002), for instance, applied this distinction on 
effects of subjective expectancy in simple choice reaction times. The 
findings of first-level and higher-order repetition and alternation effects in 
RTs and the P300 component through a build-up of subjective expectancies 
were related to the passive variant. Matt, Leuthold, & Sommer, 1992 found 
that instructing participants to expect repetitions or alternations (e.g., an 
active variant of expectancy) led to strong sequential effects in RTs. 
Similarly, our manipulation of the global probability of congruency level 
repetition (Chapter 2) or stimulus appearance (Chapter 6), on the one hand, 
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might have mainly altered passive expectancies for the more probable event. 
Still, as participants are becoming more aware of the frequency 
manipulation, active expectancies might arise as well. In this light, the less 
subtle RSI manipulation probably was more likely to be picked up by 
participants, thereby inducing active expectancies to a greater extent than the 
congruency level manipulation. Explicitly probing participants’ predictions, 
on the other hand, is the clearest example of measuring such active 
expectancies. Importantly, both forms of expectancy are assumed to work 
independently of each other, as they might show simultaneous but 
qualitatively different effects on performance (Jentzsch & Sommer, 2002).  
 Indeed, the studies in which participants were asked to voluntarily 
generate predictions clearly produced the strongest effects on performance. 
The sequential probability manipulation applied in Chapter 2, on the other 
hand, did not invoke strong enough expectancies to have an impact on 
performance. This was further corroborated in a study by Jiménez and 
Méndez (2013). These authors manipulated congruency level transitions in a 
similar way and found that Stroop performance was not strongly affected by 
these expectancies. They also measured participants’ expectancies in 
separate blocks and showed that participants’ prediction pattern aligned with 
the transitional manipulation, yet performance in the Stroop blocks showed 
reaction time patters in opposite directions of expectancies. Here too, 
expectancies in the Stroop blocks might have not been sufficiently strong to 
exert a clear impact. 
 Evidence from the task switching domain further supports the notion 
that more active expectancies produce stronger effects on performance. 
Koch (2003) used a fixed and predictable task sequence to look for the 
effects of subjective, internal expectancies on performance and compared 
this to performance when additional (redundant) external cues were 
presented. External cues reduced to switch cost to a greater extent than did 
internal expectancies. This was taken to reflect stronger preparatory retrieval 
of task-specific stimulus-response rules in the case of external cues.  
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 Anticipatory processes might sort even stronger effects on attentional 
and action control if these stem from goals, plans or intentions of the actor, 
rather than being steered by cues in the environment. In support of this 
claim, a recent study by Kemper et al. (2013) reported that self-generated, 
internally triggered predictions exhibited much stronger RT effects (reflected 
in the LRP, N2 and P300 component) than did external cues. In line with this 
presumption, work with the voluntary task switching paradigm (Arrington & 
Logan, 2004; 2005) has shown that task choices that were voluntarily 
initialized led to smaller switch costs than their cued counterparts. In a 
similar vein, the self-generated task predictions in Chapter 4 showed marked 
performance improvements when predictions were confirmed, and costs 
when they misfired. In sum, the extent to which expectancies are able to 
affect performance seems to crucially depend on the exact manipulation. The 
continuum between passive and active expectancies (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982) captures some of this variance.  
THE LIMITS OF EXPECTANCY-BASED PROACTIVE CONTROL 
The above discussion of active versus passive forms of expectancy 
already pointed out that proactive control seems limited to situations 
eliciting active expectancies. However, even within this scope proactive 
control has been shown to have limitations.  
Conflict Regulation. On a theoretical level, reactive control is 
assumed to boost the activation of the (attentional) response to the relevant 
dimension (by strengthening of the stimulus-response connections; Verguts 
& Notebaert, 2008; 2009) following conflict. Proactive control, in contrast, 
is hypothesized to involve the flexible and voluntary adjustment of the 
connections between the relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions, on the 
one hand, and the response on the other hand (see Aarts & Roelofs, 2009). In 
anticipation of a congruent trial, participants can widen attention, as to allow 
the irrelevant dimension to contribute more strongly to response selection. 
When expecting an incongruent trial, participants would, in contrast, focus 
attention more heavily on the relevant stimulus dimension. Related to this 
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distinction, it was further assumed that reactive control is task- (e.g., Egner, 
Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Notebaert & Verguts, 2008) and effector-specific 
(Braem, Verguts, & Notebaert), whereas proactive preparation can 
generalize across tasks (Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008). In sum, this 
brief and purely descriptive overview suggests that proactive control is 
considered a powerful and potentially even more flexible mechanism than is 
reactive control. 
However, the available evidence at present seems to point in the 
opposite direction. Wühr and Kunde (2008), for instance, showed that the 
regulation of expected response conflict in a Simon task, in which the 
irrelevant spatial location of the target interferes with the spatial code of the 
response, is restricted to strategically responding to the nominally irrelevant 
location. Cueing benefits for incongruent trials vanished when more than 
two stimulus locations were involved. In other words, changing the 
attentional weights for the relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimension (so-
called attentional weighting) cannot be proactively applied to reduce 
expected conflict. Reactive, conflict-induced regulation, on the other hand, 
has consistently been shown to elicit such enhanced attentional focus to the 
relevant dimension (e.g., Egner & Hirsch, 2005). Also in Chapter 2, it was 
found that repeated series of incongruent trials produced increasingly fast 
reactions; even in conditions were global expectancies led participants to 
expect that such runs of repeated incongruent trials would soon be broken. 
The findings of Chapter 5 also speak to this issue. Here, EEG markers 
revealed that even though predictions elicited preparatory effects, much of 
the data pattern seemed to be attributable to reactive control processes. More 
precisely, focusing attention on the task-relevant stimulus dimension, as 
reflected in the conflict slow potential component, appeared insensitive to 
the prediction type. Proactive control was limited to overriding reactively 
triggered response cautiousness on IC trials following alternation 
predictions, as reflected in the N450 component, or allowing the word 
reading process to influence response selection more strongly, reflected in a 
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speeding-up of congruent-congruent transitions following repetition 
predictions.  
A recent study by Rünger, Schwager, & Frensch (2010) also 
countered the assumption that proactive control would evoke across-task 
conflict regulation. Over three experiments, the authors failed to find carry-
over effects of anticipatory control (in contrast to Fernandez-Duque & 
Knight, 2008) from one task to the next. However, they raised the question 
whether one should indeed indentify voluntary adjustments that aim to 
optimize current task performance with such across-task spill-over effects of 
control settings. Instead, optimally preparing for a task switch would benefit 
from not being influenced by a previous task. Yet, to what extent can 
expectancies help in flexibly switching between two tasks? 
Task Switching. The role of endogenous preparation in task switching 
has been long and fiercely debated. Alternative theories have related the 
performance improvements associated with increased preparation interval to 
decay (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994) or stimulus-compound strategies 
(Logan & Bundesen, 2003). Nevertheless, a wide range of studies have 
suggested that preparation effects can be validly measured, and that 
preparatory processes are not restricted to advance task-set reconfiguration 
in anticipation of a switch (e.g., Brass & von Cramon, 2002; 2004). Instead, 
expectancy-driven, preparatory performance benefits have also been found 
for task repetitions. Dreisbach and colleagues (2002), for example, 
conducted experiments that varied the local, trial-to-trial probability while 
keeping the global probability for task switches and repetitions equal. To this 
end, they presented participants cues that indicated which task (or transition) 
was most probable on the upcoming trial. They showed that the slowing for 
unexpected compared to expected task repetitions was equal to the slowing 
for unexpected compared to expected task switch trials.  
In another experiment, Dreisbach and Haider (2006) further 
investigated preparatory adjustments in the task switching paradigm, by 
manipulating the global probability of task repetitions (e.g., creating 
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conditions with high versus low switch probability). Participants were either 
informed in advance about the global probabilities, or were presented with 
(redundant) probability cues that reflected the global frequencies. It was 
found that these expectancies about the upcoming difficulty had a significant 
impact on task processing: in conditions where switch probability was high, 
RTs for improbable task repetitions were strongly slowed. This effect was 
strongest with local cues, yet also in the condition where no explicit cue was 
presented on a trial-by-trial basis, participants were able to use the task 
probability information to strategically prepare for a switch (or slow down 
on improbable task repetitions). The fact that preparation effects were not as 
pronounced in the condition without local probability cues was explained by 
referring to the failure-to-engage hypothesis (De Jong, 2000), according to 
which participants do not always engage in effortful advance preparation. 
In Chapter 4, these findings were further expanded by showing that 
not only local or global probability cues, but also self-generated expectancies 
about the upcoming task can strategically influence task switching 
behaviour. The switch cost was strongly reduced by increasing the switch 
probability over three between-subjects conditions. This showed that 
participants adapted to the current task demands, much like in Dreisbach and 
Haider’s study. However, by selectively probing the task repetition 
expectancies on a trial-by-trial basis, Chapter 4 more convincingly showed 
that this reduction in switch costs in more demanding conditions is related to 
participants expecting more task alternations, and preparing for this 
accordingly: Following alternation predictions, the difference between an 
expected task switch and an unexpected task repetition was abolished. 
Still, even in conditions were switches were highly probable, an 
anticipated task alternation was responded to more slowly than a validly 
predicted task repetition. This residual switch cost at least suggests that 
advance preparation for task switches is restricted (e.g., there is a residual 
switch cost; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000; but see Verbruggen, Liefooghe, 
Vandierendonck, & Demanet, 2007) or that the activation advantage for task 
repetitions (Dreisbach et al., 2002; or adaptation to task-set, De Baene, 
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Kühn, & Brass, 2012) is not penetrable by preparation. Also in the voluntary 
task switching domain, voluntarily chosen task alternations produce a 
reliable switch cost (Arrington & Logan, 2004). This endogenous 
reconfiguration can be reduced, but not abolished, by increasing preparation 
time (Liefooghe, Demanet, & Vandierendonck, 2009). In conclusion, 
preparatory processes clearly play a significant role in task switching, yet the 
boundaries of this advance preparation suggest that other processes (such as 
interference or lack of facilitation from the previous trial) cannot easily be 
overridden.  
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS 
In the present dissertation, the distinction between proactive and 
reactive conflict regulation was primarily drawn on the basis of expectancy. 
Reactive conflict regulation is called upon when participants just 
experienced cognitive conflict, thereby reducing the impact of a next 
conflicting event. Proactive conflict regulation, in contrast, is recruited when 
participants are provided with advance information or when they have 
developed implicit expectancies about the conflict on the upcoming trial (see 
Aarts & Roelofs, 2009; Fernandez-Duque & Knight, 2008; Rünger et al., 
2010; Wühr & Kunde, 2008; for a similar classification). This distinction 
stresses the anticipatory and voluntary notion of the proactive control 
processes involved, whereas reactive control was assumed to be activated 
more automatically, in response to stimuli or conflict. A similar distinction 
between voluntary control, based on anticipatory information, and reflexive 
control, triggered by processing stimuli or stimulus features, has been 
proposed to explain proportion congruency effect at different levels (list-
wide versus item-specific; see Bugg & Crump, 2012; Abrahamse, Duthoo, 
Notebaert, & Risko, 2013). 
However, the concepts of ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive control’ have been 
introduced in a variety of other contexts and theoretical frameworks. Even 
on a purely conceptual level, the distinction may actually not be as clear-cut 
as it has been presented (or used as a working hypothesis) throughout this 
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dissertation. In a sense, control adjustments in response to a cue, which were 
introduced as clear examples of proactive control, can be considered reactive 
with respect to the cue. Similarly, control adjustments following conflict, 
which were consistently labelled as reactive throughout this dissertation, can 
be seen as proactive, considering that these adjustments eventually lead to 
reduce interference on the next trial. In order to solve this apparent 
inconsistency, we have opted to refer to the distinction between, on the one 
hand, prediction-driven or expectancy-based adjustments, and, on the other 
hand, stimulus-driven or conflict-induced adjustments. 
In an overview of the role of the medial frontal cortex in cognitive 
control, Ridderinkhof, Forstmann, Wylie, Burle & van den Wildenberg 
(2010) proposed a different taxonomy to differentiate between control 
processes that collectively aim to optimize performance. Online control, in 
their account, refers to the processes that enable the cognitive system to 
overcome incorrect or undesirable response tendencies in favour of more 
controlled, intention-driven response selection. This entails both the 
selection of the required action based on intentions or task demands and the 
inhibition of the activation of inappropriate response tendencies. These 
control processes are considered to operate transiently, and have been 
introduced in the context of within-trial conflict adaptation in the discussion 
above (e.g, Scherbaum et al., 2011). Next to online control, Ridderinkhof et 
al. (2010) suggest a more sustained anticipatory regulation of online control, 
which enables mitigating the undesired effects of unwanted response capture 
by irrelevant information. Within this anticipatory regulation of control, the 
authors suggest a further distinction based on crossing two orthogonal 
dimensions related to (a) the point in time that triggers the control 
adjustments and (b) the nature of these adjustmens. Reactive anticipatory 
adjustments are made contingent upon internal signals of processing 
difficulty, such as cognitive conflict or performance errors. Prospective 
anticipatory adjustments depend on explicit cues or instructions to anticipate 
and guide future processing. These anticipatory adjustments can strengthen 
online control proactively, for instance by modulating inhibition readiness, 
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or they can pre-empt the need for such online control, by filtering out task-
irrelevant stimuli or stimulus dimensions so that no conflict arises. 
When considered in this framework, the present dissertation 
contrasted prospective and reactive anticipatory regulation of online action 
control. Reactive anticipatory control was shown to strengthen online 
control, by selectively enhancing attention to the relevant dimension and/or 
decreasing the influence of the irrelevant dimension in response selection 
(e.g., blocking the word reading process). These reactive adjustments can be 
framed within the conflict-monitoring (Botvinick et al., 2001) or adaptation-
by-binding (Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009) accounts. Prospective 
anticipatory control, in contrast, seemed restricted to modulating these 
reactive adjustments, either by strengthening/prolonging (Chapter 6) or 
reducing these effects (Chapters 3 and 5). Both in the Stroop task studies 
and in the task switching study, these adjustments were not pre-emptive in 
nature, as a remaining conflict or switch cost was consistently found. 
Finally, it should be briefly mentioned that the distinction between 
proactive and reactive control is presented in yet another way within the 
increasingly influential dual mechanisms of control framework (Braver, 
Gray, & Burgess, 2007; Braver, 2012). Within this framework, proactive 
control is conceptualized as a sustained, effortful and metabolically costly 
maintenance of goal-relevant information which allows biasing attention, 
action and perception in a goal-directed manner, before the occurrence of the 
cognitively demanding event. Reactive control, in contrast, pertains to a ‘late 
correction’ mechanism, which detects and resolves conflict in a just-in-time 
manner, after the onset of the high interference event. Proactive control will 
be more readily utilized when greater or more frequent interference is 
expected. Reactive control, on the other hand, is necessary to resolve conflict 
when it is unexpected or infrequent (Burgess & Braver, 2010). Framed like 
this, proactive control is similar in scope and purpose to the way it was 
presented in this dissertation, namely to bias attention in anticipation of 
future events in order to facilitate their processing. Reactive control, on the 
other hand, is more conceptually similar to what Ridderinkhof and 
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colleagues (2010) have termed online control (see also, Scherbaum et al., 
2011). Still, most of the DMC framework has been tested in the field of 
working memory, using experimental tasks as the recent negatives (Jonides 
& Nee, 2006) and AX-continuous performance test (Braver, 2012, for an 
overview), rendering it more difficult to draw clear parallels to empirical 
findings in the cognitive control and task switching studies reviewed above.  
One of the key predictions of the DMC framework is that task performance 
usually reflects striking an optimal balance between proactive and reactive 
control. In task-switching studies, for example, participants may proactively 
prepare, based on a cue, for the upcoming task. As this is metabolically 
costly, participants may sometimes rely on reactive control, and retrieve the 
appropriate task-set in response to the target, rather than proactively 
reconfiguring in advance. This seems to be compatible with the failure-to-
engage hypothesis by De Jong (2000). Clearly, future research is needed to 
further explore the explanatory power of the DMC framework in conflict and 
task-switching studies. 
In the next section of this discussion, attention is shifted to the 
predictions themselves. Should these indeed be considered as an extra 
measure of proactive control? Do they reveal strategic biases that aim to 
optimize performance? And to what extent do they also reflect reactive 
influences? 
BIASED EXPECTANCIES 
Whenever participants were asked to generate predictions about the 
upcoming stimulus event, a bias to expect repeating conditions was observed 
that appeared remarkably consistent and robust across participants, 
experiments and procedures. Similar biased subjective expectancies have 
also been suggested to underlie the reaction time benefit for repetition trials 
in the context of simple 2-choice reaction times (Bertelson & Renkin, 1966; 
Remington, 1969). When such subjective expectancies were directly 
assessed, results also typically revealed that the prediction reflected a 
repetition of the immediately preceding stimulus (Geller & Pitz, 1970; Hale, 
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1967). In later theorizing, Gratton and colleagues (1992) likewise assumed 
that participants expect the congruency level (rather than the stimulus itself) 
of the previous trial to repeat on the next trial. Correspondingly, Dreisbach et 
al. (2002) also assumed that participants in task switching experiments might 
implicitly expect a task repetition more than a task switch. Both theoretical 
assumptions were borne out by the data. Below, the underlying strategy or 
motivation to succumb to such bias is further explored. 
In Chapter 3, this repetition bias was framed as a useful, adaptive and 
strategic tendency to perceive patterns and causality in a random 
environment. Indeed, looking at real life situations, such overestimation of 
repeating events does not seem all that counterintuitive: When approaching a 
busy road intersection in the centre of town, where people tend to cross 
without much further notice on the traffic passing by, it is usually a good 
idea to predict that at the next intersection the situation will be similar, and 
keep the control settings (e.g., more deliberate and careful driving, and a 
heightened vigilance for unexpected events) at place to cope with the next 
situation. In other words, there usually is a much higher correlation between 
successive events than in the random environments created in a controlled 
laboratory setting. Overpredicting repeating events might thus reflect an 
adaptive heuristic to confront new situations. As participants were asked to 
predict the upcoming event as accurately as possible, they were also 
implicitly encouraged to look for a systematic relationship between 
successive trial events 
However, participants’ predictions might be subject to other heuristics 
and strategies as well (Kahneman & Tversky, 1974). Kareev (1995), for 
example, showed that people are biased towards repeating the response that 
was successful on the previous trial when predicting simple stimulus events. 
In a similar vein, congruency level predictions also seemed to be influenced 
by the correctness of the prediction on the previous trial. Following a correct 
prediction, participants displayed a strong repetition bias (ranging between 
68% and 80% across the four experiments in Chapter 3), whereas following 
incorrect predictions participants opted for a congruency level repetition and 
GENERAL DISCUSSION     211 
alternation equally often. This corresponds well with neuro-imaging 
evidence suggesting that people display an inherent tendency to perceive and 
expect repetition sequences (Huettel, Mack, & McCarthy, 2002), as well as 
with research on decision-making under uncertainty evidencing a win-
stay/lose-shift strategy in people’s sequence of predictions. Paulus et al. 
(2001), for example, asked participants to try to predict whether the 
upcoming stimulus would appear left or right on the screen, and reinforced 
these predictions randomly. Much like in the experiments reported in this 
thesis, participants did not know which response would be correct on a given 
trial. Yet, even with such random reinforcement, Paulus and colleagues also 
found that participants did not select their responses randomly, but rather 
seemed to prefer to repeat the response that was correct on the previous trial. 
Taken together, these findings suggest that in unpredictable environments, 
like most psychological experiments, people employ strategies to guide their 
behaviour. 
 This opens the intriguing possibility that participants’ predictions 
were also, to some extent dependent on performance on the previous trial, 
and in this respect also reactive. When predictions were successful, a 
stronger bias to expect repeated stimulus events was found. Still, as 
participants actually predict congruency level (and not congruency repetition 
or alternation), this suggests that participants tend to repeat a (correct) 
response. When predictions misfired, participants might have more carefully 
considered their prediction, opting for an alternation equally often as a 
repetition. On average, alternations were predicted more slowly than 
repetitions (Chapter 4) and they also elicited a stronger CNV, especially 
when participants were strongly biased to expect repetitions (Chapter 5). 
Research with the voluntary task switching paradigm similarly revealed that 
participants are strongly biased to execute the same task on successive trials 
(Arrington & Logan, 2004) and that self-generated task alternations elicited 
a more negative CNV (Vandamme, Szmalec, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 
2010). Moreover, reactive, stimulus-driven factors also play an important 
role in the task repetition bias, as its size is affected by priming due to 
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stimulus repetition (Mayr & Bell, 2006) or previously learned stimulus-task 
associations (Demanet, Verbruggen, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2010).  
Being biased to expect, predict or execute repetitions of stimulus or 
task conditions is also reasonable when one assumes that repetitions are 
easier to perform. Put differently, the cost of incorrectly preparing for an 
alternation is much higher than the cost for incorrectly preparing for a task 
repetition (Dreisbach et al., 2002). Further consideration of the efforts and 
costs associated with proactive, expectancy-based control seems like a 
promising avenue for further research. Together with some other future 
possibilities, this is discussed in the final section below. 
MERITS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This dissertation’s main merit lies in a thorough investigation of the 
role of expectancies in cognitive control, which hopefully may have 
deepened our understanding of the nature and limits of proactive cognitive 
control, and serve as a reference point for further research. Based on the five 
experimental chapters, the conclusion can be drawn that expectancies, in 
general, only play a minor role in aligning our behaviour with external task 
demands, when they are not explicitly manipulated or registered. Usually, 
the cognitive system can readily rely on less effortful, reactive control 
adjustments to maintain a sufficient level of performance. In most cases, 
detecting and resolving cognitive conflicts as they occur may indeed form a 
more adaptive strategy than proactively preparing for these before they 
occur. The latter presumably draws more strongly from our limited attention 
capacity, which consequently cannot be dedicated to other, potentially more 
rewarding things. Below, some of the further theoretical implications are 
highlighted, and accompanying suggestions for future research are 
mentioned. 
On a theoretical level, this dissertation firmly grounded the 
congruency sequence effect as useful tool to investigate (reactive) control, 
and gave a clear answer to what it most likely does not reflect. Future 
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research is needed, though, to further investigate the relative contribution of 
associative influences (e.g., contingency learning) that have not been 
controlled for in this dissertation and in the literature in general (Schmidt, 
2013). With some additional tweaks in the design, the vocal 8-colour Stroop 
task that has been applied in many of the empirical chapters might be a 
promising paradigm to control for both contingencies and feature repetitions. 
It can also be readily applied to further constrain existing accounts of the 
CSE. Using this vocal Stroop task, a study on reactive control in Parkinson’s 
disease patients highlighted a crucial role for dopamine in bringing about the 
CSE (Duthoo et al., submitted), challenging current models of reactive 
control to integrate this neurotransmitter. Yet, as dopamine has also been 
implicated to interfere with proactive control and attentional focusing (Aarts, 
van Holstein, & Cools, 2011), it might also be interesting to investigate the 
effects of dopaminergic medication on performance in the prediction Stroop 
task. 
As a second theoretical contribution, Chapter 2 clearly showed that 
implicit manipulations of expectancies in interference tasks are usually too 
subtle to elicit strong effects. However, the findings of Chapter 6 suggested 
that proactive control may effectively emerge (potentially indirectly, via 
strengthening of reactive control) under more favourable circumstances. 
Next to temporal expectancy, another crucial aspect may pertain to the 
willingness of participants to commit to the efforts that accompany proactive 
control. A more thorough investigation of these motivational aspects of 
proactive control may constitute an interesting future line of research. To 
this end, encouraging participants more strongly to prepare and implement 
control proactively by means of rewards seems a promising research 
strategy. To investigate the effect of reward on proactive conflict regulation, 
one could selectively reward fast responses to correctly predicted 
incongruent trials in the prediction Stroop task, or the longer RSIs in the 
variable RSI face-word Stroop task. In a similar vein, the effect of reward on 
task switching could be probed by selectively rewarding fast reactions to 
correctly predicted task alternations (but see Nieuwenhuis & Monsell, 2002). 
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Apart from the willingness to engage in proactive control, also individual 
differences in processing capacity or working memory might play a crucial 
role. This could be investigated by relating measures of working memory to 
participants’ ability to exploit the transitional probabilities or task structure 
(as in Chapter 2) in preparing for upcoming difficulty.  
On an empirical level, the experimental strategy to probe participants’ 
expectancies more explicitly has proven a fruitful tool to uncover structural 
biases in predictions and proactive influences on conflict and task-set 
control. As such, it may also be interesting to apply it to response inhibition 
paradigms, where the distinction between reactive and proactive stopping 
has recently attracted considerable research interest (Aron, 2011), and look 
for preparatory control over stopping inappropriate responses. An extra 
advantage of this paradigm is that the predictions themselves can be 
considered as an additional measure to capture ‘the elusive homunculus’ 
(Arrington & Logan, 2005) on top of the traditional analysis of RTs and 
performance errors. However, much like in research with the voluntary task 
switching paradigm, measures of the prediction or choice bias and 
subsequent performance rarely seem to correlate, as was also the case in the 
experiments reported in this dissertation. This suggests that prediction and 
performance measures ‘may index at least partly separable aspects of 
cognitive control’ (Yeung, 2010, p. 361). The lack of robust individual 
difference correlations might be related to a huge variation in strategies that 
participants can apply in the prediction task. Better insights in these 
strategies, or in the contextual manipulations that may influence these, could 
boost our understanding of prediction-driven control adjustments. 
However, one can also question the ecological validity of this 
manipulation. In everyday life, we are usually not asked to explicitly 
generate predictions about what is going to happen next. Similarly, inserting 
these predictions as a second task into a normal Stroop or task switching 
procedure might have introduced a procedural change that hampers 
comparison with other research in these paradigms. This also touches upon 
one question about the role of expectancy in control that remained 
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unresolved in this thesis: to what extent will participants in experimental 
tasks generate predictions when they are not explicitly asked to. One way of 
quantifying these sorts of implicit expectancies is by looking for EEG 
components that are known to be sensitive to expectancy violation (e.g., the 
P3; Donchin & Coles, 1988; Verleger, 1988; Sommer, Matt, & Leuthold, 
1990) and relate these to known markers of conflict control (the N450 and 
conflict slow potential), without intervening predictions. 
In sum, intriguing avenues for further research are plenty. In line with 
the hot hand fallacy, I predict more nice things to come from these. 
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NEDERLANDSTALIGE SAMENVATTING 
 
COGNITIEVE CONTROLE 
In onze huidige samenleving worden we dagelijks gebombardeerd 
door een niet aflatende stroom aan verleidingen waaraan we dienen te 
weerstaan. Sociale netwerk- en andere entertainmentsites eisen continu onze 
aandacht op, zelfs tijdens de werkuren, en voor onze favoriete snack hoeven 
we, bij wijze van spreken, gewoon de hoek om lopen. Hierdoor wordt het 
meer dan ooit noodzakelijk om ons gedrag en onze aandacht in goeie banen 
te leiden om aan onze plannen en intenties te voldoen. Norman en Shallice 
(1980) identificeerden enkele situaties die de noodzaak voor dergelijke 
cognitieve controleprocessen sterk oproepen, waaronder die situaties waarbij 
oude, automatische gedragingen dienen overschreven te worden, of nieuwe 
of nog niet sterk geoefende gedragingen dienen aangeleerd te worden. In dit 
soort situaties dienen vaak routineuze gedragingen onderdrukt te worden, en 
de aandacht naar specifieke omgevingsfactoren gericht te worden. Hier kan 
men zich bijvoorbeeld de eerste autorijles voor de geest halen.  
Het nut van dit soort controleprocessen wordt het meest duidelijk 
wanneer die verstoord worden door neurologische schade. Patiënten met 
ernstige schade aan de frontale cortex, het hersengebied dat geassocieerd 
wordt met cognitieve controle, vertonen dan ook duidelijke moeilijkheden 
met plannen, of met het onderdrukken van routineuze handelingen. Zo kan 
bij sommige patiënten het zien van een tandenborstel automatisch de 
handeling ‘tanden poetsen’ oproepen, ook al bevindt die patiënt zich in een 
situatie waarin het helemaal niet nodig of zelfs niet gepast is om over te gaan 
tot het poetsen van de tanden (Lhermitte, 1983). Hoewel deze 
patiëntenstudies interessante inzichten boden in de rol van de prefrontale 
cortex, focuste het onderzoek rond cognitieve controle zich op het 
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bestuderen van (de neurale correlaten van) aandacht, responsinhibitie en 
taakafwisseling in gecontroleerde experimenten op gezonde vrijwilligers. 
PARADIGMA’S VAN COGNITIEVE CONTROLE 
Om de mate waarin mensen weten te weerstaan aan verleidingen of 
erin slagen routineuze responsen te onderdrukken ten voordele van minder 
automatische handelingen te onderzoeken, wordt in de experimentele 
psychologie vaak beroep gedaan op zogeheten conflict- of congruentietaken. 
In dit soort taken wordt de mate van overlap tussen de relevante 
stimulusdimensie, de irrelevante stimulusdimensie en de responsdimensie 
gemanipuleerd om ‘conflict’ te induceren (Kornblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 
1990). Meest bekende voorbeeld van dit soort taken is de Strooptaak 
(Stroop, 1935), waarbij proefpersonen gevraagd worden om zo snel mogelijk 
de kleur van een kleurwoord te benoemen. De overlap tussen de relevante 
kleurdimensie en de irrelevante woorddimensie wordt gemanipuleerd om 
tegenstrijdige responstendensen te induceren. Aangezien lezen een sterk 
automatisch proces is, zijn cognitieve controleprocessen nodig om de taak in 
overeenkomst met de instructies vlot en juist uit te voeren. Fluctuatie in het 
verschil in reactietijden en nauwkeurigheid tussen incongruente (vb., 
‘ROOD’ in het blauw) en congruente (vb., ‘ROOD’ in het rood) trials – het 
zogeheten congruentie-effect, werd als maat van cognitieve controle gebruikt 
doorheen deze thesis.  
Waar congruentietaken vooral selectieve aandacht en inhibitie meten, 
worden taakafwisselingsparadigma’s aangewend om licht te werpen op hoe 
mensen flexibel kunnen wisselen tussen cognitieve taken. Hierbij moet de 
automatische tendens om telkens dezelfde taak te herhalen overwonnen 
worden (zie Kiesel et al., 2010, voor een review). Wanneer twee of meer 
verschillende taken dienen uitgevoerd te worden op eenzelfde stimulus, is 
cognitieve controle nodig om de verschillende taaksets actief te houden en 
een voorheen toegepaste taakset te inhiberen. Het wisselen tussen twee taken 
kost tijd, en gaat vaak gepaard met fouten. De wisselkost, het verschil in 
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reactietijden en nauwkeurigheid tussen trials waarop proefpersonen dienen te 
wisselen van taak en trials waarop dezelfde taak herhaald dient te worden, 
werd als maat van cognitieve controle beschouwd in Hoofdstuk 4.  
SEQUENTIËLE CONGRUENTIE-EFFECTEN 
Zoals hierboven werd aangegeven, worden fluctuaties in de grootte 
van het congruentie-effect verondersteld aanpassingen in cognitieve controle 
te weerspiegelen. Het sequentieel congruentie-effect (SCE; ook vaak 
conflictadaptatie of Grattoneffect genoemd), de bevinding dat het 
congruentie-effect sterk verkleint na een incongruente stimulus, inspireerde 
een overvloed aan empirisch en theoretisch werk. Dit effect vormt het 
empirische hart van de invloedrijke conflict-monitoring theorie (CMT; 
Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), die de theorievorming 
rond cognitieve controle sterk domineerde. Deze theorie stelt een regulatie 
van de aandachtscontrole voorop, waarbij gedrag op een schijnbaar 
automatische manier wordt gecorrigeerd of geoptimaliseerd aan de 
omgeving.  Binnen dit theoretische kader, wordt het SCE verondersteld een 
conflictgeïnduceerde vernauwing van de aandachtsfocus te weerspiegelen, 
die ervoor zorgt dat het gedrag meer in overeenstemming komt met de 
opgelegde taakinstructies. De CMT stelt dat de verwerkingsstroom continu 
gemonitord wordt op de aanwezigheid van conflict. Conflict duidt in deze 
context op incompatibele neurale representaties. In de Strooptaak, 
bijvoorbeeld, induceert de incompatibiliteit tussen de kleur en de betekenis 
van een kleurwoord een dergelijk conflict. Na detectie van conflict, waar de 
anterieure cingulate cortex voor instaat (Jones, Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & 
Braver, 2002), wordt cognitieve controle verhoogd, waardoor de impact van 
een volgend conflict gemilderd wordt.  
In dit opzicht, reflecteert het SCE aldus een automatische, reactieve 
adaptatie aan cognitief conflict: na een incongruente trial, wordt de impact 
van een volgende incongruente trial gereduceerd, weerspiegeld in een 
kleiner congruentie-effect. Deze dominante interpretatie van het SCE werd 
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in vraag gesteld door de kenmerkintegratietheorie (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 
2004). Volgens deze theorie reflecteert het SCE geen aanpassingen in 
cognitieve controle, maar veeleer meer basale episodische 
geheugenprocessen, waarbij geheugensporen van relevante en irrelevante 
kenmerken de verwerking van een volgende trial bespoedigen dan wel 
verhinderen. Een hele reeks studies werd opgezet om het aandeel van 
cognitieve controle te bepalen wanneer gecontroleerd werd voor allerhande 
kenmerkherhalingen in de overgang van de ene trial op de andere. 
Daarnaast werd een debat gevoerd binnen de notie dat het SCE 
aandachtscontrole weerspiegeld. De verklaring die oorspronkelijk gegeven 
werd door Gratton, Coles, & Donchin (1992) deed beroep op strategische 
aandachtsaanpassingen gebaseerd op de verwachtingen van de 
proefpersonen omtrent de volgende trial, onafhankelijk van conflict op de 
vorige trial. Deze auteurs stelden daarnaast de assumptie voorop dat 
proefpersonen een bias vertonen om gelijkaardige condities te verwachten 
over verschillende trials heen. Evidentie voor deze verwachtingsverklaring is 
evenwel schaars. Toch lijkt het intuïtief plausibel dat gedrag en aandacht ook 
proactief gecontroleerd en gestuurd kunnen worden, in plaats van of 
aanvullend op de reactieve gedragsaanpassingen vooropgesteld door de 
CMT.  
 REACTIEVE VERSUS PROACTIEVE COGNITIEVE CONTROLE 
Na verloop van tijd en mits enige oefening, lijkt zo goed als alle 
gedrag moeiteloos en vlot te lopen, schijnbaar zonder veel intentionele 
controle: Wanneer een spits in volle snelheid op het doel afstormt, hoeft die 
gelukkig zijn bewegingen niet langer nauwkeurig te plannen. Ook hoeven 
we tijdens de fietstocht van thuis richting werk niet keer op keer ons hoofd te 
breken op de te volgen route: zonder veel nadenken gaan we op weg. Totdat 
plots onverwacht een verstrooide voetganger voor onze fiets opduikt, en we 
maar nipt op tijd de rem kunnen indrukken. Voor de rest van de trip zullen 
we geconcentreerder op de omgeving letten, om gelijkaardige situaties te 
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vermijden. Dit soort reactieve controleaanpassingen treden vaak snel in actie 
wanneer het nodig is; ze impliceren een actieve monitor die het gedrag stuurt 
en aanpast wanneer nodig. Wanneer het licht op rood springt, kunnen we 
meestal tijdig vertragen. We zijn evenwel ook in staat om actief het groene 
licht te anticiperen en ons klaar te stomen om sneller dan de omstaande 
auto’s uit de startblokken te schieten. Proactieve controleaanpassingen 
kunnen aldus ook aangewend worden om onze plannen of intenties te 
verwezenlijken.   
SELECTIEVE AANDACHT 
In navolging van de CMT, werd het merendeel van het onderzoek naar 
selectieve aandachtsmodulatie binnen het reactieve denkkader van 
conflictadaptatie geplaatst. Niet enkel gedrags-, maar ook EEG- en fMRI-
studies werden opgezet om de feedbackloop van conflictdetectie en -
resolutie in kaart te brengen. Het model werd verder uitgewerkt met de 
toevoeging van een neurologisch plausibel stimulus-respons leeralgoritme 
gedreven door de neurotransmitter noradrenaline (adaptatie-door-binding 
model; Verguts & Notebaert, 2008; 2009) dat specifieerde hoe het cognitieve 
systeem weet wanneer en waar controle dient verhoogd te worden.  
Desondanks is er ook evidentie voorhanden dat dit soort 
aandachtsaanpassingen proactief kan worden gestuurd, uitgaand van 
verwachtingen over of anticipatie op toekomstige gebeurtenissen. Dit soort 
verwachtingen kan enerzijds impliciet gemanipuleerd worden, door 
bijvoorbeeld de proportie van congruente/incongruentet trials te verhogen 
(Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; 1982; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992). In 
blokken met een verhoogd aantal incongruente trials wordt typisch een 
gereduceerd congruentie-effect gevonden. Deze adaptatie aan frequent 
conflict werd geïnterpreteerd als een bewust strategische aanpassing in de 
controlesettings, gebaseerd op verwachtingen omtrent de probabiliteit van 
nakend conflict, of de afwezigheid daarvan. Dit soort 
verwachtingsgebaseerde controle werd evenwel nog vaker onderzocht aan de 
van cueing paradigma’s, waarbij informatieve cues de proefpersonen 
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alarmeren welke controlesetting meest gepast is voor de daaropvolgende 
target (Aarts, Roelofs, & van Turennout, 2008; Aarts & Roelofs, 2011; 
Correa, Rao, & Nobre, 2009; Strack, Kaufmann, Kehrer, Brandt, & Stürmer, 
2013). Deze studies toonden overtuigend aan dat cues controleaanpassingen 
kunnen uitlokken, onafhankelijk van responsconflict. Het blijft evenwel 
onduidelijk in welke mate dit soort proactieve aanpassingen, net als conflict, 
de impact van de irrelevante dimensie gradueel kunnen uitfilteren en de 
focus op de relevante dimensie selectief kunnen verhogen (Aarts & Roelofs, 
2011), dan wel beperkt blijven tot het strategisch omkeren van de respons op 
basis van de irrelevante dimensie (Wühr & Kunde, 2008; Strack, Kaufmann, 
Kehrer, Brandt, & Stürmer, 2013). In deze thesis werd dan ook onderzocht 
in welke mate reactieve controle al dan niet een krachtiger mechanisme 
vormt dan proactieve controle om ons gedrag te optimaliseren. 
TAAKAFWISSELING 
Meer dan in het onderzoek rond selectieve aandacht, werd het 
onderzoek naar taakafwisseling getekend door een sterk proactieve 
component. De robuuste taakwisselkost die gepaard gaat met het wisselen 
tussen twee of meer cognitieve taken, geeft duidelijk aan dat conflict of 
interferentie van een voorgaande taak dient opgelost te worden, wil men 
successvol wisselen naar de andere taak. Wanneer proefpersonen een cue 
aangeboden krijgen die voorspelt welke taak dient uitgevoerd te worden, 
wordt de taakwisselkost sterk gereduceerd. Deze bevindingen wijzen erop 
dat proefpersonen in staat zijn zich proactief voor te bereiden op het 
wisselen (Koch, 2003) en herhalen (Dreisbach, Haider, & Kluwe, 2002) van 
taken. Desalniettemin speelt een reactieve component ook een sterke rol in 
vele taakwisselstudies: stimulusgedreven, associatieve effecten (e.g., binding 
tussen stimuli en taaksets) dragen bij tot de wisselkost (Waszak, Hommel, & 
Allport, 2003), en cueing voordelen kunnen deels toegeschreven worden aan 
het vlugger encoderen van de cue eerder dan het beter voorbereiden op een 
nieuwe taak (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; maar zie ook Brass & von Cramon, 
2004; De Baene & Brass, 2011). Los van deze overwegingen, lijkt de 
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robuuste bevinding van een residuele taakwisselkost aan te geven dat 
voorbereidende, proactieve processen gelimiteerd zijn (Allport, Styles, & 
Hsieh, 1994). Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Vandierendonck, & Demanet (2007) 
toonden evenwel aan dat een complete voorbereiding (en gerelateerde 
eliminatie van de residuele wisselkost) kan gevonden worden wanneer 
proefpersonen sterker gedwongen worden tot voorbereiden. Samengenomen, 
lijken taakwisselingsstudies te suggereren dat anticipatorische controle het 
cognitieve systeem optimaal kan configureren voor toekomstige 
gebeurtenissen.  
DE ROL VAN VERWACHTINGEN 
Zoals de hierboven geschetste korte review liet uitschijnen, berust het 
gros van de evidentie voor proactieve controle op studies die expliciete cues 
gebruikten. Hieruit bleek duidelijk dat proefpersonen zich (gedeeltelijk) 
kunnen voorbereiden op een toekomstig conflict of taakwissel. In welke 
mate proefpersonen zich laten leiden door verwachtingen wanneer dergelijke 
cues niet voorhanden zijn, blijft onontgonnen terrein. In deze thesis werd 
naar methodes gezocht om deze verwachtingen te sturen en in kaart te 
brengen, alsook hun impact op de verdere verwerking en aandachtscontrole 
nagegaan. Aan de hand van impliciete en expliciete 
verwachtingsmanipulaties werden proactieve en reactieve gedrags- en 
controleaanpassingen tegenover elkaar uitgespeeld.  
OVERZICHT VAN DE STUDIES 
Naast een algemene inleiding en discussie, werden in deze thesis vijf 
empirische hoofdstukken gebundeld. Deze hoofdstukken werden als aparte, 
op zichzelf staande wetenschappelijke papers opgesteld en ter review 
uitgestuurd. De eerste drie hoofdstukken zijn intussen gepubliceerd. 
Hoofdstuk 6 zit momenteel verwikkeld in het reviewproces. Het manuscript 
waarin de EEG-bevindingen uit Hoofdstuk 5 worden gerapporteerd, wordt in 
de nabije toekomst klaargestoomd om in te zenden. 
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In Hoofdstuk 2, werd een paradigma uitgewerkt dat beter toeliet om 
het aandeel van cognitieve controle in het sequentieel congruentie-effect 
(SCE) te evalueren, door te controleren voor alternatieve verklaringen in 
termen van kenmerkintegratie en facilitatie/interferentie door 
geheugensporen. Aan de hand van een 8-kleuren, pseudo-gerandomiseerde 
Strooptaak werden proactieve en reactieve verklaringen voor het SCE 
tegenover elkaar uitgespeeld. Hiertoe werd de verwachting rond de 
probabiliteit van opeenvolgende makkelijke/moeilijke trials gemanipuleerd 
en geverifieerd of dit het SCE al dan niet in de hand werkte. Daarnaast werd 
nagegaan of de geïnduceerde verwachtingsmanipulatie transfereerde naar 
een testfase, waarin de sequentiemanipulatie werd weggelaten. De resultaten 
van twee experimenten lieten zien dat het gedrag sterker bepaald werd door 
conflict (of de afwezigheid hiervan) in de recente trialhistorie dan door de 
globale verwachtingen. Dit suggereert dat fluctuerende cognitieve controle 
in congruentietaken meer gekenmerkt wordt door kortstondige, lokale, 
reactieve aanpassingen op conflict dan door proactieve, 
verwachtingsgebaseerde aandachtsmodulatie. 
In Hoofdstuk 3 werd de rol van verwachtingen in aandachtsmodulatie 
op een meer directe manier getest. Hiertoe werden proefpersonen expliciet 
gevraagd hun voorspelling omtrent de moeilijkheid van de volgende trial 
(congruent dan wel incongruent) aan te geven, en de impact van deze 
predictie op de daaropvolgende prestatie in de Strooptaak werd opgemeten. 
Het in kaart brengen van de verwachtingen leverde een extra voordeel op: 
analoog aan studies met het vrijwillige taakafwisselingsparadigma 
(Arrington & Logan, 2004), kunnen de keuzes van de proefpersonen als een 
extra meting van cognitieve controle beschouwd worden. Op basis van de 
theoretische opvattingen van Gratton, Coles, & Donchin (1992) kon 
voorspeld worden dat proefpersonen algemeen geneigd zijn om repetities 
van eenzelfde stimulusconditie te verwachten. Wanneer de predicties van de 
proefpersonen gerelateerd werden aan de gebeurtenis op de voorgaande trial, 
bleek inderdaad dat proefpersonen een algemene bias tot 
repetitieverwachting vertonen. Deze repetitiebias had ook een duidelijke 
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impact op een gekende cognitieve-controlemaat: enkel na een 
repetitiepredictie, vertoonden de proefpersonen een SCE, terwijl dit SCE 
volledig leek uit te blijven na alternatiepredicties. Deze bevindingen werden 
verklaard vanuit een interactie tussen conflictgedreven, reactieve 
controleprocessen en predictiegedreven, proactieve controleprocessen.  
In gelijke lijn met Hoofdstuk 3, werd in Hoofdstuk 4 het effect van 
expliciete taakpredicties op cognitieve controle nagegaan. De proefpersonen 
werden gevraagd flexibel te wisselen tussen twee eenvoudige cognitieve 
taken: ofwel moest het even dan wel oneven zijn van een cijfer beoordeeld 
worden, ofwel moest dat cijfer geclassificeerd worden als kleiner dan wel 
groter als vijf. Proefpersonen werden random onderverdeeld in drie condities 
die verschilden in de mate van effectief aangeboden taakwissels (variërend 
van 30% over 50% tot 70%). Ongeacht de predictie, bepaalde het kleur 
waarin het cijfer werd aangeboden welke van de twee taken de 
proefpersonen dienden uit te voeren. Uit de resultaten bleek dat de predicties 
van de proefpersonen mee varieerden met de gemanipuleerde probabiliteit 
van de taakwissels. Opvallend was echter dat in alle condities opnieuw een 
bias tot repetitieherhaling werd vastgesteld. Bovendien was die het meest 
uitgesproken in de conditie met de grootste kans op wissels. Daarnaast 
repliceerde de studie de bevinding van een sterk gereduceerde wisselkost bij 
een verhoogde kans op wissels (Mayr, 2006; Monsell & Mizon, 2006). Ook 
werd een mogelijke verklaring voor dit effect gevonden: ongeacht de 
conditie, bleek het verschil tussen taakwissels en –repetities sterk 
gereduceerd na een alternatiepredictie. Aangezien proefpersonen meer 
alternaties verwachtten in de conditie waarin veel gewisseld werd, kan de 
gereduceerde wisselkost gelinkt worden aan verwachtingen, en proactieve, 
voorbereidende processen.  
In Hoofdstuk 5 werd het effect van expliciete 
congruentievoorspellingen op conflictresolutie in de Strooptaak verder 
bestudeerd aan de hand van een analyse van het elektro-encefalogram 
(EEG). Deze techniek tracht de hersenactiviteit die geassocieerd is met een 
stimulus- of responsconditie in kaart te brengen. Zo kon worden nagegaan 
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hoe zowel verwachtingen als conflict gekende negatieve en positieve 
deflecties in het signaal moduleren. De contingente negatieve variatie 
(CNV), een trage golf in het EEG-signaal die gelinkt wordt aan actieve 
voorbereiding en aandachtscontrole (Brunia, 2004), bleek meer uitgesproken 
voor incongruente alternatiepredicties. Hieruit kon worden geconcludeerd 
dat proefpersonen effectief voorbereiden op een alternatietrial. Voorts bleek 
dat het SCE weerspiegeld werd in een vroege negatieve component van het 
EEG, de N450. De interactie tussen proactieve, verwachtingsgebaseerde 
controleprocessen en reactieve, conflictgeïnduceerde controleaanpassingen 
was aldus gereflecteerd in deze vroege component. Dit lijkt erop te wijzen 
dat reactief gestuurde woordonderdrukkingsprocessen proactief opgeheven 
kunen worden, weerspiegeld in snellere reacties op congruente trials na een 
conflict op de voorgaande trials.  
In Hoofdstuk 6, ten slotte, werd onderzocht in welke mate proactieve 
controle baat heeft bij a priori informatie omtrent wanneer een stimulus 
aangeboden wordt, eerder dan welk soort stimulus precies verwacht wordt. 
Hiertoe werd het respons-stimulus-interval (RSI), de tijd tussen de respons 
op de voorgaande trial en de stimulus op de volgende trial, gemanipuleerd. 
Uit voorgaand onderzoek was gebleken dat het SCE sterk uitdoofde 
naargelang het RSI groter werd (Egner, Ely, & Grinband, 2010). Dit werd 
geïnterpreteerd als evidentie voor de kortstondige, reactieve aard van dit 
effect. In een eerste experiment werden de bevindingen van Egner en 
collega’s gerepliceerd met een beperktere subset aan RSI’s. In een tweede 
experiment werd de proportie van trials met een langere RSI selectief 
verhoogd, waardoor proefpersonen geïnduceerd werden de stimulus pas na 
verloop van tijd te verwachten. Uit de resultaten bleek dat, in tegenstelling 
tot het vorige experiment, robuuste SCE’s teruggevonden worden op deze 
latere RSI’s. Dit geeft aan dat proefpersonen wel degelijk proactief 
cognitieve controle kunnen hoog houden in meer gunstige omstandigheden 
en/of wanneer de wil om controle hoog te houden vergroot wordt. 
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BESLUIT 
Deze thesis had als doel de rol van verwachtingen in 
aandachtscontrole grondig onder de loep te nemen. Op basis van de 
hierboven beschreven studies, kan besloten worden dat verwachtingen 
slechts een beperkte impact hebben op typische maten van cognitieve 
controle onder ‘normale’ taakomstandigheden. Wanneer deze verwachtingen 
niet expliciet gemanipuleerd werden, bleken fluctuaties in cognitieve 
controle beter gevat door een puur reactief controlemechanisme, dat de 
aandacht scherper stelde in reactie op recent conflict. Anders gesteld, kunnen 
we in de meeste gevallen vertrouwen op ons reactief controlesysteem, dat 
bijstuurt wanneer de nood het hoogst is. Dit lijkt evenwel adaptief, gezien 
een continue voorbereiding op mogelijke onverwachte gebeurtenissen als erg 
cognitief inspannend kan geacht worden, en de kracht van dit proactieve 
systeem duidelijk beperkt is gebleken. Bovendien werd keer op keer 
vastgesteld dat mensen hun verwachtingen laten leiden door heuristieken. De 
bias om meer van hetzelfde te verwachten, kan in dit opzicht evenwel ook 
gezien worden als een adaptieve heuristiek: in het dagelijkste leven is er 
immers een veel sterkere correlatie tussen opeenvolgende gebeurtenissen 
dan in de meeste artificiële laboratoriumtaken. Daarnaast bleken expliciete 
predicties omtrent de moeilijkheid of de gevraagde taak op de volgende trial 
wel een effect te sorteren op de verwerking. De taakwisselkost werd effectief 
gereduceerd wanneer hierop geanticipeerd was. Na alternatiepredicties bleek 
ook de verwerking van een Stroopstimulus meer gecontroleerd. Toch kon 
ook telkens een reactieve component vastgesteld worden. Dit laat opnieuw 
zien dat proactieve controle een grotere inspanning vereist, en daarom 
minder consistent teruggevonden wordt. Manipulaties die dergelijke 
inspanningen selectief belonen, vormen een interessante piste om proactieve 
cognitieve controle verder te bestuderen. 
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